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Highly indebted countries are probably better off raising con-
ventional taxes and cutting current spending - rather than
raising taxes on financial intermnediation  and cutting public
investment.  But shifting policies may require the breathing
space only new external financing or debt relief would provide.
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To study the adjustment to the debt crisis, the  The crisis countries would probably have
author compared the experience of seven  been better off raising conventional taxes and
"crisis" debtor countries (Argentina, Brazil,  cutting current spending rather than raising taxes
Chile, Mexico, Morocco, Yugoslavia, and the  on financial intermediation and cutting public
Philippines) with those of five "noncrisis"  investment.
debtor countries (Colombia, Indonesia, Korea,
Turkey, and Thailand).  Small increases in rates or coverage of
broad-based  Axes  (such as income or consump-
In response to a sharp reduction in external  tion) are probably less distortionary for the same
capital flows, the crisis countries rescheduled  amount of additional revenue than taxes on
their debt during 1982-87. The noncrisis group  financial intermediation.  Conventional broad-
avoided debt rescheduling during that period and  based taxes penalize mainly consumption. The
maintained access to extemal capital.  tax on financial intermediation falls more on
investment and may cause more severe damage
Most of the noncrisis countries followed an  in the long run.
approach of modest domestic financing at
market interest rates. This was less costly for  In a situation that called for quick action, the
p,ivate investment because financial savings  behavior of the crisis countries was understand-
grew rapidly.  able. It takes more time to raise conventional
taxes than to tax financial balances, and it takes
In the crisis countries, public investment  more time (because it is harder) to cut current
was the locus of fiscal adjustment.  Most of the  spending than to cut public investment.
crisis countries took the approach of increased
domestic financing through taxes on financial  Shifting to sounder policies in the crisis
intermediation - through reserve requirements,  countries may require the breathing space only
high inflation, and interest rate controls. In the  new extemal financing or relief from debt
short run, this tax precipitated capital flight and  service would provide.
financial disintermediation.
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The sharp  reduction  in  external  financing  to  most  high-debt  countries
in the  1980.  forced  major  adjustments  in  macro  policy,  especially  in the
management  of fiscal  deficits. The  debt  crisis  itself  initially  worsened  public
finances,  since  the  governments  of  debtor  countries  often  felt  compelled  to
assume  external  liabilities  of the  private  sector  and  financial  system. At the
same  time,  the  near-termination  of  external  capital  flows  required  an  increase
in  internal  finance  of  public  deficits.  The  result  in  most  high-debt  countries
was increased  inflation,  output  stagnation,  and  falling  private  investment.  By
contrast,  some  high-debt  countries  avoided  a drastic  decline  in their  capital
inflows  and  did  not  have  to reduce  public  deficits  as sharply  or increase
reliance  on internal  financing. The  outcome  w&s  much  more favorable  in  these
countries,  with steady  growth.  low  and  stable  inflation,  and  healthy  private
investment.
In  order  to study  the  nature  of adjustment  to the  debt  crisis,  this
paper  focuses  on a group  of seven  debtor  countries  that  experienced  a sharp
reduction  in external  capital  flows  and rescheduled  their  debt  in the  period
198i-87: Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Mexico,  Morocco,  the  Philippines,  and
Yugoslavia. The  study  contrasts  a group  of five  countries  that  avoided
reschcduling  over  1982-87  and  maintained  access  to external  capital: Colombia,
Indonesia,  Korea,  Turkey,  and  Thailand. The  former  group  of countries  will be
referred  to  as *crisis  countries,  and  the  latter  as 'non-crisis  countries'.
The  purpose  of discriminating  between  the  two  groups  is to show  the
adverse  consequences  of the  cutoff  in external  financing  to the  'crisis'  group
and  the  resulting  policy  response. The  combination  of a  more favorable  external
environment  and  wiser  policy  choices  made for  better  performance  in the 'non-
crisis'  group. The  study  will  not examine  the  origins  of the  debt  crisis  itself
or how  the  countries  came  to be in  one  group  or the  other. The  debt  crisis  was-2-
clearly  an endogenous  phenomenon  --  and  one  that  had  a lot  to do  with fiscal
policy. However,  the  origins  of the  debt  urisis  have  already  been  analyzed  in
many other  places  (see  for  example,  Barandiaran  (1988),  Sachs  (1985),  Berg  and
Sachs  (1988),  Cuddington  (1988)),  and so  will be treated  as  an exogenous  event
in this  paper.
The  use  of rescheduling  as a discriminator  is  far  from  ideal,  since  it
refers  only  to  a short  period  and  thus  does  not  capture  problems  which  may  not
have become  evident  during  this  period. The  distinction  between  rescheduling
and Ivoluntary'  refinancing  may also  be  more  of form  than  of substance  in some
cases. Turkey  and  Coiombia  are  borderline  cases  in  this  regard,  both  because
they  may yet  reschedule  and  because  their  refinancing  operations  may  have
contained  an element  of  official  intervention.  However,  the  rescheduling
criterion  at least  has the  advantage  of being  objective,  in contrast  to the
Judgmental  assignment  of countries  to 'success and "failure'  groups  by the
researcher.
The  specification  of two  contrasting  groups  of countries  also  must
allow  for  substantial  differences  among  countries  within  each  group.  This  is
particularly  evident  in  the  varying  policy  responses  in the 'crisis'  group  --
ranging  from  failed  adjustment  efforts  in  Argentina  to impressive  adjustment  in
Chile  --  and  in the  incomplete  adjustment  of Turkey  in the  'non-crisis,  group.
However,  the similarity  of external  conditions  faced  within  each  group  justify
also considering  the  group  as a  whole.
The  central  role  of fiscal  deficits  and  their  financing  has recently
received  increased  attention  in the  voluminous  literature  on the  adjustment  to  -
the  debt  crisis. The framework  linking  public  deficits,  the  decline  in external
financing,  and  inflation  has  been  set  out in  Van  Wijnbergen  et.  al. (1988)  and
Buiter  (1988). The  risk  of an internal  public  debt  t.ap  and  need for  eventual
monetization  has  been  analyzed  in  Morley  and  Fishlow  (1987),  with the  classic-3-
result  on  monetization  of internal  debt  coming  from  Sargent  and  Wallace  (1984).
Reisen  and  Van Trotsenburg  (1988)  contains  a comparative  analysis  of internal
public  financing  in debtor  countries  and  its  macroeconomic  implications.
Cardoso  and  Dornbusch  (1987)  and  Dornbusch  (1988)  have  analyses  of the  internal
and  external  debt  dynamics  in  Brazil  and  Mexico,  respectively.  Kiguel  (1988)
has a trenchant  analysis  of the  role  of excessive  public  financing  requirements
in the  failure  of the  Austral  Plan  in  Argentina.
Many  of the  general  surveys  of adjustment  to the  debt  crisis  also  give
a central  place  to fiscal  policy. Selowsky  and  Larrain  (1988)  show  the
importance  of public  sector  behavior  in the  debt  crisis  and  subsequent
adjustment  in  Latin  America. Barandiaran  (1988),  Cline (1987),  and  Edwards  and
Larrain  (1988)  also feature  inadequate  fiscal  adjustment  as one  of the  main
culprits  in the  disappointing  macroeconomic  outcomes  in  Latin  America.
This  paper  will seek  to contribute  to this  literature  through
refinement  of the  theoretical  framework  and  through  detailed  empirical  results.
The  paper  will examine  first  the  nature  of changes  in  external  debt  flows,  which
will show  how the  external  debt  crisis  contributed  to  a parallel  fiscal  crisis
in the  crisis  countries  but  not in the  non-crisis  countries. The  specific  kind
of fiscal  adjustment  undertaken  is discussed  in the  following  section. The
adjustment  efforts  were concentrated  on public  investment  in  the  crisis
countries,  while  the  non-crisis  countries  maintained  stable  levels  of  most
fiscal  aggregates.  A resource  surplus  was generated  in tne  crisis  countries
through  the  investment-led  contraction  of absorption,  even  though  overall
production  was stagnant. By contrast  the  non-crisis  countries  had obtained  a
resource  surplus  by the  end  of the  period  through  healthy  growth  of both
production  and  absorption.  The  Gverall  amount  of fiscal  adjustment  was less
than  the  decline  in  external  financing  in  the  crisis  countries,  so that  they  had
to recur  increasingly  to domestic  financing.-4-
The  next section  discusses  the  macroeconomic  implications  of the
increased  reliance  on  domestic  financing  of  public  deficits,  including  the
significance  of domestic  versus  external  finance  and  the  different  types  of
domestic  finance.  A simple  theoretical  model  relates  the  means  of domestic
financing  to the  behavior  of interest  rates  and  inflation. The  final  section  of
the  paper  presents  empirical  data  on the  means  of domestic  financing  utilized  in
the  sample  countries  and  on levels  of interest  rates  and inflation. It shows
that  the  crisis  countries  relied  heavily  on implicit  taxes  on financial
intermediation  to domestically  finance  their  deficits,  which  explains  the  poor
performance  of  private  investment  and  inflation. The  non-crisis  countries
largely  eschewed  taxes  on financial  intermediation  for  domestic  borrowing  at
market  rates,  with successful  results. The  policy  conclusions  are  that  larger
deficit  reductions  --  preferably  implemented  through  tax  reform  and  reduction  of
current  expenditures  --  and  less  distortionary  means  of financing  would  lead  to
improved  outcomes  in  the  crisis  countries.
Il.  Changes  in  external  debt  flows
The  hallmark  of the  external  debt  crisis  was a sharp  reduction  in
external  debt  flows  to the  crisis  countries.  As Table  1 shows,  the  net flow  of
public  external  debt  to the  crisis  countries  reached  a  peak  of 3.8  percent  of
GNP in  1982  and  then  declined  to 0.8  percent  of  GNP in 1986. The reduction  in
private  long-term  debt flows  began  after  1981,  when it reached  a peak  of 2.3
percent  of GNP.  By 1986,  there  was a small  negative  flow  of external  long-term
debt  to the  private  sector  in  the  crisis  countries. (See  Appendix  I for  data  on
individual  countries.)
The  data in  Table  1  also  indicate  that  the  public  sector  assumed  part
of the  private  external  debt.  The  increase  in  public  external  debt  is
considerably  greater  than  the  net  flow  of new lending  (both  measured  in  dollars
as a  percentage  of GNP in  dollars). Revaluation  of debt  in  non-dollar-5-
Table 1
EXTERNAL  OEBT  FLOWS
(Percont  f  ONP)
1980  s91  1982  1988  1984  1985  1986
PUBUC  LONG-TERM  DEBT:  I
CRISIS COUNTRIES
Change  2.  1  2.4  3.8  6.1  4.1  4.4  4.4
Not flowe  2.n  2.8  3.8  2.9  2.4  1.8  0.8
Rovelustion  -0.1  -0.4  -0.a  -0.4  -0.6  1.2  1.3
Residuel  0.1  -0. 1  0.3  68  2.2  2.0  2.4
NON-CRISIS  COUNTRIES  I
Chongp  8.9  2.0  2.6  2.5  2.1  4.9  4.3
Net  flo"  I  2.8  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.5  1.3
Revaluation  I  0.0  -0.8  -0.6  -0.5  -0.8  2.0  2.7
Residual  I  1.1  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.4  0.2
~~~~~~-----------------------  ----- 5--------
PRIVATE  LONG-TERM  DEBT:
CRISIS  COUNTRIES
Change  NA  2.3  0.1  0.5  -0.7  -2.2  -1. 
No  t I  oe  1.1  2.2  0.6  -0.8  -0.2  -0.  -0.2
Revaluation  I  0.2  -0.  1  -0.2  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.2
Residual  I  NA  0.2  -0.3  0.4  -0.8  -2.2  -1.3
NON-CRISIS  COUNTRIES  I
Change  NA  0.7  0.1  0.7  0.6  0.4  -0.4
Net flom  1  0.5  0.7  0.1  0.7  0.7  0.4  -0.4
Revaluation  l  0.1  -0.1  -0.1  0.2  0.3  0.6  0.6
Residual  l  NA  0.0  0.1  -0.2  -0.4  -0.6  -0.6
- ---.--.-  I.---  ---- - --------------- …-…----------
SHORT-TERM  DEBT:  I
CRISIS  COUNTRIES  I
Change  NA  2.3  1.4  -6.2  -1.2  -0.9  -1.0
Revaluation  I  0.2  -0.1  -0.2  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1
Effective  Change  K  NA  2.5  1.6  -6.5  -1.4  -1.1  -1.2
NON-CRISIS  COUNTRIES  |
Chone  K  NA  0.8  1.3  0.2  0.3  0.2  -0.1
Revaluation  0.3  -0.1  -0.2  0.4  0.4  C.7  1.0
Effective  Chnge  NA  0.4  1.6  -0.8-  -0.1  -0.5  -1.0
Source:  World DObt  Tables,  1987-86 edition.  Estimates of  revaluation  by IEC  Debt Division.
Private  and short-term  ostimtes  assum an  identical  currency composition to  the
public  debt.  For country  breakdown,  s*e Appendix I.-6-
currencies  explains  part  of this  difference  in  1985-86,  but  this  was  not  a
factor  in 1983-84. The residual  --  the  difference  between  the  net flow  (plus
revaluation)  and  the  increase  in  debt  --  reaches  5.6  percent  of GNP in  1983  and
is over  2 percent  of GNP  in 1984-86. The  private  sector  data  display  a
complementary  negative  residual  beginning  in 1984  --  the  reduction  in  the
private  external  debt  is  not fully  explained  by the  negative  flow  of new lending
minus  amortization,  plus  revaluation  (a  positive  factor  in 1984-86). The  data
on short-term  debt  complete  the  picture. In  1983,  the  effective  reduction  in
short-term  debt (excluding  revaluation)  amounted  to  over  6 percent  of GNP,
continuing  at over  one  percent  of GNP in  1984-86.  The  data thus  imply  that  there
was a conversion  of short-term  debt (both  public  and  private)  into  public  long-
term  debt in 1983  --  and  to a lesser  extent,  into  private  long-term  debt.
Beginning  in 1984,  there  was a conversion  of private  long-term  debt  into  public
debt.  In  most countries,  this  was done  through  a program  which  exchanged  the
private  external  liability  for  a  domestic  currency  liability  to the  public
sector. This  domestic  debt  in  many  cases  was  not serviced,  or carried  negative
real  interest  rates. The  public  sector  thus  had to absorb  a  double  shock  --  the
reduction  of  net flows  of new  finance  and  the  need  to finance  the  servicing  of
newly  acquired  short-term  debt  and  private  long-term  debt.
In contrast,  the  flow  of  net external  finance  to the  public  sector  in
the  non-crisis  countries  was steady  until  1986. The  flow  to the  private  sector
is  modest  but  stable. Short-term  debt  also  does  not show  any  marked
fluctuations.  There  is  no evide-nce  of as&umption  by the  public  sector  of
private  sector  debt.  Thus  the  public  sector  in these  countries  was able  to
avoid  the  double  shock  that  bedeviled  governments  in  crisis  countries.-7-
III.  Fiscal  adjustment  during  the  1980s
This section  analyzes  the fiscal  adjustment  undertaken  in  high-debt
countries  after  the  outbreak  of the  debt  crisis.  This  paper  takes  the  approach
of using  only  consolidated  public  sector  data,  refraining  from  any conclusions
where such data  is  not available. This  will leave  gaps in the  analysis,  but
this  is preferable  to the  use of  misleading  central  or general  government  data.
Although  central  government  data  is  more  widely  available  for  most countries,  it
is inadequate  to address  fiscal  adjustment,  in  which public  enterprises  usually
figure  prominently.l/
A.  Changes  in fiscal  aggregates
The reduction  of  net capital  flows  and  the assumption  of  private
external  debt forced  the  crisis  countries  to  make adjustments  in  their  public
expenditures,  revenues,  and  overall  deficits.  Table  2 shows  the  behavior  of
consolidated  public  sector  deficits  in  the sample  countries. In several
countries  --  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  and  Yugoslavia  --  the debt  crisis
initially  caused  an increase  in  the  public  deficit. After 1982  most of the
crisis  countries  achieved  reductions  in  their  deficits,  especially  when they  are
measured  in  operational  terms. Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico,  and the Philippines
had  particularly  sizable  cuts in  the  early  stage  of the  adjustment. However,
all of these  countries  except  the  Philippines  later  experienced  retrogression.
Chile  had  a lesser  fiscal  deficit  and  achieved  more  permanent  adjustment  in  the
conventional  fiscal  accounts  but experienced  high  central  bank losses.
Yugoslavia  also  had a  major fiscal  problem  because  of central  bank losses.
Morocco  postponed  most  of its  adjustment  till  1986-87. As reflected  in the
total  public  deficit,  the  degree  of fiscal  adjustment  in  the  crisis  countries  is
modest.
1/  Indonesia  is  excluded  from  this  part  of the  analysis  on this  criterion,
since  data  on public  enterprises  arc not  available.-8-
Table  2
PUBLIC  SECTOR  DEFICITS:
PUBLIC SECTOR  BORROWING  REQUIREMENT,  OPERATIONAL,  AND  PRIMARY  DEFICITS
PUBLIC  SECTOR  BORROWING  REQUIREMENT  1979  1030  1i11  1982  1988  1984  1086  1988  1987
(Percent  of  C)  (positive  Indicates  deficit) e-------------------------e------------------------e-------------------------------------
CRISIS COUNTRIES
Argentina-PSOR  6.5  7.6  13.8  15.1  16.1  12.6  6.1  4.3  7.5
-mnel.  ceontrol  bank  losse  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  16.1  6.3  6.9  11.8
Brazil-PSBR  NA  NA  12.6  16.0  18.6  28.8  27.5  10.8  NA
-operational  NA  NA  5.2  7.0  8.6  2.7  4.3  3.7  6.6
Chi l-PSR  -5.0  -5.6  -0.6  8.4  3.0  4.4  2.6  1.9  0.4
-Incl.  central  bank  loos.  NA  41.6  -2.3  2.9  9.4  10.8  15.2  11.4  NA
iexico-PS9R  7.4  7.6  14.1  16.9  8.5  7.1  9.6  15.6  16.2
-operatlonal  NA  6.2  11.3  7.2  -1.2  -1.0  3.5  S.8  -6.4
Morocco  NA  NA  :8.6  9.0  10.6  9.8  8.2  4.4  3.8
Philippines  NA  NA  7.6  6.5  6.2  3.3  2.1  1.6  1.9
-!nl.  financial  loses  NA  NA  NA  NA  8.9  8.4  6.4  6.4  3.2
Yugo.lavia-PSB  -0.1  0.6  -0.6  -0.5  -0.8  -0.3  -0.3  0.0  NA
-inei.  national  bank  lonas  2.2  6.1  2.1  8.8  18.4  13.2  13.6  11.5  NA
NON-CRISIS  COUNTRIES
Colombia  0.2  2.8  5.2  6.0  7.6  6.?  3.6  -0.2  1.6
Kore.  NA  NA  NA  7.8  3.8  3.9  3.9  0.3  NA
Thai  land  5.6  7.8  6.5  7.8  5.6  4.3  7.0  4.7  2.6
Turkey  NA  NA  8.2  4.0  6.7  6.6  4.7  4.5  8.3
PRIMARY  DEFICIT  1979  1960  1981  1982  1983  1984  1986  1986  1987
(Porcent  of  GOP)  (potit1o  indicates  deficit)
CRISIS COUNTRIES
Arentino  3.4  4.1  6.9  4.8  10.1  7.7  0.6  0.6  3.6
Brazil  NA  NA  1.6  2.1  -2.8  -3.6  -2.4  -0.6  NA
Chile  .4.2  4.4  -1.2  2.9  1.2  2.0  -0.6  -0.6  -2.6
Mexico  4.0  4.1  9.1  6.7  -3.9  -4.6  -2.4  -0.9  -4.3
Morocco  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Philippines  NA  NA  6.7  5.5  4.9  1.4  -0.3  -2.8  -7.2
Yugoslavia  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
NON-CRISIS  COUNTRIES
Colombia  -1.1  1.1  3.8  4.2  6.6  3.9  0.7  -3.2  -2.2
Koro  aNA  NA  NA  5.9  2.3  2.6  2.4  -1.0  NA
Thniland  4.2  6.4  4.7  E.8  3.2  1.8  4.0  NA  NA
Turkey  NA  NA  -1.0  2.9  -0.7  4.0  -1.3  -1.0  NA
Sources  ore  given  in  Appendix  IV.The  non-crisis  countries  also  show  some  decline  in public  deficits
after  1982,  although  it  is  more gradual  and  begins  from  a slightly  lower  level.
Korea  eliminated  its  deficit  by 1986,  while  Colombia  and  Thailand  continue  to
show  moderate  deficits. The  only  exception  to the  fiscal  improvement  is  Turkey
whose  deficit  failed  to improve  over  1983-86,  the;n  increased  in 1987.
The improvement  in  the  primary  deficit  (the  total  deficit  excluding
interest  payments)  is  more  pronounced  than  the  overall  fiscal  adjustment  in  the
crisis  countries. Brazil,  Chile,  Mexico,  and  the  Philippines  achieved  primary
surpluses  after  1982.  In  Mexico  and  the  Philippines,  the  degree  of adjustment
in the  primary  balance  was particularly  noteworthy  --  a change  of 13  percentage
points  of  GDP from  1982  to 1987.  In  the  non-crisis  countries,  the  improvement
in the  primary  deficit  was  more  modest,  although  again  the  level  was lower  to
begin  with.  Korea,  Colombia  and  Turkey  achieved  primary  surpluses  by 1986.
Losses  of the  central  bank --  often  not included  in  conventional
deficit  definitions  --  were a  major  factor  in the  behavior  of the  deficits  after
1982  in several  countries.  These  were associated  with  the  assumption  of external
liabilities  and  financial  losses  of private  corporations  and  banks. In some
cases,  the  losses  stemmed  from  the  granting  of exchange  rate  guarantees  or
differentially  low  exchange  rates  to  private  debtors  in foreign  currency. Data
on such  losses  were only  found  for  four  countries  --  Argentina,  Chile,  the
Philippines,  and  Yugoslavia  --  but  they  were probably  important  in other  cases.
In these  four  cases,  the  central  bank  losses  were  very important  --  in  Chile  and
Yugoslavia  they  explain  virtually  the  entire  public  sector  deficit. The  losses
prevented  the  total  deficit  from  falling  more rapidly  (or  not  at all)  in these
countries.
Table  3 shows  that  the  additional  revenue  effort  to  achieve  the  fiscal
adjustment  in the  crisis  countries  was small. Revenue  stayed  stagnant  or
declined  in  Argentina,  Chile,  the  Philippines,  and  Yugoslavia.  A breakdown  of- 10  -
Table 8
CONSOLIDATED  PUBLIC  SECTOR  REVENUE.
(Percent  of  GoP)
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________._
Total  Revenue  1979  1960  1961  1982  1988  1984  1986  198e  1987
Crisis  Countries
Argentlne  a8.9  U8.4  86.7  38.1  84.7  38.4  41.5  38.2  38.8
Brazil  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Chile  43.8  48.2  88.2  40.2  41.1  41.0  48.6  40.6  41.0
Mexico  24.0  25.2  28.9  26.8  30.5  29.2  28.2  30.4  30.0
Morocco  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Philippines  NA  NA  16.8  16.2  16.1  13.7  14.9  13.9  18.8
Yugoulovis  NA  82.0  31.8  30.6  29.9  28.4  27.1  NA  NA
Non-Crlois  Countries
Colombia  28.7  27.8  24.8  24.6  23.9  18.8  20.6  22.0  18.6
Korea  NA  NA  NA  26.9  28.0  27.0  27.1  26.9  NA
Thailand  14.8  16.1  14.9  16.5  16.9  18.8  17.5  19.9  20.1
Turkoy  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Tax  Revenue  1979  1980  1981  1982  1988  1984  1986  1988  1987
Crisis  Countries
Argentina  20.6  23.3  20.3  18.7  18.6  18.2  22.0  21.9  21.7
Brazll  NA  23.2  23.6  25.1  24.4  21.8  NA  NA  NA
Chile  26.7  26.3  26.2  22.7  22.4  23.7  23.2  23.4  23.8
Mexico  11.3  10.9  10.6  9.9  10.2  10.2  10.0  11.2  10.6
Morocco  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Philippines  NA  NA  10.9  10.6  9.3  9.7  10.6  NA  NA
Yugoslavia  NA  30.1  29.1  27.7  26.6  13.3  24.2  NA  NA
Non-Crisis  Countries
Colombia  15.2  14.5  12.9  18.0  13.3  12.4  13.7  14.5  13.6
Korea  NA  NA  'lA  18.2  19.0  18.3  18.3  18.2  NA
Thailand  18.1  13.4  13.6  13.1  14.1  14.1  14.5  NA  NA
Turkxy  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  14.4  16.8  19.9  20.4
Non-tax  Revenue  1979  1980  1981  1982  1988  1984  1986  1986  1987
Crisis  Countries
Argentina  13.3  13.2  16.4  14.4  16.1  16.2  19.6  10.2  15.1
Brazil  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Chile  17.6  16.9  13.0  17.5  18.7  17.3  20.3  17.1  17.2
M"xico  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.1  1.0  0.8  0.9  1.0  1.0
Morocco  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Philippines  NA  NA  4.4  4.7  5.8  4.0  4.5  NA  NA
Yugoslavia  NA  2.8  2.7  2.8  8.3  16.1  2.9  NA  NA
Non-Crisis  Countries
Colombia  11.6  12.8  11.9  11.6  10.6  6.4  6.8  7.6  6.0
Korea  NA  NA  NA  8.7  9.0  8.8  8.8  8.7  NA
Thailand  1.7  1.7  1.4  2.4  278  8.8  3.0  NA  NA
Turkey  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*  Consolidated  public  sector  includes  central,  state  and local,  decentralized  agencies,  and SOEs.
Sources  are  given  In  Appendix  IV.- 11  -
revenue  into  tax  and  nontax  revenue  shows  that  taxes  did  not  play  much of a role
in  the  adjustment. The  ratio  of tax  revenue  to GDP  falls  or is  virtually
unchanged  over  1982-85  for  the  six  crisis  countries  for  which  consolidated  data
are  available. An increase  in  nontax  revenues  --  mainly  reflecting  improved
financial  performance  of  public  enterprises  as a result  of output  price
increases  --  is  noticeable  in the  first  year  after  the  debt  crisis  broke  out  but
is later  eroded. In the  non-crisis  countries,  Colombia,  Korea,  and  Thailand  do
not show  major  changes  in their  tax  revenue  ratio. Turkey  did  have  a rapid  rise
in taxes,  although  this  was  not  enough  to  keep its  deficit  from  rising. Nontax
revenues  are  more  variable  --  falling  sharply  in  Colombia,  rising  in  Korea,  and
unchanged  in  Thailand.
The  burden  of the  adjustment  in  the  crisis  countries  was on the  public
expenditure  side,  as shown  in  Table  4.  The  most severely  cut  was capital
spending,  which  fell  sharply  in  Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico,  and  the  Philippines,
increasing  only  in  Chile.  By contrast,  Colombia,  Korea  and  Thailand  showed
fairly  stable  public  investment  ratios  over  the  period,  while  Turkey  increased
its  ratio.
The  other  expenditure  category  that  shows  significant  reductions  is  net
transfers. This  is  a catch-all  category  which  includes,  among  other  things,
social  security  contributions  and  payments,  medical  benefits  of  public
employees,  and  consumer  subsidies.  After  an initial  increase  in 1982-83,  net
transfers  fell  in  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  the  Philippines  and  Mexico. They
were also  reduced  in Colombia,  but  not in the  other  non-crisis  countries.
Not  surprisingly,  public  interest  expenditures  increase  dramatically  in
all  crisis  countries. Even  when interest  is  corrected  for  the  effect  of high
inflation.--  such  as in  Mexico  and  Brazil  --  the  increase  is still  significant.
By contrast,  public  interest  expenditure  in  the  non-crisis  countries  stays
stable  at around  2  percent  of GDP.- 12  -
Table  4
CONSOLIDATED  PUBLIC SECTOR  EXPENDITURES*
(Por  ent  of  CDP)
Non-interest  Current  Expenditure  1979  1960  1961  1962  1963  1984  1986  1983  1987.
--------------------------------------- _--------------_-----------__---_-----__-_-----------------------_---__-_-----
Crisis  Countries
Argentina  19.0  21.7  21.2  20.7  24.7  23.4  26.5  22.3  23.1
Brazil  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Chile  12.6  12.4  11.1  11.5  10.2  10.0  9.3  7.5  8.3
Mexico  17.9  20.4  20.3  26.3  16.9  17.7  19.7  23.6  20.2
Morocco  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Philippines  NA  NA  9.2  8.9  6.8  7.1  7.6  NA  MA
Yugoslavia  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Non-Crisis  Countrieo
Colombia  7.6  8.3  9.3  8.9  9.6  9.1  8.6  8.2  7.6
Korea  NA  NA  NA  15.6  14.9  14.1  14.5  12.6  NA
Thailand  12.7  12.8  12.8  13.3  13.1  13.7  14.0  NA  NA
Turkey  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
------------------------------------------------ ____-____---_-________-__----__-----____--_--------------_.---------_
Interest  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1966  1988  1967.
---------------------------------------------------------- _-------__---------__--------------------------------------
Crisis  Countries
Argentina  3.1  3.4  7.4  10.4  6.0  5.0  6.6  3.8  .9
Brazil  NA  NA  10.9  13.7  21.4  27.1  29.9  11.3  A
- operational  NA  NA  3.6  4.9  6.3  6.6  6.7  4.2  .A
Chile  1.2  0.8  0.4  0.6  1.8  2.4  3.2  2.4  2.9
Mexico  3.4  3.6  5.0  8.2  12.4  11.9  12.0  16.6  19.5
- operational  2.1  1.5  2.6  -0.4  6.2  5.4  5.8  6.8  4.0
Morocco  NA  NA  NA  NA  4.7  6.2  6.2  6.2  NA
Philippines  NA  NA  0.8  1.0  1.3  1.9  2.4  NA  NA
Yugoslovia  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Non-Crisis  Countrios
Colombio  1.3  1.7  1.4  1.7  2.1  2.4  2.9  3.0  3.8
Korea  NA  NA  NA  1.4  1.3  1.4  1.4  1.3  NA
Thailand  1.4  1.4  1.8  2.0  2.4  2.6  2.9  NA  NA
Turkey  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Capital  Expenditures  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987.
------------------------------------------------------------------ __---------__--------------------------------------
Crisis  Countries
Argentina  10.6  9.5  9.7  8.6  9.7  7.8  7.1  7.1  7.7
Brazil  NA  NA  7.6  7.5  5.5  6.2  6.4  NA  NA
Chile  6.2  6.4  6.2  4.7  4.9  6.4  7.0  7.5  8.9
Mexico  10.0  8.9  12.7  9.7  7.7  6.7  6.0  6.0  S.S
Morocco  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Philippines  NA  NA  8.7  6.6  7.6  4.5  3.2  3.8  5.0
Yugoslavia  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Non-Crisis  Countrios
Colombia  6.2  6.5  7.4  7.3  8.2  9.6  8.9  7.5  8.3
Koreu  NA  NA  NA  10.9  10.3  10.1  9.9  9.0  NA
Thailand  6.7  8.5  7.9  8.0  7.3  8.9  7.8  7.2  6.8
Turkoy  NA  NA  NA  NA  10.2  9.7  11.4  13.6  13.5
-------------------------------------------------------------- _----______---____-------------------------------------
Net  Transfers  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987.
Crisis  Countries
Argentina  7.7  9.3  10.7  8.6  10.4  9.8  9.6  9.3  9.5
8razil  NA  NA  10.8  11.6  10.9  9.3  10.0  NA  NA
Chile  19.3  19.0  20.7  26.9  27.2  26.6  26.6  23  8  23.2
Mexico  6.3  6.4  7.6  10.8  7.2  6.8  6.1  NA  NA
Morocco  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Philippines  NA  NA  0.8  1.4  1.1  0.7  0.8  -1.9  -1.0
Yugoslavia  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Non-Crisis  Countries
Colombia  11.8  13.6  11.8  12.7  11.6  4.1  3.6  2.8  2.3
Korea  NA  NA  NA  3.1  2.1  2.5  2.9  2.9  NA
Thailand  -0.4  -0.5  -0.7  -0.4  -0.4  -0.6  -0.7  NA  NA
Turkey  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
_____________-----_-___--------  -- __--___--_-______-------  --  --  ---  --  --  --  ---  --  --  ---  --  --  -- ___________-  --  --  ---  --  -- _____--  --
*  Consolidated  public  sector  includes  central,  state  and local,  decentralized  agencios  and  SOEs.
Operational  interest  refers  to  interest  lose  the  inflation  correction  on  domestic  debt.
Sources  are  given  in  Appendix  IV.- 13 -
One  expenditure  category  that  showed  considerable  variability  between
crisis  countries  was current  expenditure  (excluding  interest). It increased  in
Argentina  but  was cut  in  Chile  and  the  Philippines. In  Mexico,  current
expenditures  rose  and  fell  erratically  in  response  to  crises  and successive
stabilization  efforts. By  contrast,  Colombia,  Korea,  and  Thailand  show  little
change  in  their  current  expenditures  over  the  period.
B.  Income  and  Absorption
The  overall  adjustment  pattern  in  the  crisis  and  non-crisis
countries  is  very  different. In the  crisis  countries,  saving  remained  constant
but  investment  was cut. In the  non-crisis  countries,  investment  increased  while
saving  was raised  even  more,  so  that  a resource  surplus  was eventually  achieved.
Income  was ri3ing  steadily  in  the  non-crisis  countries  while  stagnant  in the
crisis  cases. Absorption  was reduced  sharply  in the  crisis  countries  but  kept
growing  in the  noncrisis  countries  (Figure  1).  Thus  consumption  was  also
increasing  at a  healthy  rate  in  absolute  terms  in the  non-crisis  countries,
while  flat  in the  crisis  countries.  As the  data in  Appendix  I show,  this
pattern  also shows  up in the  behavior  of imports  and  exports. Imports
contracted  sharply  in the  crisis  countries,  while  exports  stagnated. Both
imports  and  exports  grew  in the  non-crisis  countries. These  differing  outcomes
were  a result  of the  public  finance  choices  made,  especially  the  means  of
financing  fiscal  deficits,  as  described  in  the  next section.
Although  public  expenditure  adjustments  contributed  to the  improvement
in  the  resource  balance  of the  crisis  countries,  the  overall  fiscal  improvement
was less  than  the  degree  of the  turnaround  of the  external  balance. This  can  be
seen  in  Figure  2,  which  compares  the  current  account  deficit  and  fiscal  deficits
in  6 crisis  and  3  non-crisis  countries.  The  greater  reduction  in  the  current
account  deficit  in  comparison  with  the  public  deficit  implies  that  more  net- 14 -
Figure 1:
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Figure  2:
CURRENT  ACCOUNT  AND FISCAL  DEFICITS
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internal  finance  from  the  private  sector  had to  be  mobilized. The  public  sector
in the  crisis  countries  was forced  to increase  its  reliance  on domestic
financing  even  though  its  overall  deficit  was  declining. In the  non-crisis
countries,  the  current  account  deficit  ei.d  public  deficit  declined  gradually
together,  so  that  there  was  a lesser  need  for  internal  financing.
IV.  Financing  of  public  deficits  and  macroeconomic  outcomes
This  section  will set  out  a framework  for  the  analysis  of the  domestic
financing  of  public  deficits  and  their  macroeconomic  consequences.  The  overall
flows  of financing  within  the  economy  will first  be discussed  to try  to pin  down
what "domestic  financing'  of the  public  deficit  really  means. Then the  menu of
fL _cing choices  faced  by the  public  sector  will be detailed. Lastly,  the
macroeconomic  implications  of  domestic  financing  choices  will be discussed.
A.  Financing  matrix  for  the  public  sector  deficit
The  matrix  shown  in Table  5 illustrates  the  financial  inter-
relationships  which  underlie  the  financing  of the  fiscal  deficit. The
nonfinancial  public  sector  is  shown  in the  top  row  and  the  first  column  of the
matrix. The  row  shows  the  composition  of gross  financing  of the  public  sector.
The  column  shows  any  financial  assets  held  by the  public  sector. The  same
principle  holds  for  each  type  of participant  in the  financial  markets  --  asset
holdings  are shown  in the  column  and  liabilities  are  given  in the  row  for  that
participant. One  agent's  liability  is someone  else's  asset. Thus  the  second
entry  in the  first  row  is  central  bank  credit  to the  government.  This is  a
liability  to the  government  but  an asset  to the  central  bank.  In the  same  way,






(g)  (b)  (f)  (c)  (p)  (e)
Public  Central  Financial  Private  Private  External Total
Sector  Bank  System  Corps  Household  Accounts deficit
Public  AQg  AL 8 AA  ABP  AEF 8 -(PSBR+Vg)
Sector
Central  AHf+ATf  AHp+ATP  hEFb  -(QFD+Vb)
Bank
Financial  AD8 Aqf  ADc  ADp  AEFf  Vf
System
Private  Aqc  ALc  AC  AEFc  -(Sc_Ic+Vc)
Corps
Private  ALp  -(Sp+Vp)
Households
External  AERb  AERf  AERp  -(CAD+Ve)
List  of  variables
PSBR  Public  Sector  Borrowing  Requirement
Fi  Foreign  Debt  of Sector  i
E  Exchange  rate
Bi  Government  Bonds  held  by Sector  i
Li  Financial  system  loans  to sector  i
Qi  Central  bank  credit  to sector  i
QFD  Quasi-fiscal  deficit  (deficit  of central  bank)
Hi  Currency  held  by sector  i
Ti  Non-monetary  liabilities  of  central  bank  held  by sector  i
Di  Deposits  in financial  system  by sector  i
CAD  Current  account  deficit
Ri  Foreign  assets  held  by sector  i
Si  Saving  of sector  i
Ii  Investment  of sector  i
A  Stock  of  public  arrears  to  private  sector
Vi  Net  capital  losses  of sector  i
C  Corporate  equity  purchases  by households
Sector  subscripts  shown  above  column  headings- 18 -
The  matrix  demonstrates  that  a  snapshot'  of the  public  sector's
borrowing  does  not tell  the  whole  story. For  example,  the  government  could
borrow  entirely  from  domestic  sources,  only  to  have  the  banking  system  finance
the  entire  public  debt  through  its  own  external  borrowing. Or the  government
could  vow  not to borrow  from  the  central  bank  so  as to avoid  money  creation,
only  to  borrow  from  the  rest  of the  banking  system. The  banks  may in turn  get
rediscounts  from  the  central  bank  --  with equivalent  effects  on  money  creation
as  would  have resulted  from  direct  central  bank  financing  to the  government.
The  government  could  even  allow  the  central  bank to take  over  certain  public
expenditures  itself,  such  as credit  subsidies  or exchange  rate  guarantees  to
private  enterprises.  The  nonfinancial  public  sector  deficit  might  appear  low  in
such  cases,  but  money  creation  and/or  loss  of foreign  exchange  reserves  would
result  from  the  deficit  of the  central  bank.
This  tells  us that  even  knowing  the  composition  of the  government's
financing,  it is quite  possible  to  misread  the  implications  for  foreign
borrowing  and  money  creation. That  is to say,  the  entire  matrix  cannot  be
predicted  on the  basis  of the  entries  in  the  first  row. To predict  the  result
of government  financing  choices,  it is  necessary  to  have some  data  on the
behavior  of the  other  participants  in the  financial  markets.
Some  of these  problems  can  be solved  through  the  consolidation  of the
public  sector  and  the  central  bank.  High-powered  money  less  net foreign  assets
and rediscounts  of the  central  bank  can  be substituted  for  net  domestic  credit
creation  to  the  public  sector. This  eliminates  any  possibility  of hiding
indirect  money  creation  or central  bank  deficits.- 19  -
The  other  problem  of indirect  foreign  borrowing  can  be addressed  by
esamining  the  balance  sheet  of the  financial  system. The  implications  of public
borrowing  cannot  be analyzed  without  considering  the  outcome  for  overall
financial  flows. In the  next  sections,  a rramework  will be presented  to  analyze
the  implications  of government  financing  for  private  financial  behavior.
B.  Financing  choices  for  the  public  sector
We could  summarize  the  financing  choices  as follows:
1.  External  Financing
The  matrix  showed  that  this  is somewhat  difficult  to  measure. Direct
foreign  borrowing  by the  government  is  equivalent  to  borrowing  from  banks  who in
turn  borrow  abroad. The  same  goes  for  the  private  sector,  who may  be pushed  to
l'orrow  abroad  by the  public  sector  cornering  domestic  financing. Indeed,  in the
extreme  case  of perfect  capital  mobility,  the  division  of  government  financing
into  direct  internal  and  external  borrowing  has  no analytical  significance.
While  a high  degree  of capital  mobility  held in  many  of the  high  debt
countries  prior  to  1982,  borrowing  ceilings  became  binding  after  the  debt  crisis
broke  out. The  breakdown  between  external  and  domestic  finance  again  became
meaningful  as the  reduction  in total  net  external  flows  led  to increased
economy-wide  reliance  on domestic  financing.
2.  Domestic  Financing
The  following  details  the  alternative  means  of domestic  financing
available  and  their  advantages  and  disadvantages.
a.  currency  creation
To the  extent  that  currency  creation  exceeds  the  growth  in demand  for
real  balances,  it is  a tax  on  holdings  of currency  and  so  has the  advantage  that:
excess  expenditures  are  paid  for  now rather  than  in  the  future. However,  the
cost  of current  distortions  caused  by the  inflation  tax  may  be very large.- 20  -
b.  reserme  requirem_nts
These  also  pay for  expenditures  now,  but  through  a tax  on all financial
intermediation  and  not  just  currency. They  thus  increase  interest  rates  to
private  borrowers  and  depress  rates  to  private  savers. This  effect  is  worse  the
higher  the rate  of inflation.  The tax  is  distortionary  in that  it represses
domestic  financial  intermediation.
c.  required  bank  holdings  of government  bonds  at  controlled
Interest  rates
This  is equivalent  to  b) except  that  the  degree  of distortion  is
reduced  if the  controlled  interest  rate  is  greater  than  that  on reserve
requirements  (usually  zero). Recall  that  by aggregating  the  central  bank  and
nonfinancial  public  sector  we net  out 'hidden  money  creation',  i.e.  banking
system  purchases  of government  bonds  at controlled  rates  financed  by central
bank rediscounts.  Controls  on  government  interest  rates  expand  the  potential
for  the  inflation  tax  to include  real  devaluation  of  government  nonmonetary
liabilities.
d.  government  controls  on all  domestic  interest  rates  with
credit  rationing
If  domestic  interest  rates  are  kept  below  market  levels,  then  credit
will  be  rationed  and  private  investment  will  be  determined  by  the  availability
of  credit  rather  than  its  explicit  cost.  If  there  is  inflation,  the  inflatior
tax  will include  devaluation  of real  government  non-monetary  liabilities,  as in
(c),  but  part  of this  tax  will be  shared  with the  private  sector  through  the
controlled  loan  rates.- 21 -
e.  borrowing  from  banks  at  market  rates  (same  as  to  private
sector)
This  does  not distort  financial  intermediation  like  b),  c) or d).
However  excessive  reliance  on this  source  will drive  real  interest  rates  above
the  rate  of economic  growth  and  the  return  to public  spending  and  crowd  out
private  investment.  If there  is  unanticipated  inflation,  this  will still
generate  an inflation  tax  as in b),  c)  and  d),  but  without  the  distortionary
effects.
f.  Direct  government  bond sales  to the  nonbank  public  sector
at market  rates  of interest
This  is  equivalent  to the  government  depriving  itself  of the  tax  on
financial  intermediation.  However,  excessive  reliance  on these  bond  sales
drives  up the  domestic  interest  rate  and  crowds  out  private  investment  in the
same  way as borrowing  from  the  banking  system.
C.  Consequences  of deficit  financing  choices
This  section  analyzes  the  tradeoffs  facing  the  government  when it
chooses  between  alternative  domestic  financing  methods  for  a given  fiscal
deficit. The  conclusions  drawn  are  based  on  a simple  theoretical  model,  the
details  of  which  are  given  in  Appendix  II.  The  model  integrates  portfolio
equations  for  three  assets  --  money,  debt,  and  foreign  currency  --  and  an
equation  for  fixed  capital  formation.  As in the  recent  work  of Buiter  (1988)
and  Van  Wijnbergen  (1988),  the  government  financing  identity  is then  used  to
draw  the  consequences  for  inflation  (and  in  this  model,  real  interest  rates  as
well)  of government  financing  choices. The  case  of  controls  on interest  rates
will be examined  after  first  looking  at free  financial  markets.- 22 -
1.  Uncontrolled  financial  markets
There  are  two  basic  relations  in  the  model,  corresponding  to
equilibrium  conditions  in the  domestic  debt  and  money  markets.  The  equilibrium
condition  for  the  debt  market  can  be written  as:
(1)  big - f(fic - ir, Ai)  f1 >O  f 2 <O
where 1g is  the  ratio  of government  domestic  debt  to  GDP, ic  is the  nominal
interest  rate  on corporate  loans,  and  I is  the  rate  of inflation. The
government  chooses  the  increase  in  the  domestic  debt  ratio  when it decides  the
composition  of internal  deficit  finance  (external  finance  is  exogenous)  between
debt  and  money. As described  in appendix  II,  the  increase  in  the  debt  ratio
will  be related  negatively  to the  rate  of inflation.  Inflation  depresses  the
real  deposit  rate  for  a given  real  loan  rate  and  thus  lowers  the  flow  of savings
into  the  banking  system.  This  effect  will be only  partially  offset  by a shift
from  cash  into  deposits. The  relationship  between  the  debt ratio  and  the  real
interest  rate  is  positive  (see  Appendix  II).  Increased  real  interest  rates
increase  real  deposits  and  depress  private  investment  for  a given  inflation
rate,  increasing  the  flow  of domestic  debt  to the  government.  Therefore,  the
debt  equilibrium  implies  a  positive  relationship  between  interest  rates  and
inflation.
The  money  market  equilibrium  can  be  written  in similar  form:
(2)  7  - (Afg  - Arb)  - g(Aic - AT,  Air)  gl><O  92>0_ 23 -
Here  7  is  the  primary  deficit  of the  public  sector,  Afg is  the  increase  in the
ratio  of  public  external  debt  to  GDP,  and  Arb  is the  change  in the  ratio  of
foreign  exchange  reserves  to GDP. Thus,  the  expression  on the  left-hand  side
gives  the  domestic  financing  requirement  of the  public  sector. Since  the
increase  in  public  domestic  debt  is  already  given  in  equation  (1)  and  money  is
the  residual  source  of finance,  this  equation  gives  the  equilibrium  in the  money
market. The  left-hand  side  can  be thought  of also  as the  total  'domestically
financeable  deficit'  through  money  creation.
The  domestically  financeable  deficit  is a  positive  function  of
inflation,  as long  as  we have  not  passed  the  maximum  point  of the  inflation  tax
'Laffer  curve'. The  increased  revenues  from  money  creation  will offset  the
decrease  in  demAnd  for  deposits  and  currency  in this  case.  The  relationship  of
the  financeable  deficit  to the  real  interest  rate  depends  on the  existing  level
of government  domestic  debt. If debt  is low,  then  increased  real  interest  rates
increase  the  demand  for  base  money  by increasing  real  deposits  and  thus  make
possible  a  higher  domestically  financeable  deficit. However,  real  interest
rates  also  raise  the  need  for  money  finances  through  higher  domestic  debt
servicing  costs. If  government  domestic  debt  is  high,  higher  real  interest
rates  will raise  the  requirement  for  money  finance  more  than  the  demand  for  base
money,  and  thus  lower  the 'financeable  deficit".
Figure  3 shows  the  money  market  relation  for  the 'low  debt'  case,  where
money  market  equilibrium  implies  a  negative  relation  between  inflation  and
interest  rates. Equation  (1),  the  debt  equilibrium,  is also  shown  in the  graph.
Real  interest  rates  and  inflation  are  thus  jointly  determined  by the  money  and
debt  market  equilibria.  We can  use  this  graph  to  perform  comparative  statics.
An increase  in debt  finance  (with  unchanged  domestic  financing  requirement).- 24 -
shifts  up the  debt  equilibrium  line. Thus,  a shift  in  the composition  of debt
finance  from  money to  debt raises  the real  interest  rate  and lowers  inflation.
This  confirms  the  conventional  wisdom  on the  effect  of 'tight  moneyw.  However,
if  the  government  continues  to rely  on increases  in debt  to finance  its  deficit,
this  will reverse  the  slope  of the  money  market  equilibrium  as described  above.
Figure  4 shows  the  effect  of a shift  to  debt finance  in  this situation. Now
"tight  money"  causes  an increase  in  both  real interest  rates  and inflation.
This  is  because  additional  inflation  tax revenues  are  necessary  to generate
financing  to cover  the  higher  interest  costs.
The other  comparative  static  experiment  that  can  be performed  with this
model  is a  money-financed  increase  in  the  amount  of  domestic  financing  (caused
for  example  by a decline  in external  financing). This shifts  upward  the  money
market  equilibrium  relation  but leaves  the  debt  equilibrium  unchanged.  As shown
in Figures  3 or 4, this  increases  both  the rate  of inflation  and the real
interest  rate  on loans. The increased  real  interest  loan  rate  comes  about
because  higher inflation  raises  the *tax'  on financial  intermediation  through
the reserve  requirement.2/
A last  exercise  is  to combine  an increase  in domestic  borrowing  with a
money-financed  increase  in the  domestic  financing  requirement  (shifting  both
curves  in  the graphe). This  can  be thought  of as substituting  domestic  for
foreign  debt.  This  has the  same  effect  on interest  rates  and inflation  as  a
debt-financed  expansion  in the  primary  deficit. As shown  in  Appendix  II,  an
exact  substitution  of domestic  for foreign  debt  increases  real interest  rates,
because  of the increased  pressure  on  credit  markets.  Inflation  may go either
2/  See  Reisen  and  Van Trotsenburg  (1988)  for  a similar  result.GIAIS  IN REL  DAN RAT  CGUNO IN REL  WNF RATE
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way. The  increase  in interest  rates  increases  the  demand  for  money  base  and  so
makes  possible  the  same  level  of inflation  tax  revenue  at a lower  rate  of
inflation. However,  the  monetization  of additional  interest  payments  may
partially  or fully  offset  this  effect. Thus  inflation  will decline  in  the  low-
debt  case (Figure  3) and  increase  in  the  high debt  case (Figure  4).
It is straightforward  to trace  the  results  of these  outcomes  for  other
macroeconomic  variables. A shift  to  debt  finance  for  a given  domestic  financing
requirement,  a  money-financed  increase  in  the  domestically-financed  deficit,  and
substitution  of domestic  for  foreign  debt  all  cause  a  decline  in  private
investment through increased real interest rates.  If  we are in the !..  debt
situation  of figure  3, a shift  to debt  finance  causes  a decrease  in  capital
flight  through  the  increase  in  interest  rates  and  fall  in inflation. However,
tight  money  could  perveraely  cause  an increase  in capital  flight  (and  fall  in
reserves)  in the  high debt  situation  of Figure  4.  This  would  occur  if the
negative  effect  of  higher  inflation  outweighs  the  positive  effect  of  higher  real
interest  rates  on capital  flight  (see  Appendix  II). The substitution  of
domestic  fore  foreign  debt  could  also  increase  capital  flight  for  the  same
reason.
2.  Interest  rate  controls  and  credit  rationing
When there  are  controls  on inmerest  rates,  the  nature  of the  tradeoff
between  debt  and  money  finance  changes. Inflation  now  worsens  the  real  rate  on
all  domestic  financial  assets  and  liabilities.  Since  there  will  be excess
demand  for  credit  if controls  are  effective,  credit  to the  private  sector  must
be rationed. This assumes  that  the  government  is the  preferred  borrower  and
that  transactions  cost are  so  high  as to  prevent  the  formation  of informal
credit  markets.- 27 -
The rationing  of credit  means  that  the  equilibrating  variable  in the
debt  and  money  markets  will be  private  investment  instead  of interest  rates.
The  equilibrium  condition  for  the  debt  market  can  be written  as follows:
(3)  Ic/Y  - h(Alg.  al)  h, c 0  h2 x<  0
where  Ic/Y  is the  ratio  of  private  investment  to GDP (see  Appendix  II for
details).  Investment  is a  negative  function  of the  increase  in  government
debt.  The "crowding  out"  is  one  to one,  since  an increase  in  government
borrowing  simply  subtracts  investment-financing  credit  from  the  private  sector.
The relationship  between  investment  and  inflation  depends  on the  level  of
government  debt relative  to total  deposits. If government  debt  is low  and/or
total  deposits  are  high,  enough  of the  benefits  of the  inflation  tax  could
accrue  to  private  firms  to offset  the  negative  effect  of inflation  on total
deposits  and total  credit. However,  too  much reliance  on inflation  and  interest
rate  controls  will eventually  lead  to  a decline  in  deposits  until  the  credit
crunch  effect  dominates.
The  money  market  equilibrium  condition  can  be given  as follows:
Ic/Y  - (7  - (Afg A  Arb) ,  Af)  Jl < °  J2 >  °
Private  investment  is  a negative  function  of the  total  domestic  financing
requirement.  Crowding  out  is one-for-one  regardless  of  whether  domestic
financing  is through  money  or debt,  since  either  one  displaces  private  credit.
Private  investment  is  a positive  function  of inflation  as long  as  the  maximum
point  on the  inflation  tax 'Laffer  curve*  has  not  been  passed. The  base  of the- 28 -
inflation  tax  now includes  both  currency  and  deposits  (i.e.  M2) and  not only
high-powered  money,  since  the  interest  rate  is fixed  on all  domestic  financial
assets. When inflation  increases,  part  of the  inflation  tax  accrues  to  private
firms,  making  possible  an increase  in investment  unless  the increased tax  is
more than  offset  by the  decline  in  M2 and  thus  total  credit.
The  money  and  debt  equilibria  are  graphed  in figure  5 for  the  case
where  government  debt  is low  relative  to deposits. The  slope  of both  are
positive,  but the  loci  of debt  equilibria  is flatter  than  the  loci  of  money
equilibria  (see  appendix  II). A shift  from  money  to  debt finance  in  this  case
will lower  private  investment  by even  more than  one  to  one.  This is  because  in
addition  to crowding  out  through  the  credit  market,  it lowers  inflation  also  and
thus  increases  the  real  interest  rate  to corporations,  decreasing  the  net
resources  left  fcr  investment.  An increase  in the  domestically-financed  deficit
covered  by money  creation  will increase  private  investment  for  the  same  reason.
Higher  inflation  and  lower  real  interest  rates  will  make  more resources
available  for investment.
However,  inflation  will  cause  financial  disintermediation  which  will
eventually  reverse  the slope  of the  debt  equilibrium  line,  as shown  in figure  6.
A money  financed  increase  in the  domestic  borrowing  requirement  will  now lead  to
a fall  in investment  because  the  fall  in deposits  and  credit  more than  offsets
the  inflation  tax  benefit  to firms. A shift  to debt  finance  will still  lead  to
a fall  in investment,  but  now  less  than  one-for-one. The  fall  in  inflation  from
tight  money  will  have  enough  of a  positive  effect  on the  supply  of credit  to
mitigate  the  crowding  out  of investment  in  credit  markets.
The  substitution  of domestic  for  foreign  debt  has  a particularly  simple
result  in the  credit  rationing  model. It  will  have  no effect  on the  rate  of
inflation  and  will  decrease  private  investment  one-for-one,  regardless  of the
level  of government  debt.  The  control  on interest  rates  means  that  no- 2 9-
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additional  interest  costs  will  arise  and  so  no  additional  monetization  or
inflation  is  necessary.  With  no change  in  either  inflation  or  interest  rates,
there  will  be  no  change  in  total  credit  supply  and  the  increase  in  public
domestic  borrowing  will  simply  displace  private  credit.
How  can  the  effects  of  these  policy  experiments  be  compared  across
regimes  --  free  market  interest  rates  versus  interest  rate  ccntrols?  The
comparisons  depend  very  much  on  the  initial  conditions.  If  government  debt  is
high,  then  the  inflationary  impact  of  substituting  money  creation  for  foreign
debt  will  tend  to  be less  in  the  controlled  regime. This  is  because  of  the
effect  on  inflation  of  monetizing  additional  interest  costs  in  the  free  market
regime,  as  opposed  to  the  erosion  of real  domestic  debt  service  in  the
controlled  regime. The  effect  on  private  investment  could  also  be  more
favorable  under  controlled  interest  rates  because  part  of the  inflation  tax
will  be  passed  onto  the  private  sector.  However,  as  total  deposits  shrink
under  the  impact  of  negative  real  interest  rates,  the  ranking  is  reversed.
The  base  of the  inflation  tax  --  although  broader  at the  beginning  --  declines
more  rapidly  under  the  controlled  regime,  so  a  given  amount  of  money  creation
will  lead  to  more  inflation  than  under  free  markets.  Investment  will  also  be
damaged  more  under  the  controlled  regime  in  these  circumstances  by the  erosion
of  credit  flows  caused  by  inflation.
The  substitution  of  domestic  for  foreign  debt  could  also  have  less  of
a  negative  effect  under  the  controlled  regime  if  government  debt  is  high.
Such  substitution  could  cause  more  than  one-for-one  crowding  out  under  free
markets  because  of  the  double  effect  on  real  loan  interest  rates  of  higher
inflation  and  greater  government  credit  demand.  Under  the  controlled  regime,
crowding  out  is  always  one-for-one  regardless  of  the  level  of  government  debt.
However,  this  ranking  is  peculiar  to  the  special  case  of  an  internal  *debt
trap".  Under  more  normal  circumstances,  private  investment  has  the  crowding
out  mitigated  by the  decrease  in inflation  and  rise  in  total  domestic  credit
caused  by 'tight  money,  policies  in  uncontrolled  financial  markets.- 31 -
V.  Def4-,it  financing  in the  high debt  countries
In this  section,  the  framework  of the  previous  section  is applied  to
the  experience  of the  crisis  and  non-crisis  countries. Since  the  key
variables  which  reflect  financing  choices  of the  public  sector  are  interest
rates  and  inflation,  data  on these  variables  will  be presented  first.
Monetary  data  will then  be used  to show  the  actual  financing  choices  made in
the  crisis  and  non-crisis  countries.
A.  Interest  rate  behavior
Table  6 shows  nominal  spreads  and  ex-post  real  rates  on deposits,
loans,  and  government  securities  for  the  sample  countries. There  is  enormous
variety  in  levels  of real  interest rates in the crisis countries, not only
between  countries  but  also  for  the  same  country  over  different  years.
Argentina  and  Yugoslavia  followed  a policy  of financial  repression  which
resulted  in  high  negative  real  interest  rates  for  most of the  period. Mexico
and  the  Philippines  did  the  same  for  part  of  the  period,  while  Brazil  lurched
back  and  forth  between  high  positive  real  rates  and  financial  repression. (In
these  countries,  the  variability  of inflation  also  led  to ex-post  negative
real  rates  in some  years  even  when financial  repression  was  not  a conscious
policy). Chile  had  market-determined  interest  rates  which  were extremely  high
in real  terms  in  1981-82,  declining  thereafter  to  modest  positive  levels.
Morocco  had  much lower  inflation  and  more  modest  swings  in  real  interest
rates,  although  still  negative  until  1986. Policies  determining  interest
rates  on government  securities  also  varied  considerably.  In Brazil  and  Chile,
rates  on treasury  bills  were considerably  lower  than  deposit  rates,  so that
required  holdings  of government  bonds  by banks  functioned  as an additional  tax
on financial  intermediation.  In  Mexico  and  the  Philippines,  government  bond- 2-
Table  6
INTEREST  RATES,  190-87
(In  P-re  nt)
____  ___________________________I________________________________________________________________________
- 1980  l  Pe1 198t  1986  1984  198S  1986  1987
ARGENTINA  I
Rel  lending  rate  6.1  31.2  -16.7  -22.9  -29.7  -6.3  8.9  2.7
Real  deposit  rate  I  -4.3  9.7  -27.8  -80.4  -89.0  -21.9  -12.0  -14.6
Real  govornment  rate  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Nominal  spread  I  9.8  19.6  11.6  10.7  16.4  20.0  18.1  20.6
BRAZIL  l
Roal lending  rate  -2.6  4.9  26.2  0.2  7.5  -0.1  -0.1  NA
Roal  deposit  rate  -3.8  -3.0  11.0  -1.4  10.7  -0.6  -1.8  NA
Real  government  rate  -24.3  -3.9  9.8  0.8  -0.6  2.7  -16.8  NA
Nominal  spread  I  1.1  6.2  18.1  1.7  -2.9  0.7  1.8  NA
CHILE  l
Real  ledng  rate  1  12.1  88.8  86.7  15.9  11.5  11.1  7.6  4.9
Re l  deposit  rate  4.8  28.5  22.5  8.9  2.5  4.1  1.4  8.1
Real  government  rate  -23.8  -6.7  7.5  0.2  -2.6  -2.7  -0.7  -1.4
Nominal  spread  I  7.0  8.0  10.6  11.6  6.8  6.7  6.1  1.6
MEXICO  I
Real  lending  rate  -1.8  6.2  -26.6  -9.8  -2.8  NA  NA  NA
Roal  deposit  rato  I  -2.8  0.7  -28.8  -14.4  4.8  -2.6  -10.2  NA
Real  government  rate  I  -6.7  1.6  -26.6  -11.9  -6.2  -0.5  -18.3  -25.6
Nominal  spread  1  1.6  5.4  -4.3  6.4  4.3  NA  NA  NA
MOROCCO  I
Real  lending  rate  -2.5  -5.5  0.3  -4.9  -0.5  -2.0  4.2  NA
Real  depoott  rate  -4.4  -6.4  -0.8  -5.4  -1.0  -1.9  3.9  NA
Roal  governnont  rate  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Nominal  spread  I  2.0  0.9  0.6  0.5  0.5  -0.2  0.3  NA
PHILIPPINES  l
Rel  lending  rate  NA  4.2  8.9  -5.4  -15.0  21.7  17.9  NA
Real  deposit  rate  NA  2.7  4.8  -9.9  -19.7  12.5  11.6  NA
Real  government rate  -2.8  2.1  6.4  -9.0  -18.6  19.9  15.9  NA
Nominal  sproad  I  NA  1.4  8.6  6.0  5.8  8.2  6.6  NA
YUGOSLAVIA  I
Real  lending  rate  I  -18.9  -17.6  -6.8  -18.6  -8.P  i.8  -4.5  NA
Real  deposit  rate  -23.0  -20.9  -15.6  -80.0  -14.6  -6.5  -18.8  NA
Real  government rate  I  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Nominal  spread  1  6.8  4.8  8.0  28.2  18.2  12.1  17.6  NA
COLOWIA  I
Real  lnding  rate  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  14.1  11.8  9.6
Real  deposit  rate  NA  3.9  4.4  9.7  8.8  10.5  8.2  6.0
Real  government  rate  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Nominal  spread  l  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  8.8  3.3  3.3
INDONESIA  l
Real  lending  rate,  NA  NA  10.9  9.9  16.4  17.4  13.1  14.3
Real  deposit  rate  -2.4  6.1  6.9  4.6  9.3  12.7  5.0  7.8
Re I  government  rate  I  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Nominal  sproad  I  NA  NA  4.7  4.6  6.6  4.1  7.7  6.0
KOREA  l
Rel  londng  rate  I  -12.3  5.1  6.6  7.9  7.4  6.6  8.6  NA
Real  deposit  rate  I  -11.2  4.0  8.0  6.9  6.0  6.6  8.6  NA
Real  governm_nt  rate  -13.6  3.8  3.0  6.9  6.4  NA  NA  NA
Nominal  spread  I  -1.8  1.0  8.5  1.9  0.7  0.0  0.0  NA
THAILAND
Real  lending  rate  1.4  5.9  18.0  18.8  19.2  15.2  15.1  NA
Real  deposit  rate  -3.8  0.2  10.2  6.8  18.4  9.4  7.9  NA
Real  government  rate  -4.3  0.5  10.4  7.0  12.9  7.6  6.2  8.7
Nominal  spread  5  5.4  6.8  6.3  4.1  6.1  6.8  6.6  NA
TURKEY 
Real  lending  rate  -0.6  50.2  37.7  28.0  26.7  42.0  61.0  NA
Roel  deposit  rate  -40.9  -1.4  6.5  10.6  8.1  8.6  7.9  NA
Real  govornment  rate  I  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  4.2  13.8  NA
Nominal  spread  68.3  52.8  29.8  15.6  24.9  37.2  39.9  NA
NOTE: Real  interest  rates  calculated  from  nominal  rates:  [(1.r)/(1*p)-1]*1OO,  sharo r  is  Interest
rete  and p  is  the  inflation  rate.  Spreads  calculated  as [(1+i)/(1*r)-lj1eOO,  where  I  is  the  loan
rate  and r  is  the  deposit  rate.- 33 -
rates  were  ,imilar  to other  interest  rates,  all  of  which  were negative  in real
terms  when inflation  accelerated.  Interest  rate  spreads  --  reflecting  both
costs  of intermediation  and  implicit  taxes  on intermediation  such  as reserve
requirements  --  were very  high in  Argentina,  Chile,  and  Yugoslavia  throughout
the  period. In  Argentina,  for  example,  the  high spread  is  because  the  banking
system  has  over  70 percent  of total  deposits  tied  up in reserve  and  forced
saving  requirements.  Other  countries  do  not  show  high spreads,  although  data
can  be misleading  since  quotes  on deposit  and loan  rates  do  not  necessarily
reflect  the  average  rates  paid  and  received  by banks  for  all  types  of  assets
and  liabilities.  The  overall  conclusic is that  all  of the  crisis  countries
put  substantial  taxes  on financial  intermediation  at one  time  or another  in
the  adjustment  process,  either  through  overall  financial  repression  or through
negative  real  interest  rates  on government  bonds  or central  bank  liabilities.
In the  non-crisis  countries,  on the  other  hand,  policies  of  positive
real  interest  rates  were  consistently  followed  from  1982  on.  In all  of the
countries  interest  rates  reached  fairly  high  levels  by historical  standards
-- most  of the  loan  rates  were in double-digits  in real  terms  throughout  the
period. The  most extreme  case  was Turkey,  where  loan  rates  reached  51  percent
in real  terms  in 1986. Government  bond  rates  were  a.  positive  in real
terms. Spreads  were fairly  modest  except  in Turkey,  where  the  large  spread
explains  the  extreme  interest  rates  on loans. Thus,  except  for  Turkey,  most
of the  non-crisis  countries  did  not rely  heavily  on taxes  on financial
intermediation.- 34 -
B.  Inflation  outcomes
Table  7 shows  the  inflation  rates  for  the  sample  countries.
Inflation  accelerated  in all  of the  crisis  countries  except  Morocco  in the
period  beginning  in 1982.  The  aggregate  inflation  rate  accelerated  from  41
percent  in 1981  to 57  percent  in 1982. There  was further  acceleration  during
1983-84  led  by the  more  than  doubling  of triple-digit  inflation  in  Argentina
and  Brazil  and  the  development  of  high inflation  in the  Philippines. In
1985-86  there  was a significant  drop  in inflation  as a result  of the  Austral
and  Cruzado  anti-inflation  programs  in  Argentina  and  Brazil,  respectively.
The  Philippines  also  returned  to  near  price  stability. However,  the
improvement  proved  transitory,  as  the  breakdown  of the  Austral  and  Cruzado
plans  and the  acceleration  of  inflation  in  Mexico  and  Yugoslavia  caused
average  inflation  in  the  crisis  countries  to exceed  100  percent  in 1987.  In
the  non-crisis  countries  inflation  fell  in  IZorea  and  Thailand  and  remained
roughly  stable  in Indonesia.  Colombian  inflation  was higher  than  in the  East
Asian  countries,  but stable  at around  20  percent. Inflation  was  more erratic
in  Turkey,  accelerating  in 1984  and in  1987  after  temporary  declines. The
aggregate  inflation  rate  in  the  non-crisis  countries  is  much lower  and  more
stable  than  in their  crisis  counterparts.- 35  -
Table  7
CPI  INFLATION  RATES
(Decombr  ovor  December  rate)
1980  1981  1982  1988  1984  1985  1986  1987
Argentino  s  88  la1  210  484  688  ass  82  176
Brazil  86  101  102  178  209  249  64  482
Chile  81  10  21  28  28  26  17  21
Mexico  go80  29  99  81  69  64  106  159
Morocco  l  is  18  is1  8  lO  4  2
Phillippines  16  11  8  26  61  6  0  7
Yugoslavia  87  86  88  60  58  76  92  169
CRISIS COUNTRIES  AVERAGE  |  40  41  67  86  S9  84  46  102
Colo  mbia  20  26  24  17  18  22  21  24
Indonesia  I  17  7  10  12  9  4  9  9
Korea  35  12  5  2  2  3  1  6
Thailand  16  12  8  4  0  8  2  4
Turkey  t  86  80  86  87  60  44  81  66
NON-CRISIS  COUNTRIES  AVERAGE  3  84  17  15  14  16  14  12  18
NOTE: Average  are unwelghted,  geometric  averagee.
Source:  World  Bank  data.- 36 -
C.  Domestic  financing  public  deficits
The results  in this  section  are  from  a flow-of-funds  exercise
following  the  framework  set  out  in Table  5 and  described  in section  III.  This
will allow  us to see  what  types  of domestic  finance  were actually  used in  the
crisis  and  non-crisis  countries. To be consistent  with the  theoretical
framework  developed  above,  the  data  are  presented  in the  form  of the  change  in
the  financial  stock  (end-of-year)  as a  percentage  of GDP. All flows  are
analyzed  in inflation-adjusted  terms  except  for  the  money  base  and
rediscounts,  where  both the  inflation-adjusted  and  nominal  flows  are  given.
The  nominal  flows  are  relevant  for  the  money  base  because  they  represent  the
total  *revenue-  from  the  inflation  tax.  The  inflation-adjusted  flow
represents  the real  change  in  demand  for  the  money  base,  which  can  be
interpreted  as the  real  seignorage  accruing  to the  public  sector. The  nominal
flow  of  central  bank  rediscounts  also is important  when  no interest  is
effectively  paid  on these  rediscounts.  The inflation-adjusted  flows  are
calculated  as the  nominal  flow  minus  the  inflation  adjustment  applying  to  the
previous  year's  stock.
For  some  cases  it is  appropriate  to  make  adjustments  for  the  negative
real  interest  rates  paid  on government  debt.  This  is  done in  the  analysis  for
loans  from  the  financial  system  and  for  sales  of government  securities.  The
adjusted  figure  can  be interpreted  as the  net  domestic  transfer.  i.e.  the  real
net  flow  minus  interest  payments  on that  particular  liability. The  adjustment
factor  to get  from  the  inflation-corrected  flow  to the  net  transfer  can  be.
interpreted  roughly  as the  real  interest  on government  debt  times  the
outstanding  stock  of  debt. Where  data  on government  bond  rates  are  not
available,  the  deposit  interest  rate  is  used  as a proxy. Where  interest  is
paid  on bank  reserves  by the  central  bank (Argentina,  Chile,  Mexico),  the  same
correction  is  made  for  reserves.- 37 -
1.  Total  domestic  financing
Table  8 shows  the aggregate  public  domestic  financing  as  percent  of
GDP for the  crisis  and  noncrisis  countries  (Appendix  III  contains  the  detailed
data  for  each  country  broken  down  by source  of financing). Most of the  crisis
countries  shows  a  marked increase  in  domestic  financing  in 1982  or aftcrwards.
Argentina,  Chile,  and  Mexico  show  an increase  immediately,  even if  bank
reserves  are treated  as debt.3/  After  the initial  burst  of financing  in
1982,  domestic  financing  slows  in  Argentina  and  Mexico,  even turning  negative
if reserves  are treated  as debt.  In Brazil,  Morocco,  and  Yugoslavia,  the
increase  in  domestic  financing  is  more gradual,  but still  significant. The
Philippines  is the  only  crisis  country  which  does  not show  a sizeable  increase
in domestic  financing  in the  period  beginning  in 1982.
The  non-crisis  countries  shows  a different  pattern. None  of them
show  a marked  increase  in  domestic  financing  over  the  period.  Some  years show
a moderate  increase  for  some  countries,  such  as  Thailand  for  alternating
years,  Korea in  1986,  and  Turkey  in  1984-85.
2.  Tax on financial  intermediation
Even the  high  numbers  shown  for domestic  financing  in the  crisis
countries  underestimated  the impact  on the financial  system  in some  cases.
This  is  because  negative  interest  rates  were  paid on  government  debt in  some
cases,  which  meant the  real  change  in  debt  was artificially  depressed  by the
3/  If interest  is  paid  on reserves,  we should  treat  them  as debt  and
include  the real  flow  rather  than  the  nominal  flow  in  the  domestic
financing  calculation. This  correction  is done  only for  Argentina,
Chile,  and  Mexico,  where  interest  is paid  on reserves  and information
is  available. However,  the  correction  is  overstated,  since  not all
reserves  receive  interest  in these  countries. The  numbers  presented
for  Argentina,  Chile  and  Mexico  should  thus  be thought  of  as upper  and
lower  bounds  for  domestic  financing.- 38  -
Table  8
AOGE0ATE  PUBLIC  DOMESTIC  FINANCING
(Percent  of GOP)
AVERAOE  - -
1971-75  1976-78  1979-81  1982-86*  1982  1688  1984  1986  1966
Crisis  Countries
Argentina  1/  14.65  13.07  6.18  14.72  26.09  17.88  17.70  6.84  8.58
2/  6.00  -1.54  8.78  8.64  26.10  -4.60  -2.01  -0.41  0.12
Brazil  NA  NA  4.17  6.07  4.06  5.84  6.40  6.40  NA
Chile  1/  NA  8.28  0.41  2.85  4.85  2.85  1.86  NA  NA
2/  NA  1.19  -0.61  1.08  8.72  2.08  1.61  NA  NA
Mexico  1/  NA  NA  6.95  10.88  28.46  2.68  4.07  7.67  18.88
2/  NA  NA  4.67  4.08  15.46  -4.69  -1.16  2.81  6.48
Morocco  2.88  8.90  1.97  8.64  1.60  8.88  0.48  8.95  8.46
Philippines  NA  1.86  0.60  0.68  1.60  0.24  -0.17  1.05  NA
Yugoslavia  NA  NA  5.60  10.19  7.09  11.13  10.25  9.71  12.77
Non-Crisis  Countrie
Colombia  NA  4.91  2.72  1.98  2.60  1.14  2.26  NA  NA
Indonesia  NA  1.76  1.67  1.51  1.86  1.83  1.86  0.95  1.66
Korea  2.12  2.78  0.22  1.75  1.25  0.48  1.65  1.81  8.61
Thailand  2.36  1.74  0.93  8.04  a.80  1.81  4.48  1.88  4.72
Turkey  NA  4.85  2.568  8.04  2.02  1.65  4.60  5.68  1.86
*  Period  average  for  years  for  which  data  are  available.
1/  Including  nominal  flow  of  bank reserv;s.
2/  Substituting  Inflation-adjusted  flo-  of bank  reservos.
Source; Internotional  Financial  Statistics,  Intornational  Monetary  Fund.
Table  9
TAX ON FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
(Percent  of  GOP)
AVERAGE
1971-75  1976-76  1979-81  1962-66.  1982  1988  1984  1986  1986
Crisis  Countries
Argentina  I/  NA  NA  5.70  16.24  7.90  29.16  26.00  7.U6  5.75
2/  NA  NA  2.78  10.22  7.47  17.09  17.15  6.09  8.29
Brazil  NA  NA  NA  2.27  1.26  8.27  2.64  2.08  NA
Chile  I/  NA  NA  2.16  1.49  2.72  0.91  0.84  NA  NA
2/  NA  NA  0.80  NA  1.62  0.68  0.64  NA  NA
Mexico  1/  NA  NA  8.52  11.64  16.42  18.68  8.82  6.95  12.90
2/  NA  NA  0.68  7.12  12.74  6.28  8.95  1.76  6.90
Morocco  NA  NA  2.82  1.24  0.98  2.60  1.20  1.68  -0.07
Philippine  NA  0.56  1.20  0.69  0.16  2.11  8.69  -0.86  -0.70
Yugoslavia  NA  NA  7.12  10.67  6.86  12.12  10.68  12.49  12.77
Non-Crisis  Countrieo
Colombia  NA  1.70  2.48  1.21  2.09  0.76  0.74  1.26  NA
Indonesia  AN  0.865  1.01  0.28  0.60  0.52  0.24  -0.28  0.42
Korea  1.29  1.12  1.62  0.28  0.38  0.29  0.29  0.28  0.08
Thall2nd.  NA  NA  1.81  -0.74  -0.61  -0.a8  -1.25  -0.74  -0.70
Turkey  NA  NA  7.82  2.80  2.48  2.79  8.82  8.28  1.66
*  Period  overage  for  yoars  for  which  data  are  available.
1/  Including  nominal  flow  of  bank  reserves.
2/  Including  only  negative  real  Interest  rate  paid  on  reservoe.
Source:  International  Financial  Statlitics,  International  Monetary  Fund.- 39 -
amount  of a  'tax*  which  was collected  from  the  holders  of the  debt.4/
Summing  this  and the "inflation  tax'  on the  money  base (which  includes  both
currency  and  bank reserves)  gives  the  total 'tax  on financial  intermediation."
As shown  in Table  9 for  crisis  and  non-crisis  countries,  the  tax on financial
intermediation  was an important  source  of finance  for  the  crisis  countries  of
Argentina.  Mexico,  and  Yugoslavia  after  1982 (it  is still  important  even  if  we
make  the correction  for  the interest  paid  on reserves  in  Argentina  and
Mexico).  It  was also  significant  in  some  years  in  Brazil  and in  the
Philippines  compared  to  pre-crisis  levels. Even  these 'revenues'  from
financial  intermediation  taxes  do  not fully  reflect  the increase  in the
*rates'  of the  tax,  since  the 'base'  of the tax  was at the same  time  being
eroded. For example,  Brazil  had  very  high inflation  and  negative  real
interest  rates  throughout  the  period,  but shows  only  moderate  inflation  tax
revenues  because  of its  miniscule  financial  base.  Only in  Chile  and  Morocco
is there  little  change  from  pre-crisis  levels. In the  non-crisis  countries,
Turkey  and  Colombia  show  a significant  level  of revenue  from  the  tax on
financial  intermediation,  but this  was a decline  from  the 1979-81  period.
Indonesia,  Korea,  and  Thailand  do  not  have significant  revenues  from  this
'tax.'
3.  Financial  savings
The reliance  on taxes  on financial  intermediation  had consequences
for  the level  of financial  saving  in the  crisis  countries. Table  10 shows  the
inflation-adjusted  change  in  currency  and in  financial  system  liabilities  to
the  private  sector  and  as percent  of  GDP.  Those  countries  that  had  high
revenues  from  financial  intermediation  taxes  also  saw  their 'tax  base'  begin
to  disappear. Argentina,  Mexico,  and  Yugoslavia  had  negative  real financial
4/  In the  absence  of sufficient  information  to  evaluate  the equilibrium
real  interest  rate,  we suppose  it  to be zero  for  all countries. If the
equilibrium  rate  is  positive,  the  tax  will  be underestimated.- 40 -
savings  for  most or all  of the  period  beginning  in  1982,  as  well as a decline
in real  currency  balances. The  Philippines  had  negative  financial  savings  and
a decline  in real  currency  holdings  in  1983-84  --  the  same  years  for  which it
had  a  higher  than  usual  financial  intermediation  tax.  The  other  crisis
countries  had  mostly  positive  financial  savings. Brazil  increased  financial
savings  compared  to poor  performance  in  1979-81,  but it remained  relatively
low  by international  standards  and  currency  still  declined. Chile  had one
year  of  negative  financial  savings  immediately  after  the  crisis  (1983).  Only
Morocco  --  which had moderate taxes on financial intermediation --  had fairly
steady  improvement  in financial  savings  throughout  the  period. Morocco  was
also  the  only  country  that  avoided  a decline  in  currency  balances  after  1982.
The  non-crisis  countries  had  much stronger  performance  in the  growth
of financial  savings  on the  whole. Korea  and  Thailand  had  outstanding  growth
in financial  as'ets  which  surpassed  their  experience  in  the  1970's.
Indonesia,  Colombia,  and  Turkey  had  more  erratic  performance  but  still
superior  to  most of the  crisis  countries,  as  well  as comparable  or superior  to
performance  in  the  1970's.
4.  Credit  to  public  and  private  sectors
Table  11 shows  the  inflation-adjusted  credit  flows  from  the  financial
system  to  the  public  and  private  sectors  for  crisis  and  noncrisis  countries.
In 1982,  there  is  a surge  of credit  to  the  public  sector  in  Argentina,  Chile,
and  Mexico,  with  more  modest  credit  flows  in the  other  crisis  countries. In
1983-84,  however,  the  inflation-adjusted  flow  of  credit  to the  public  sector
turns  negative  in  Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico,  Morocco  and  the  Philippines.  In
1985-86,  public  credit  flows  increase  sharply  again  in  Mexico  and  Morocco,  but
decline  in  Argentina  and  Yugoslavia.  These  erratic  flows  reflect  the- 41  -
Table 10
FINANCIAL  SYSTEM  LIBASILITIES  TO PRIVATE  SECTOR
(Porcent  of  GDP)
(inflation  Adjusted)
AVERAGE  -
1971-75  19076-78  1979-81  1982-868  1082  1088  1984  1985  1986
…-----------  - - --  -------  -------- …---…
Crisis  Countries
Argentina
currency  -0.69  -0.85  -0.81  0.06  -0.40  -0.02  -0.97  1.27  0.42
deposits  -8.06  8.41  1.71  -2.54  -9.76  -2.89  -8.82  -0.20  2.96
Brazi  I
currency  0.78  -0.12  -0.24  -0.26  -0.81  -&04  C  16  0.15  KA
deposits  NA  1.51  0.02  1.72  1.21  0.46  3.89  1.49  NA
Chile
currency  NA  0.69  0.88  -0.81  -0.89  -0.07  0.02  NA  NA
deposits  NA  4.16  8.48  -0.16  2.24  -6.08  2.40  NA  NA
Mexico
currency  0.86  0.84  0.81  -0.64  -0.61  -1.86  0.18  -0.22  -0.65
deposits  NA  NA  8.88  -8.87  -9.16  -2.60  1.42  -8.64  -2.95
Morocco
currency  0.92  0.87  0.81  0.88  0.08  0.16  0.27  -0.19  1.84
deposit.  NA  NA  1.28  8.07  2.10  8.89  0.94  8.98  4.97
Philippines
currency  -0.08  0.87  -0.14  0.11  0.02  0.94  -1.44  0.17  0.86
dpooslt.  NA  8.87  -0.13  -2.53  1.65  -4.84  -10.44  1.28  -0.29
Yugoslavia
currency  0.U8  0.27  -0.44  -0.45  0.05  -1.82  -0.74  -0.07  0.82
deposit.  NA  NA  NA  -4.44  -0.28  -8.88  -2.49  -6.50  -4.12
Mon-Crslis  Coulikd
Colombia
currency  f  0.10  0.64  -0.14  -0.11  0.17  0.51  0.85  -1.49  NA
deposit. s  *  NA  1.87  2.46  1.81  -0.04  2.70  1.27  NA  NA
Indonosia
currency  0.46  0.56  0.87  0.29  0.21  0.07  0.08  0.62  0.49
deposit.  NA  1.88  2.02  2.11  0.47  2.84  2.22  4.18  0.88
Kore
currency  0.58  1.00  -0.85  0.41  0.85  0.41  0.24  0.10  0.46
deposit.  8.88  4.82  1.10  4.47  5.44  4.26  1.84  4.75  6.09
Thailand
currency  0.25  0.47  -0.08  0.86  0.59  0.89  0.42  -0.16  0.54
deposit.  2.79  6.66  1.85  8.12  8.82  8.14  10.28  6.62  7.90
Turkey
currency  0.86  0.47  -0.80  -0.04  0.85  -0.15  -(0.46  -0.16  0.24
deposit.  NA  -0.78  0.68  1.66  8.12  -!.s0  1.62  2.60  2.46
*  Period  average  for  years  for  which  data  are  *allablo.
Source: International  Financial  Statistics,  Internotional  Monetary  Fund.- 42  -
increased  need for  credit  to the  government  at the  same  time  as financial
disintermediation  made such  credit  provision  difficult.
This fatal  squeeze  had an  even larger  effect  on  credit  to  the  private
sector  in the  crisis  countries. Table  11 shows  that  inflation-adjusted  flows
of credit  to the  private  sector  were  negative  in  most years  for  the  crisis
countries  beginning  in  1982,  with the  exception  of  Morocco. The  private
sector  was the  residual  that  absorbed  the  effects  of increased  public
financing  demands  and  lower  financial  savings.
In  the  non-crisis  countries,  the  credit  pattern  is  drastically
different. All of the  non-crisis  countries  improved  the  flows  of credit  to
the  private  sectot  compared  to the  late  1970's. Only  Turkey  had  a  negative
inflation-adjusted  flow  in one  year (1984). Thailand  and  Korea  had
particularly  high rates  of real  delivery  of private  credit. Credit  provision
to the  public  sector  was more  modest,  but  was positive  for  the  period  for
Indonesia,  Korea.  and  Thailand. Turkey  and  Colombia  had  more erratic  flows  of
public  credit,  averaging  close  to zero  for  1982-86.
5.  Central  bank rediscounts
The remaining  piece  of the  puzzle  is the  provision  of credit  by the
public sector --  through central bank rediscounts --  to the banking system and
private  sector. As shown  in table  12,  these  flows  (measured  here in  nominal
terms  as  percent  of GDP)  were  very important  in some  of the  crisis  countries,
increasing  the  total  financing  needs  of the  public  sector  in  those  countries.
Argentina,  Chile,  and  Mexico  had a surge  in such  credits  in  1982,  which
continued  afterward  for  Argentina  and  Chile,  though  not for  Mexico. This
reflected  some  form  of bailouts  of banks  and  private  firms  in  these  countries
after  the  outbreak  of the  debt  crisis. In Brazil  and  Yugoslavia,  previous 1 .y- 43  -
Table  lla
FINANCIAL  SYSTEM  CLAIMS  ON  PUBLIC  SECTOR
(Percent  of GOP)
(Inflatlon  Adjusted)
- ----  AVERAGE  ---- 
1971-76  1976-78  1979-81  1982-86*  1982  lss9  1984  1986  1986
Crisis  Countries
Argetine  1.82  -6.29  0.89  -0.64  21.24  -10.11  -7.07  -4.78  -2.52
Brazil  NA  NA  1.87  0.71  1.11  1.28  -0.88  1.82  NA
Chile  NA  0.90  -1.68  1.84  3.87  0.94  0.70  NA  NA
Mexico  NA  NA  8.16  2.06  11.70  -6.58  -8.15  1.26  7.00
Morocco  1.03  1.71  0.16  2.10  0.59  1.47  -0.88  2.78  6.55
Philippinos  NA  1.48  -0.82  -0.11  0.66  -1.78  -0.79  1.60  NA
Yugolavia  NA  NA  -0.67  0.22  1.00  1.90  1.06  -2.47  -0.89
Non-Crisis  Countrios
Colombia  NA  1.60  0.08  0.04  -0.78  0.88  0.60  NA  NA
Indonesia  1.09  0.26  0.81  0.78  0.77  1.00  1.41  0.08  0.48
Korea  o  0.  0.78  -0.65  0.91  1.20  -0.71  2.17  1.55  0.a8
Thalland  1.18  0.71  -0.08  2.52  2.62  0.64  4.09  1.29  4.04
Turkey  1.98  2.78  -4.07  -0.06  -1.00  -1.76  1.26  2.17  -0.98
_  __  ~~~~~~~~--  - - -_-  - - - --  --  - --  - - - - --  --  _-  --  - - - - - --  - --  - - - --  - -
e  Period  average  for  years  for  which  data  are  avallable.
Table  llb
FINANCIAL SYSTEM  CLAIMS  ON PRIVATE  SECTOR
(Percent  of  COP)
(Inflation  Adjusted)
---- AVERAGE  --
1971-76  1976-78  1979-81  1982-USe  1982  1988  1984  1985  1986
Crisis  Countries
Argentina  -1.98  2.69  6.49  -4.98  -2.18  -18.22  -8.60  -0.98  0.17
Brazll  6.75  2.48  -0.66  -0.81  2.82  -8.26  2.67  -2.87  NA
Chile  NA  7.30  6.77  2.23  10.68  -8.19  4.19  NA  NA
Mexico  NA  -1.85  1.76  -2.66  -9.17  -2.76  2.09  -0.35  -2.68
Morocco  2.86  1.92  1.17  1.86  2.25  0.60  2.22  0.46  NA
Philippines  2.11  8.99  8.46  -6.81  2.36  0.61  -17.96  -8.64  -7.92
Yugoslavia  0.21  8.60  -1.64  -6.62  -4.20  -12.58  -1.72  -8.91  -5.78
Non-Crisis  Countrieo
Colombia  NA  0.86  2.24  2.97  1.88  4.07  3.08  NA  NA
Indonesia  NA  1.24  1.68  2.63  2.60  1.92  8.04  2.78  2.97
Korea  4.93  6.97  4.69  7.52  9.91  7.64  5.84  8.22  6.98
Thailand  2.76  8.08  0.78  6.66  6.02  9.65  7.58  8.61  1.81
Turkey  2.81  -0.57  0.22  1.45  1.72  1.99  -2.17  1.65  4.06
_  ------  - ---  - ------  - ---------  - --------  - - - -----------  - -------  - -
o Period  average  for  years  for  which  data  are  available.
Source: International  Financial  Statistics,  International  Monetary  Fund.- 44  -
Table  12
SUM  OF CENTRAL  SANK  REDISCOVNTS  TO  BANKING  SYSTEM  AND  PRIVATE  SECTOR
(Percent of  GDP)
--  AVERAGE
1971-75  1976-78  1979-81  1962-866  192  198  1084  1966  1086
Cristo  Countries
Argentina  1/  10.59  8.76  8.10  NA  29.61  13.40  15.U8  NA  NA
Brazil  NA  5.84  4.67  8.72  3.98  8.57  8.84  4.15  NA
Chile  NA  1.68  0.46  18.08  11.97  28.76  18.46  NA  NA
Mexico  1/  NA  0.88  0.28  0.87  2.77  -1.06  0.20  -0.18  0.06
Morocco  NA  NA  NA  1.62  0.84  0.21  1.88  1.81  4.85
Philippines  1/  1.08  0.26  2.28  0.08  1.11  1.79  1.75  0.46  -4.72
Yugoslavia  2.42  5.48  4.66  4.86  4.78  4.48  4.94  8.56  4.08
Non-Crils  Countries
Colo  blo  1.28  1.48  0.46  1.34  1.01  1.91  1.28  1.22  NA
Indonesia  NA  NA  1.82  2.98  4.68  1.86  4.61  0.05  8.08
Korea  1/  1.66  1.19  1.91  2.08  1.07  1.72  2.69  2.68  2.05
Thailand  1/  0.58  0.11  0.79  0.47  0.16  0.21  0.48  0.59  0.96
Turkey  1/  NA  5.08  2.43  0.18  -0.86  2.26  -1.98  0.28  0.45
*  Period  average  for  years  for  which  data  are  available.
1/ Redilcounts  to  financial  system  only.
Source:  International  Financial  Statistics,  International  Monetary  Fund.- 45 -
high levels  of central  bank rediscounts  continued  in  the  1980's. These  flows
were  comparatively  less  important  in  Morocco  and  the  Philippines.
In the  non-crisis  countries,  the  flows  of central  bank  rediscounts
are important  in all  of the  countries  except  Thailand,  but  do  not show
dramatic  increases  over  the  period  as  a  whole.  Indonesia  and  Colombia  both
show  the  effect  of financial  crises,  but  not  on the  same  scale  as  Argentina  or
Chile.
5.  Summary
The results  on financial  intermediation  taxes  and financial  savings
dramatize  the  policy  dilemmas  faced  by some  of the  crisis  countries. The  tax
on financial intermediation --  including the inflation tax --  was one
substitute  for  the  external  public  financing  which  disappeared  beginning  in
1982,  especially  as increased  central  bank  rediscounts  demanded  more
resources.  With the  poor  financial  savings  performance  in  these  countries,  it
could  generate  more financing  than  conventional  borrowing  at  market  rates.
However,  the  tax  itself  caused  further  declines  in real  financial  balances,
which in  turn  required  even  more reliance  on inflation  or interest  controls  to
achieve  the  necessary  financing.  The  end  result  was  a severe  squeeze  on
private  sector  credit,  with baleful  consequences  for  private  investment.  The
Scylla  of an internal  debt  trap  was  avoided  only  to sail  into  the  Charybdis  of
financial  disintermediation.  The  non-crisis  countries,  who  had less  urgent
need for  domestic  firance  to replace  lost  external  credits,  escaped  the
shipwreck  altogether.
V.  Conclusions  and  Extensions
What  policy  lessons  should  we draw  from  the  country  experiences
reviewed  in  this  paper? The  outcomes  of the  policies  followed  in  the  crisis- 46 -
countries  suggest  that  policies  were not  optimal  even  under  the  conditions
imposed  by the  debt  crisis. The  large  taxes  on financial  intermediation
through  reserve  requirements,  high inflation,  and  interest  rate  controls  were
severely  distortionary  both in  the  short  run  and  in the  long  run.  In the
short  run,  the  tax  was  associated  with  capital  flight  and  financial
disintermediation.  This  may  have  implied  some  inequity  in the "tax
collection',  since  wealthier  people  could  move  their  capital  out  more  easily.
By penalizing  private  investment,  the  tax  also  damaged  long-run  growth. In
the  non-crisis  countries,  on the  other  hand,  government  borrowing  at market
rates  was less  costly  for  private  investment  because  the  growth  of financial
savings  was so rapid.
Further  research  is  needed  on  how the  distortions  caused  by taxes  on
financial  intermediation  compare  with the  effects  of conventional  taxes.
Although  any  conclusions  are  speculative  in the  absence  of such  research,  it
seems  likely  that small  increases  in  rates  or coverage  of  broad-based  taxes
(such  as those  on income  or consumption)  would  generally  be less  distortionary
for  the  same  amount  of additional  revenue  than  taxes  on financial
intermediation.  Conventional  broad-based  taxes  penalize  mainly  consumption,
while  the  tax  on financial  intermediation  falls  more  upon investment.  This
might  suggest  that  the  long-run  damage  caused  by the  latter  is  more severe.
The  choice  of  public  investment  as the  main locus  of fiscal
adjustment  also  may have  hurt  private  investment  and  growth  in the  crisis
countries.  At least some public investments.  --  such as infrastructure --  are
essential  inputs  into  private  production.  By contrast,  the  maintenance  of
public  investment  in the  non-crisis  countries  may  have reinforced  the  healthy
rates  of private  investment  and  growth. The  magnitudes  of these,  effects
should  be the  subject  of further  research.
The  evidence  collected  in this  paper  suggests  that  the  approach
followed  in  most of the  non-crisis  countries  --  modest  domiestic  finance  at_ 47 -
market  interest  rates  --  was superior  to that  followed  in  most  of the  crisis
countries  --  increased  domestic  finance  through  taxes  on financial
intermediation.  Although  further  research  is  needed,  it is likely  the  crisis
countries  would  have  been  better  off  raising  conventional  taxes  and  cutting
current  spending  rather  than  raising  taxes  on financial  intermediation  and
cutting  public  investment.
The  context  in  which  these  policies  were  made should  not  be ignored,
however. The speed  with  which  external  net transfers  were reversed  required
quick  action  by the  crisis  countries. Raising  conventional  tax  collections  is
an inherently  slower  process  than  taxing  financial  balances. Cutting  current
spending  is  more  politically  and  institutionally  difficult  --  and  thus  slower
--  than  cutting  public  investment.  It is  understandable  that  countries  often
resorted  to  quick,  although  distortionary,  policies.  To allow  a shift  towdrds
sounder  policies  in  the  future  would  likely  require  some  breathing  space
through  new  external  financing  or relief  from  debt service.- 48 -
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APPENDIX  I
EXTERNAL  DEBT. ]WORTS.  AND EXPORTS  BY COUNTRYEXMNi.L  DEBT  FLOWS
(Percent  of  ONP)
1980  1981  1982  1988  1984  1986  1996
ARGENTINA
PUBLIC  LT  DEBT:  18.14  18.91  30.42  42.81  36.97  68.90  61.70
change  in  PUBLIC  LT  debt  2.82  0.70  10.18  16.08  1.80  14.69  3.80
net flows  of PUBLIC  LT debt  8.02  1.48  7.16  2.80  0.06  4.88  1.17
revaluation  -0.20  -0.66  -0.38  -0.36  -0.e6  1.38  1.03
residusi  0.00  -0.21  3.40  14.13  2.41  8.44  1.60
PRIVATE  LT DEBT:  11.76  21.76  21.60  17.48  14.29  7.68  6.13
change in  PRIVATE  LT debt  NA  9.97  -1.80  -1.40  -0.07  -9.63  -0.02
net  flows  of PRIVATE  LT debt  NA  9.98  3.87  0.17  -0.04  -0.30  -0 31
revaluation  NA  -0.22  -0.30  -0.11  -0.18  0.38  0.09
residual  NA  0.20  -6.38  -1.46  0.16  -9.69  0.20
SHORT-TERM  DEBT:  18.60  23.11  1.683  13.69  11.96  9.84  4.24
change  in  SHORT-TERM  debt  NA  4.54  6.89  -14.21  0.79  -4.46  -3.76
revaluation  NA  -0.34  -0.32  -0.17  -0.16  0.37  0.13
effective  chanr,s  NA  4.88  7.22  -14.04  0.94  -4.82  -3.89
BRAZIL
PUBLIC  LT DEBT:  17.60  17.64  19.88  31.00  36.49  34.38  30.65
change  in  PUBLIC  LT debt  2.01  1.87  2.17  4.86  6.29  1.68  3.19
net flows  of PUBLIC  LT debt  1.84  2-38  2.60  3.16  3.76  0.61  0.31
revaluation  -0.01  -0.43  -0.26  -0.36  -0.66  1.10  1.12
residual  0.18  -0.07  -0.07  2.06  2.09  0.07  1.78
PRIVATE  LT DEBT:  7.16  7.7/  9.11  11.16  9.74  8.00  6.42
change  in  PRIVATE  LT debt  0.32  1.26  1.31  -0.84  -1.12  -0.98  -0.96
net  flows  of  PRIVATE  LT  debt  0.10  1.02  0.60  -0.68  -0.36  -0.36  -0.27
revaluation  NA  -0.17  -0.11  -0.16  -0.16  0.28  0.2!
residual  NA  0.40  0.82  -0.01  -0.60  -0.90  -0.89
SHORT-TERM  DEBT:  6.83  6.01  6.88  7.36  6.81  6.13  3.34
Chn;e  *n  SCnoT-TvDU  Adk:  MA  A  7A  A  0.  -l.O  -1.37  -0.22  -0. 4
revaluation  NA  -0.14  -0.08  -0.11  -0.11  0.17  0.14
effective  change  NA  0.84  0.92  -1.67  -1.26  -0.39  -0.88
CHILE
PUBLIC  LT DEBT:  17.79  14.62  23.60  38.06  62.87  91.76  101.11
change  in  PUBLIC  LT debt  -0.27  -0.68  3.34  8.83  23.01  14.86  14.55
net flows  of PUBLIC  LT debt  0.00  -0.24  3.65  8.19  10.47  8.16  4.88
revaluation  -0.20  -0.44  -0.28  -0.32  -0.48  1.84  2.32
residual  -0.07  0.00  -0.03  0.96  13.02  4.86  7.36
PRIVATE  LT DEBT:  17.62  26.10  38.86  46.00  37.28  33.68  18.88
change  i.a  PRIVATE LT debt  7.35  11.06  2.62  -3.33  -9.85  -12.03  -12.78
net flows  of PRIVATE  LT debt  7.97  11.16  2.68  -1.97  -0.39  -0.81  -0.01
revaluation  NA  -0.36  -0.41  -0.43  -0.61  1.02  0.83
residual  NA  0.24  0.36  -0.93  -8.96  -12.24  -13.60
SHORT-TERM  DEBT:  9.61  9.69  14.86  14.39  11.10  11.83  9.90
change  in SHORT-TERM  debt  NA  1.38  1.66  -4.09  -3.97  -1.75  -1.26
revaluation  NA  -0.19  -0.16  -0.16  -0.16  0.30  0.29
effective  change  NA  1.57  1.70  -3.93  -3.81  -2.06  -1.55
MEXICO
PUBLIC  LT DEBT:  18.86  18.72  33.31  60.16  43.48  42.72  61.76
change  in  PUBLIC  LT debt  2.63  3.96  6.62  11.36  2.09  1.23  2.26
not flows  of PUBLIC  LT debt  2.86  4.16  6.68  1.79  0.76  0.20  1.03
revalustion  -0.16  -0.21  -0.31  -0.39  -0.41  0.66  1.04
residual  -0.07  0.01  0.26  9.96  1.74  0.37  0.20
PRIVATE  LT DEBT:  4.06  4.43  6.22  11.12  10.86  9.76  13.26
change  in  PRIVATE LT debt  NA  1.26  -1.35  6.03  1.67  -0.69  -0.33
net  flows  of  PRIVATE  LT  debt  NA  1.26  -0.46  0.00  0.24  -0.63  -0.24
revaluation  NA  -0.04  -0.08  -0.06  -0.08  0.13  0.17
residual  NA  0.04  -0.82  6.08  1.62  -0.19  -0.26
SHORT-TERM  DEBT:  8.96  10.86  16.86  7.62  3.99  3.22  5.44
change in  SHORT-TERM  debt  NA  3.83  0.76  -12.02  -2.29  -0.69  0.95
revaluation  NA  -0.08  -0.19  -0.16  -0.06  0.05  0.08
effective  change  NA  3.91  0.94  -11.87  -2.24  -0.64  0.89- 53  -
EXTERNAL  DEBT FLOWS
(Percent  of  ONP)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1986  1986
INDONESIA
PUBLIC  LT DEBT:  20.01  17.76  20.64  27.99  28.03  32.69  44.38
chang In  PUBLIC  LT  debt  2.82  1.94  1.98  2.26  2.14  2.18  2.42
net  flows  of PUBLIC  LT debt  2.18  1.81  8.48  4.71  2.68  1.53  2.88
revaluation  0.16  -0.82  -0.54  -0.51  -Y.14  2.90  4.60
residual  0.00  0.96  -0.96  -1.96  0.61  -2.80  -4.76
PRIVATE  LT DEBT:  4.20  4.00  3.65  4.40  4.68  4.67  6.32
chang*  in  PRIVATE  LT debt  NA  0.49  -0.42  0.26  0.49  0.01  0.03
not flows  of PRIVATE  LT debt  NA  0.49  -0.42  0.26  0.49  0.01  0.03
revaluation  NA  -0.16  -0.09  -0.10  -0.15  0.36  0.52
reasidual  NA  0.16  0.09  0.10  0.16  -0.36  -0.62
SHORT-TERM  DEST:  3.71  3.66  6.31  6.00  6.63  6.48  8.77
change  in  SHORT-TERM  debt  NA  0.6B  1.68  -0.19  0.92  -0.13  1.43
revaluation  NA  -0.14  -0.09  -0.16  -0.21  0.61  0.73
effective  change  NA  0.70  1.77  -0.04  1.13  -0.64  0.71
KOREA
PUBLIC  LT DEBT:  26.84  28.27  29.71  29.80  30.26  34.65  30.60
change  in  PUBLIC  LT debt  4.18  3.81  3.64  3.32  3.06  3.02  2.65
net flowa  of  PUBLIC  LT debt  3.28  4.66  3.24  2.94  3.40  3.21  -1.60
revaluation  0.40  -0.84  -0.68  -0.26  -0.68  1.47  1.82
residual  0.60  0.01  0.98  0.62  0.24  -1.66  2.34
PRIVATE  LT DEBT:  3.81  4.78  4.98  6.28  6.40  7.68  6.46
change  in  PRIVATE  LT debt  2.80  1.29  0.43  1.74  0.61  1.38  -1.30
n-t flows  of  PRIVATE  LT debt  0.81  1.29  0.34  1.61  0.98  1.386  -1.09
revaluation  NA  -0.11  -0.09  -0.04  -0.10  0.29  0.40
residual  NA  0.11  0.17  0.17  -0.27  -0.27  -0.61
SHORT-TERM  DEBT:  17.49  16.43  17.91  16.93  13.87  12.82  9.73
chango  in  SHORT-TERM  dobt  NA  -0.61  3.17  -0.41  -0.84  -0.83  -1.66
r.v-!t-u-tl^  MA  --. a6  -O.SO  -V.iJ  -0.26  u.6i  0.o6
effective  change  NA  0.01  3.47  -0.28  -0.67  -1.46  -2.20
THAILAND
PUBLIC  LT DEBT:  12.39  14.64  17.22  17.90  18.62  28.70  27.46
change  in  PUBLIC  LT debt  3.79  3.65  3.49  3.18  3.07  3.37  3.10
not  flows  of  PUBLIC  LT debt  3.68  3.42  3.11  2.29  1.92  4.06  0.27
rovaluation  0.23  -0.43  -0.36  -0.15  -0.68  1.96  2.86
residual  -0.01  0.66  0.73  1.03  1.73  -2.64  -0.04
PRIVATE  LT DEBT:  6.18  6.99  8.60  6.79  8.33  9.15  7.74
change  in  PRIVATE  LT debt  1.40  1.13  0.61  0.87  1.77  -0.01  -0.65
net flows  of  PRIVATE  LT debt  2.07  1.13  0.61  0.91  1.76  -0.01  -0.66
revaluation  NA  -0.12  -0.08  -0.02  -0.15  0.70  0.97
residual  NA  0.12  0.08  -0.02  0.16  -0.70  -0.97
SHORT-TERM  DEBT:  7.01  8.22  8.63  8.46  8.77  8.69  7.07
change  in SHORT-TERM  debt  NA  1.64  0.46  0.68  0.61  -0.96  -0.90
revaluation  NA  -0.17  -0.11  -0.03  -0.19  0.74  0.92
effectivo  change  NA  1.81  0.67  0.71  0.79  -1.70  -1.82
TURKEY
PUBLIC  LT DEBT:  26.76  27.01  31.19  32.22  36.24  37.68  41.38
chango  in PUBLIC  LT debt  7.01  6.96  7.59  7.88  8.12  7.81  6.96
not  flows  of PUBLIC  LT debt  3.16  2.04  1.72  0.90  2.74  0.98  3.01
rovaluation  -0.76  -1.43  -1.04  -1.26  -1.48  2.46  2.67
residual  4.62  6.36  6.91  8.22  6.86  4.18  1.27
PRIVATE  LT DEBT:  0.96  0.78  0.76  0.80  0.88  0.70  0.89
chango  in  PRIVATE  LT debt  -0.17  -0.17  -0.09  0.01  0.06  -0.13  0.28
not  flows  of PRIVATE  LT debt  0.08  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.06  -0.18  0.18
revaluation  NA  -0.04  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  0.04  0.04
residual  NA  -0.16  -0.08  0.03  0.03  0.01  0.e^4
SHORT-TERM  DEBT:  4.46  3.90  3.42  4.69  6.69  9.26  12.27
change  in SHORT-TERm  debt  NA  -0.53  -0.83  1.04  1.86  3.07  3.82
revaluation  NA  -0.17  -0.17  -0.11  -0.19  0.32  0.47
effective  change  NA  -0.36  -0.68  1.16  2.06  2.74  3.35
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EXTERNAL  DEBT FLOWS
(Percent  of  GNP)
1980  1981  1982  1988  1984  1985  1986
MOROCCO
PUBLIC  LT DEBT:  42.69  57.32  63.87  80.93  93.97  115.79  103.87
change  in  PUBLIC  LT debt  6.80  8.31  8.20  9.26  10.36  10.57  8.33
not flows  of PUBLIC LT debt  6.45  7.89  9.37  3.15  8.65  6.43  4.65
revaluation  -0.96  -2.72  -1.78  -2.42  -3.20  5.91  6.64
residual  1.80  3.14  0.65  8.52  6.02  -0.76  -1.96
PRIVATE  LT DEBT:
change  in  PRIVATE  LT debt
not flows  of  PRIVATE  LT debt
revalustion
residual
SHORT-TERM  DEBT:  4.46  9.01  8.19  9.26  10.48  16.01  15.68
change  in  SHORT-TERM  debt  NA  3.67  -0.71  0.03  0.10  4.32  3.73
revaluation  NA  -0.30  -0.22  -0.36  -0.36  0.62  0.44
effective  change  NA  3.87  -0.49  0.38  0.46  3.70  3.29
PHILIPPINES
PUBLIC  LT DEBT:  18.53  19.81  22.74  31.06  38.84  42.72  65.84
chango  in  PUBLIC  LT debt  3.87  3.66  3.47  4.00  4.32  4.29  4.63
not  flows  of PUBLIC  LT debt  3.46  3.32  3.69  6.10  3.37  2.82  1.95
rovaluation  0.41  -0.60  -0.39  -0.13  -0.76  2.30  3.26
residual  0.02  0.73  0.18  -0.97  1.70  -0.83  -0.68
PRIVATE  LT DEBT:  6.97  7.18  P.22  9.17  8.58  9.43  6.96
change  in  PRIVATE  LT debt  1.09  0.80  1.19  -0.30  -1.31  0.90  -4.00
net flows  of PRIVATE  LT debt  0.43  0.57  0.22  -0.06  -0.33  0.42  -0.06
revaluation  NA  -0.18  -0.12  -0.04  -0.17  0.36  0.46
rosidual  NA  0.40  1.09  -0.21  -0.81  0.12  -4.40
SHORT-TERM  DEBT:  21.46  24.51  28.84  27.59  30.05  26.96  17.86
change  in  SHORT-TERM  debt  NA  4.86  4.86  -6.64  0.28  -2.89  -10.61
revaluation  NA  -0.65  -_n41  -0.14  -0.51  1.25  1.29
effective  change  NA  5.40  6.26  -6.49  0.79  -4.14  -11.90
YUGOSLAVIA
PUBLIC  LT DEBT:  6.34  7.38  8.65  16.43  19.37  25.13  20.37
chango  in  PUBLIC  LT debt  1.27  0.88  0.42  3.76  3.07  6.67  2.42
n-t'flows  of PUBLIC  LT debt  1.38  1.01  0.48  1.72  0.63  -0.14  -0.73
revaluation  -0.13  -0.14  -0.07  -0.20  -0.32  0.78  1.20
residual  0.02  0.00  0.00  2.23  2.76  6.93  1.96
PRIVATE  LT DEBT:  16.23  16.61  17.23  21.45  18.49  13.41  7.39
change  in  PRIVATE  LT debt  1.31  0.99  -1.31  -1.80  -4.17  -4.31  -2.19
net  flows  of PRIVATE  LT debt  1.67  0.73  -0.34  0.16  -0.94  -0.20  -0.19
rvoaluation  NA  -0.09  -0.18  -0.66  -0.60  0.84  0.69
residual  NA  0.35  -0.79  -1.41  -2.73  -4.96  -2.69
SHORT-TERM  DEBT:  2.96  3.64  2.87  2.44  2.32  2.14  2.07
change  in  SHORT-TERM  debt  NA  0.60  -1.08  -1.43  -0.26  -0.08  0.64
revaluation  NA  -0.02  -0.04  -0.09  -0.0o  0.11  0.09
effective  change  NA  0.62  -1.04  -1.34  -0.20  -0.18  0.46
COLOMBIA  -
PUBLIC  LT DEBT:  12.30  14.11  15.68  18.17  21.69  28.45  36.60
change  in  PUBLIC  LT debt  2.14  1.97  1.86  1.88  1.93  2.16  2.27
not  flows  of PUBLIC  LT debt  2.31  2.92  2.42  2.64  3.26  3.63  6.34
revalustion  -0.08  -0.19  -0.12  -0.16  -0.23  0.67  1.08
residual  -0.09  -0.76  -0.46  -0.60  -1.10  -2.04  -4.16
PRIVATE  LT DEBT:  1.66  2.41  3.12  3.38  3.91  A.J7  5.07
change  in  PRIVATE  LT debt  0.17  0.98  0.86  0.23  0.43  0.40  0.06
not  flows  of PRIVATE  LT debt  0.13  0.98  0.86  0.23  0.43  0.40  0.06
roveluation  NA  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.03  0.08
residual  "A  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  -0.03  -0.09
SHORT-TERM  DEbT:  7.04  7.71  8.18  8.62  7.81  9.42  6.11
change  in  SHORT-TERM  debt  NA  1.22  0.92  0.36  -1.07  0.70  -4.81
revaluation  NA  -0.06  -0.04  -0.04  -0.03  0.07  0.17
effective  change  NA  1.28  0.95  0.40  -1.04  0.64  -4.97- 55  -
IMPORTS
(millions  of  US  dollars)
1080  1981  1982  1988  1984  1985  1986  1987
CRISIS COUNTRIES  82178  a8688  66298  62875  63210  52686  58288  NA
Argentina  9894  8431  4859  4119  4118  s518  4406  6366
Brazil  22955  22091  19395  15429  13916  13168  14044  NA
Chile  6489  6513  3643  2846  8367  2954  3099  3994
Mexico  18896  24037  14485  8550  11266  13212  11432  12222
Morocco  3770  3840  8815  8301  8689  3613  3477  3860
Philippines  7727  7946  7687  787  6070  5111  6044  6737
Yugoslavia  13967  13528  12484  11144  10926  11210  11786  NA
NON-CRISIS  COUNTRIES  64370  63069  62768  65221  66012  62460  64188  80706
Colombia  4288  4730  6358  4464  4027  3873  8409  3874
Indonesia  12624  16542  17864  17726  16047  12706  11938  12710
Korea  21598  24299  23473  24967  27371  26461  29707  38686
Thailand  8352  8931  7566  9169  9236  8391  8416  11981
Turkey  7613  0667  8518  8895  10331  11230  10664  13556
Source:  World  Bank  data.
EXPORTS
(millions  of  US  dollars)
1980  1981  1982  19e3  1984  i985  i986  i987
CRISIS  COUNTRIES  66204  74661  70257  72862  80636  768983  7811  NA
Argentina  8021  9143  7623  7836  8100  8396  6852  6866
Brazil  20132  23276  20173  21898  27002  26834  22392  NA
Chile  4705  3836  3706  3831  3650  3804  4199  6224
Mexico  lose  19938  21230  22312  24196  21663  16031  20665
Morocco  2416  2283  2048  2068  2161  2146  2411  2781
Philippines  5788  6722  5021  5005  5891  4629  4842  5720
Yugoslavia  9077  10363  10461  9813  10136  10822  11084  NA
NON-CRISIS  COUNTRIES  52364  58781  56465  57076  66089  63933  70026  91067
Colombia  3986  8158  3114  2970  4273  3650  5331  5700
Indonesia  21795  23348  19747  18689  20764  18627  14396  17206
Korea  17214  20671  20879  23204  26336  26442  33913  46244
Thailand  6449  6902  6835  6308  7838  7069  8803  11596
Turkey  2910  4703  6890  6906  7889  8256  7583  10322
Source:  World  Bank  date.- 56 -
APPENDIX II
A MODEL  OF INPLATION. INTEREST  RATES. AND  GOVERNMENT  DEFICIT  FINANCE
The  model  presented  in this  Appendix  illustrates  the  tradeoffs  facing
the  government  when it  chooses  between  alternative  domestic  financing  methods
for  a given  fiscal  deficit. The  choice  is  between  taxing  financial
intermediation  --  through  currency  creation,  reserve  requirements,  and
placement  of government  bonds  at  below-market  interest  rates
--  or borrowing  at  market  rates  of interest. This section  will first  examine
the  tradeoffs  between  borrowing  and  the  inflation  tax.  It  will then  address
the  special  case  of generalized  interest  rate  controls. The  model  presented
here  has  antecedents  in the  work  of Buiter  (1988)  and  Van  Wijnbergen  et.  al.
(1988). It is  not intended  to  be a general  macroeconomic  framework  --  it is
simplified  so  as to emphasize  only  the  aspects  of the  economy  relevant  to the
domestic  financing  of fiscal  deficits. The  only  behavioral  detail  will be in
financial  portfolio  equations  and  an investment  function,  and  the  main
endogenous  variables  are  inflation  and  interest  rates. The  model  is intended
to  be for  the  medium-run,  ignoring  the  many shocks  that  can  affect  financial
markets,  inflation,  and  interest  rates  in the  short  run.
A.  The  model
The fundamental  equation  of the  model  is the  government  financing
identity,  presented  in equation  1 (see  list  of  variables  in  Table  Al):
(1)  (ig  +  Aig) Lg + G - E (AFg  - ARb)  +  AH + ALg5  57  -
Table  Alt  Variable  definitions  for  model
ig  Interest  rate  on government  loans  from  banking  system
A  Operator  for  derivative  with respect  to time
Lg  Loans  to  government  from  banking  system
G  Primary  deficit  of government
E  Nominal  exchange  rate  (domestic  currency  per  dollar)
F8  Stock  of government  foreign  debt (in  dollars)
Rb  Stock  of foreign  reserves  of central  bank (dollars)
H  Stock  of  high-powered  money (money  base)
Hp  Currency  holdings  by nonbank  private  sector
Hf  Holdings  of reserves  against  deposits  by banks
P  Domestic  price  level
Y  Real  GDP
#h  Ratio  of currency  holdings  to  GDP
7r  Rate of inflation
D  Stock  of private  sector  deposits  in financial  system
id  Share  of deposits  in financial  assets  (excluding  currency)
rA  Nominal  interest  rate  on deposits
f  Rate  of nominal  currency  devaluation
NFA  Net financial  assets  of  households
p
R_  Stock  of foreign  assets  held  by households  (dollars)
Ip  Ratio  of  net financial  assets  of households  to  GDP
g  Growth  rate  of real  GDP
ih  Derivative  of currency  ratio  wrt  inflation
d  Derivative  of deposit  share  wrt  real  deposit  rate
Kc  Stock  of  physical  capital  held  by corporations
ic  Nominal  interest  rate  on  corporate  loans  from  banks
0  Ratio  of  corporate  physical  capital  to GDP
Ic  Real  gross  investment  by  corporations
a  Rate  of depreciation  of corporate  capital  stock
Ic  Ratio  of corporate  loans  from  banking  system  to  GDP
8c  Ratio  of  corporate  noninterest  saving  to  GDP (equals  gross
return  on capital)
Derivative  of desired  capital  output  ratio  wrt real  loan  rate
of interest
qc  Ratio  of corporate  equity  to  GDP
Required  reserve  ratio  against  deposits- 58 -
Table  Al (continuation)
f  Ratio  of public  foreign  debt  to GDP
g
rb  Ratio  of central  bank  foreign  reserves  to GDP
1g  Ratio  of public  debt  from  banking  system  to  GDP
h  Ratio  of stock  of  high-powered  money  to GDP_ 59  -
The  government  deficit  is  the  sum  of  the  primary  deficit  G and  government
domestic  interest  costs  (ig  +  Aig)  Lg.  For  simplicity,  both foreign  nominal
interest  rates  and  inflation  are  assumed  to  be zero. The  government  interest
rate  is  defined  to include  the  previous  level  (ig)  plus  any  change  (dig)
induced  by policy  shifts. The  alternative  sources  of financing  are  foreign
borrowing  by the  government  (E  AFg),  running  down  of foreign  exchange  reserves
at the  central  bank (-EARg),  creation  of  high-powered  money (AH),  and  domestic
borrowing  from  the  banking  system  (ALg).
High-powered  money  creation  can  be split  between  currency  held  by the
private  sector  (AHp)  and  reserves  against  banking  deposits  (AHf)2
(2)  AH - AHl  +  AHf
In addition  to  currency,  private  households  hold  two  other  assets,  bank
deposits  (Dp)  and  foreign  currency  (ERp). Households  have  a pure  transactions
demand  for  domestic  currency,  which  is related  to  nominal  income. The  ratio
to income  depends  inversely  on the  rate  of inflation,  however,  as increased
inflation  makes  households  economize  on their  use  of  currency. The remainder
of  household  portfolios  is split  between  bank  deposits  and foreign  currency
depending  on the  deposit  rate  of interest  (rd)  versus  currency  depreciation
(e)  (recall  that  foreign  interest  rates  are  assumed  to  be zero):
(3)  Hpy  h[]  < °
(4)  Dp 'd  [rd  el (NFA -H)  0 < Od <  1  Od > 0
(5)  ER  p=  NFA  p- D p- H- 60 -
We have  to  put  a  further  restriction  on the  partial  derivatives  of the
portfolio  demands  to insure  that  an increase  in inflation  (and  depreciation)
does  not increase  the  demand  for  deposits*
(6)  (qp-#h)d /'  +  Oh Od > 0
To specify  private  saving,  we assume  a constant  desired  ratio  of  net
financial  worth to income  (Ip). The  savings  rate  will be this  ratio  times
growth  and  inflation  (the  rate  of inflation  is  defined  as the  previous  level
of inflation  (C)  plus  the  change  (Ar)  induced  by alterations  in  policies.)
NFA
(7)  -' 9
hulA
(8)  '  - 2 -+  l  (u  u  +  g)
The  change  in  demand  for  depcsits  and  currency  can then  be derived  by
taking  the  derivatives  of (3)  and (4)  and substituting  from (8):
(9)  PY  h (  A+g)  .h  Ai
(10)  PY  d (p(r + Ai  +  g) -h  (r  +  8A  )  -h  AT)
+  (ll- h) 0d (Ard  - AC)
The  other  participants  in  domestic  financial  markets  are  private
corporations,.  which have only one asset --  physical capital (Kc) --  and one
liability  --  loans  from  the  banking  system  (Lc).  The  demand  for  physical- 61 -
capital  relative  to income  depends  on the  real  rate  of interest  (ic-f)  on
these  loans  (we  assume  profitability  of capital  is constant). Gross
investment  (1c)  will be net  investment  plus  physical  depreciation  (6).  given
as a ratio  to income  in  equation  (12):
(11)  Ic  '  tic4 - sir  Y  <' 0
PI 
(12)  pi-  (Ai  air)  + t  (g  + 6)
The  demand  for  loans  by corporations  is given  as a residual  after  the
investment  demand  has  been  determined.  The  change  in  corporate  loans  will  be
gross  investment  plus  domestic  interest  costs  minus  non-interest  corporate
saving:
AL 
(13)  py  (Aic  - Ar)  + #(g  + 6)  - sc  + (ic  +  Aic)  lc
Reserves  are  determined  as  an unchanging  fraction  of deposits,  so the
change  in reserves  will be the  reserve  ratio  times  the  change  in deposits:
(14)  ARf  ADp  )
The  interest  rates  on corporate  loans  can  then  be related  to the
deposit  rate  received  by  households.  The interest  rate  paid  on government
loans  is  assumed  to  be  the  same  as  on  corporate  loans.  Assuming  zero  net
profits  for  the  banking  system  and  zero  intermediation  costs  as a
simplification,  the  deposit  rate  will be one  minus  the  reserve  requirement  (i)
times  the  loan  ratet_ 62 -
(15)  rd - (1  -/)  c
We assume  that  currency  depreciation  equals  the  rate  of inflation  (i.e.  the
real  exchange  rate  is constant,  since  foreign  inflation  is  zero). Perfect
foresight  is  assumed,  so that  expected  inflation  and  depreciation  equal  their
realized  valuess
(16)  rd  - e  - (1  (ic  - /)  /
Loans  to the  government  are  the  residual  item. The  change  in the
ratio  of government  debt  to  GDP  will be given  by the ratio  of the  change  to
GDP  minus  adjustments  for  inflation  and  growth:
(17)  Ala=  (  (1  -A ) - j  ]  _ (ir  +  A  +  g)  l
Substituting  (I)-(16)  into (17),  the  following  expression  for  the  change  in
the  ratio  of government  domestic  debt  to  GDP  can  be derived:
(18)  Al"  -tg(g+8)  +  Sc  - (iC-T-g)  (0-c)
+2  ( ((1-/a)  (lp  -h)  O  9 dV)J  (Aic  - ATl
- [dl-/a  td  ((p-  Oh) Od  P  +  Oh
This  equation  can  be thought  of as the  equilibrium  condition  for  the  market  in
domestic  debt.
The  change  in the  ratio  of  money  base  to  GDP is:_ 63 -
(19)  Ah ,  -H  _  AT + 8)  h
Substituting  in for  the  components  of high-powered  money  from  equations
(1)-(16),  we get  the  following  expression:
(20)  Ah =  (  -h'(  $  Od) - P  (/pd h  d)  Ar
+  u  (np  th)  td (1  - P1 (Aic  -AT)
Monetary  finance  to the  public  sector  can  be derived  as the  residuAal
from  the  original  financing  identity  (1):
(21)  Lh  7  - [Afg.Arb-  (ic  -l-g)  1g+  g (fg-rb)  +  alg
+  Ol+g)  IIh  +  i#d(9p-#h))  - lg (Aic  A  T)
+  (Oh  + Ptd  (8p-L))  AO]
Monetary  finance  is  given  by the  primary  deficit  less  external  and
domestic  lending,  less  adjustments  for  interest  rates,  inflation,  and  growth.
This  equation  can  be interpreted  as the  increase  in the  supply  of  money  by the
central  bank  dictated  by government  financing  needs.
To close  the  model  and  solve  for  the  change  in inflation  and  interest
rates,  we equilibrate  the  demand  for  high-powered  money  to the  supply. The
change  in  external  debt  ratios  is  presumed  to be given  exogenously  by
international  credit  rationing.  The  primary  deficit  of the  public  sector  and
saving  by the  private  sector  (corporate  and  household)  are  glven  exogenously- 64 _
as a ratio  to  GDP.  The  change  in public  domestic  borrowing  is set  as a  policy
target  by the  authorities.  This  is the  main  policy  variable  in the  model,
since  it determines  the  inflation  and  real  interest  rate  outcomes. Thus
equation  (18)  with the  left-hand  side  set  to  a constant  gives  one  equation  in
real  interest  rates  and  inflation  (for  the  debt  market). The  other  (for  the
money  market)  can  be derived  by equating  (20)  and (21)  and  substituting  from
(18)  to get  the following:
(22)  7  _ ((fr-grb)  - gtfg-rb)  Od(p-#h) +  (i+g)  th  - #(g+6)
+  Bc +  [(1-#)c-h)  td  - t  (uc)-(np th)(1P)  8g]  (Aic-Ai)
+  [(Od - 0;)(p- th)  +  Oh  +  Oh  tdth  Au
Equations  (18)  and  (22)  give  us two  equations  in two  variables,  (Aic  - AT)  and
Ai.  We can  solve  the  equations  to  give  us the  following  reduced  forms:
(23)  Aic-Ar  - d  (9  I
(23)~  ct  t[  P  (vp-0h,)  'P+O(7-s(fg-rb)-(8fg-arb)-('r+g))#)
+(ptdxh  (  d  - ^)  +  Oh +  Oh  (1  -p#d))  (t  (g  +  6)  -8c)
+  [td(('-/')  #d(7p-th)-(t#_d)  ((Vp  Oh) Od  is  + 
(-  9c)(P0d(7p  - h) + Oh+  f]  [ic  u 8]
[od  (p  th)  +  th+  th-  (O  #  (dp-  h) +  hj]  Alg- 65 _
(24)  Ai  - [(  O  p 
+ (#d(  P_#h  )((l_  2(°d-(_c)h)(c  8
((1  )2(p-0h)#d-O -(#-c))(7-8(fg-r,,)  (  8g-rb-h  ]rg)
+ (h  -- #'--")  - 8C)
+((9p h)(1 P)(l1gPd)+O  +(-9c]1g
there  i  is given  by:
(25)  (0  [  +  )  P(('P4h)#dP  +  P(p  °h)#d fh th
+  (l-p) 2 'Oh)  LP('P  h)q  d  °  )lg]
If (6)  holds,  then  *  will  be positive  as long  as #',+-IC  is  negative,
the  inflation  tax is  below  the  maximum  and  government  debt  1g is  below  a
certain  critical  level  which  can  be determined  from  (25). We assume  for  the
remainder  of the  analysis  that  1g is  below  this  level.
From (23),  we can  now evaluate  the  partial  derivatives  of ic-Ir  with
respect  to the  es'ogenous  variables. (27)  gives  the  effect  of  an exogenous
decrease  in the  level  of foreign  lending  on the  real  interest  rate:
(27)  c  - 9  d((np-0d)  K  i  +  h)- 66 -
If (6)  holds,  then  a decrease  in foreign  lending  will increase  the  real
interest  rate. A decrease  in foreign  lending  is substituted  automatically  by
money  creation  in this  model,  since  1g is  held  constant  for  the  moment. The
increased  inflation  from  money  creation  will cause  real  deposits  to fall (if
(6)  holds)  because  of the  increased  tax  on depositors  through  the  reserve
requirement.
An increase  in  domestic  debt  will  have  the  effect  on real  interest
rates  shown  in (28):
(28)  - r rd>  28)~  ai  T  §  [0d(9p Lh)  #h #h  d  tp  h)+  ]>  °
An increase  in  domestic  debt  decreases  money  creation  and inflation
for  a fixed  primary  deficit. It  can  be thought  of as Otight  money'  in this
model. The  derivative  in (28)  is  equal  to the  real  money  base  plus the
derivatives  of the  money  base  and  total  credit  with respect  to inflation.
This  can  be interpreted  as saying  that 'tight  money"  will increase  interest
rates  as long  as the  loss  in inflation  tax  revenues  from  the  fall  in inflation
is greater  than  the increase  in total  credit  resulting  from  the  rise  in
deposits  triggered  by the  fall  in  inflation.
It is  of interest  to combine  (27)  and (28)  to see  the  effect  of  a
substitution  of  domestic  for  foreign  debt  on the  real  interest  rate.  (In  the
model,  this  has the  same  effect  as  a debt-financed  expansion  in the  primary
deficit). The  effect  of substituting  domestic  for  foreign  government  debt is
to increase  the  real  interest  rate:- 67  -
Si -Oir  8i  -BirrA.)L  ii
(29)  1  m  '  L  [  LTd(  pVh)  +  TdTW
+  POd(ph)+h+Oh]  > 0
This  expression  is equivalent  to  the  level  of the  money  base  plus the
derivative  of the  money  base  with respect  to  the  rate  of inflation. This  will
be positive  if  the inflation  rate  that  maximizes  inflation  tax  revenues  has
not  been  exceeded. This is  relevant  because  the  additional  interest  costs
from  the  increase  in interest  rates  will have  to  be  monetized.
We next turn  to the  effect  of  changes  in foreign  borrowing  and
monetary  policy  on inflation. Equation  (30)  shows  the  impact  of an exogenous
decrease  in government  foreign  debt  on the  rate  of inflation:
(30)  air  0
-)  -af9 - [-#  p-0h)Od-#  -*t-d  > °
Under the condition that t'+ t  - Ic is negative, decreased foreign capital
flows  will increase  inflation. This  is simply  because  of the  substitution  of
money  creation  for  foreign  debt.  The  effect  of 'tight  money,  on inflation  is
more subtle,  as (31)  shows:
(31)  air  i  I  (  0h)(1-omg-
If  we started  from  a level  of zero  government  debt,  then  an increase  in
government  borrowing  for  unchanged  deficit  ('tight  money')  would  decrease
inflation.  However,  as government  debt  reaches  significant  levels,  we have- 68 -
the  complication  that  additional  interest  expenditures  from  the  increased
interest  rates  resulting  from  higher  government  borrowing  will  have to  be
monetized. If 18 is large  enough,  this  effect  could  cause  the  inflation  to
increase. This is  analogous  to  the  famous  Sargent-Wallace  (1984)  result
concerning  the long-run  inflationary  effect  of *tight  money',  here  telescoped
into  a static  model.
The substitution  of domestic  debt for  foreign  debt  will  have the
following  effect  on inflation:
(32)  air  8L.  1  (I  lP)g-~d ,i,-  pf  . *  p-L)  ('-°  (lg-#+d)
Substitution  of domestic  debt for  foreign  debt  will decrease  inflation  if  we
start  from  zero  government  debt.  This  is  because  the  increase  in interest
rates  resulting  from  domestic  borrowing  will increase  real  deposits  and  thus
increase  the  real  demand  for  the  monay  base,  decreasing  the  rate  of inflation.
However,  as government  debt  increases,  the  monetization  of increased  domestic
interest  will partially  or  even  more than  offset  this  effect.
These  results  can  be used  to trace  the  effects  of foreign  borrowing
and  monetary  policy  on other  variables  in the  model.  The  effect  on  private
investment  is straightforward  --  any  shock  that  increases  real  loan  interest
rates  will decrease  private  investment.  Thus,  "tight  money'  or decreased
foreign  borrowing  will decrease  investment.
The  behavior  of capital  flight  (accumulation  of foreign  assets)  is
related  to the  real  rate  of interest  on deposits. This  is  affected  by both
changes  in inflation  (negatively)  and  real  loan  interest  rates  (positively),
as shown  in (16)  above.  The  effect  of  decreased  foreign  borrowing  on the  real
deposit  rate  is as followst_  69  -
(33)  7Fr-e  t  [th  #tP(#-EC)]  <  0
We see  that  an exogenous  decline  in  foreign  debt in  general  causes  a fall  in
real  deposit  rates  and  increase  in  demand  for  foreign  assets  (capital  flight).
This  is  because  money  creation  is substituted  for  the  missing  foreign  lending,
increasing  the  tax  on deposit  holders  through  the  reserve  requirement.
An increase  in  domestic  debt  for  given  fiscal  deficit  ("tight  money")
will  have a  more ambiguous  effect  on the  real  deposit  rate  of interest.  As
usual,  the results  depend  on the  initial  level  of government  debt:
(34)  *  [(1--#)  S#d(9p-#h)+Oh+#h  OdO)
kP((  th)(1-p&)lg+#  +0-9c)  >  o
'Tight  money'  will increase  the  real  deposit  rate  if lg starts  at zero.
However,  as 18 increases,  the  requirement  to  monetize  the  additional  interest
on the  domestic  debt  leads  to increased  inflation  which  could  offset  the  first
effect. This  could  lead  to  the  paradox  that *tight  money'  increases  capital
flight.
If a decline  in  foreign  debt  is  offset  by an increase  in  domestic
borrowing,  the  effects  are  shown  in (34):- 70 -
Ord-Sae  ardSe  rl.l.)  (#+d(Vp  °h) h+°)+d°h
g  g
- /'(Mp-Ohm-jol  ]
Again,  the  results  depend  on the  level  of outstanding  government  domestic
debt.  If  1g is initially  zero,  the  substitution  of domestic  for  foreign  debt
will drive  up real  deposit  rates  through  the  additional  demands  on domestic
credit  markets. However,  monetization  of the  interest  on government  debt
could  reverse  this  result  as in (34).
B.  Interest  rate  controls  and  credit  rationing
As described  in  the  taxonomy  of financing  in section  III,  another
possible  approach  to  domestic  financing  is to control  all  interest  rates  in
the  economy. This  alters  significantly  the  tradeoffs  between  the  inflation
tax  and  domestic  borrowing,  since  inflation  now  worsens  the  real  rate  on  all
financial  assets  and  liabilities  in the  economy. The  following  describes  the
alterations  in  the  model  for  this  situation.
The  asset  demands  by households  are  unchanged. However,  corporate
borrowing  is  no longer  determined  by  notional  investment  demands,  since
investment  will  be rationed  by available  financing  (recall  that  corporations
do not  have  access  to external  financing  in  the  model). Corporate  borrowing
will  be the  residual  item  in the  balance  sheet  of.  the  financial  system:
(36)  p  ,pALc  AD  AHf  AL_ (36)  PY  PT2--  -- 71  -
Private  investment  will  be given  by the  sum  of corporate  saving  minus  interest
costs  and  financial  system  loans:
Pic  Sc  (Aic+ ic)  Lc  ALc
(37)  0  y  _= y  c  Cy  c  c 
Substitutiig  from  the  other  equations  in the  model,  we can  now  derive  an
equation  for  private  investment  as a function  of  government  domestic  borrowing
and  the  rate  of inflation:
I
(38)  -C  icc  + Od (P  O°h)  (f  +  g) (1-p)  -l  - (r+  g)  1
+  ((1  -')((Od  - Od) (p  -h)  Od  g) 
This  equation  is the  equilibrium  for  the  domestic  debt  market.
As in the  previous  solution  of the  model,  government  monetary  finance
will  be determined  as a residual  given  the  primary  deficit  and  the
availability  of external  financing.  Equilibrating  the  supply  of  money  base to
finance  the  deficit  to the  demand  for  base  money  for  a given  rate  of
inflation,  we get  the  following  expression  for  private  investment  as a
function  of inflation:
(39)  =  (0f  Ar ) -i (1 +1 ) + a0  g  g  r Y  LI~La~g  b  c  og  c  g 
+  (+  g) (Oh  +  Od (VP  Oh))
+  (Od  d) (P-  h) +  Oh +  Oh (  - Od)  AT- 72 -
This  equation  is the  equilibrium  condition  for  the  money  market.  Together  with
equation  (38)  this  will determine  the  rates  of inflation  and  private
investment,  with the  latter  substituting  for  the  real  interest  rate  as an
equilibrating  variable.
Solving  from  equations  (38)  and (39)  simultaneously  for  r  and  Ic/Y,
we get  the  following  expression  for  Ar:
,Y(A  7  grb)-g(f it-rb)-Al9  +ic1A+(T+9)  [lR_Oh_Od(7_  Oh)
(40)  Air- 
1"Od-d d)(p P_h)  Oh Oh ;dOh  +18
The  denominator  of this  expression  is  the  sum  of the  money  base  and
government  domestic  debt  and  their  derivative  with respect  to  inflation  (plus
a small  positive  interaction  term). Both  high-powered  money  and  domestic  debt
are included  in the  base for  the  inflation  tax  under  interest  rate  controls,
since  inflation  erodes  the  real  value  of all  government  liabilities. The
denominator  will  be positive  if  we have  not  passed  the  maximum  of the
inflation  tax revenue  curve,  redefined  for  this  broader  base.  The  numerator
gives  the  incremental  money  financing  requirement.  The  derivatives  of
inflation  with respect  to foreign  borrowing  and  domestic  borrowing  are  both
minus  one  over  the  expression  in the  denominator.  It follows  that  the
substitution  of domestic  for  foreign  debt  has  no effect  on inflation,  in
contrast  to the increased  inflation  in the  situation  of  uncontrolled  interest
rates. This  is  because  the  domestic  interest  rate  is  not increased  by
additional  domestic  borrowing  under  interest  rate  controls  and  thus  no
additional  money  creation  is  necessary.
The solution  for  the  rate  of private  investment  IC/Y  is  as follows:- 73  -
(41)  y  7-Of  -Or  )]-i.1  +g  f  -r  )+(r+g)  (Lh+Od(p-Vh))+SC_$cLc
(OeO+  Od  O)(qy_O)-A  [7_(Af  .- Ar  b)-g(f  -rb  )-Al  iz+i  c  +R  g)(  [  R  h Od(_h
Oeh  °h  (Od  d)(9p  Oh) AOdOh lg
The  partial  derivatives  with respect  to foreign  and  domestic  borrowing  are  as
follows:
('42)  <____  (1-i)  (#d-0d)  R
8  h Oh -(Od Od)(9p Oh) OdOh 1g
{~~P  43_(Y  Oh+Oh+(Od-Od"  -Oh)-Od&  J
9  Oh Oh #&(Od  Od)(qp h) #dOh+1g
The  derivative  of investment  with respect  to a  decline  in  government
foreign  borrowing  (or  an increase  in  the  deficit)  financed  by  money  creation
is  negative  (positive)  if the  benefits  of the  inflation  tax  accruing  to
private  firms  are  more (less)  than  offset  by the  decline  in  total  real  credit
caused  by inflation. This  will  occur  if the  initial  stock  of deposits  is low
(high)  relative  to government  debt.  The  derivative  of investment  with respect
to government  domestic  borrowing  (for  unchanged  deficit)  is  negative. In
addition  to the  direct  removal  of credit  from  the  private  sector,  the  decline
in  money  creation  causes  inflation  to fall  and so  takes  away some  of the
inflation  tax  accruing  to  domestic  firms. However,  this  may  offset  by the
increase  in  total  real  credit  caused  by the  decline  in inflation. The- 74-
crowding  out  of private  investment  under  credit  rationing  is thus  less  than
one  for  one,  if deposits  are  low  relative  to government  debt.
The  effect  of substituting  domestic  for  foreign  debt can  be
calculated  by summing  (42)  and (43). The result  simplifies  to  minus  one.
That  is to say,  the substitution  of domestic  for  foreign  debt  leads  to  one-
for-one  crowding  out  of private  investment.  This  is  because  exchanging
domestic  for  foreign  debt  has  no effect  on inflation,  as shown  in (40).
C.  Caveats  and  extensions
Many limitations  of this  type  of  model  have  been  noted  in the  work of
Buiter  (1988)  and  Van  Wijnbergen  (1988)  and  others. One limitation  is the
assumption  that  the  primary  deficit  is  exogenous. As is  well known  from  the
work of Tanzi  (1985)  and  others,  inflation  tends  to  decrease  real  tax  revenues
because  of lags  in collection  and  nominally  fixed  tax  payments. Failure  to
adjust  public  sector  prices  one-for-one  with the  rate  of inflation  could  also
lead  to deterioration  of  public  enterprise  revenues  or an increase  in
subsidies  paid  to private  enterprises.  Incorporating  this  effect  into  the
model  cduld  reverse  the  positive  relationship  between  the  rate  of inflation
and  the fimanceable  deficit.
The  assumption  that  growth  is exogenous  also  misses  some  of the  story
through  ignori!ng  the  effects  of different  public  expenditure  or tax  policies
on the  productivity  of the  economy  and  thus  on growth. For  example,  a primary
deficit  which results  from  highly  productive  expenditure  will  have  different
effects  than  one  which  derives  from  pure  consumption  expenditure.
Incorporating  this  effect  would  allow  for  cases  where  debt  finance  is  high
without  damaging  private  investment,  as  well as for  cases  where  primary
deficits  and  debt finance  do  not seem  that  large  but  cause  major  disruptions
in the  economy.- 75 -
In addition,  the  assumption  of a constant  real  exchange  rate  misses
the  complications  of effects  on government  finance  and  private  borrowers  of
abrupt  changes  in relative  prices. These  effects  are  very significant  in some
countries,  but  are  very complicated  to  model  in  practice. The  effects  on
public  finances  of real  exchange  rate  changes  include  required  bailouts  of
financial  institutions  that  suffer  capital  losses  from  devaluation,
revaluation  of the  public  sector's  own foreign  debt  service,  revaluation  of
export  and  import  flows  in  the  public  sector,  and  changes  in relative  prices
of domestically  consumed  tradable  goods.
Finally,  the  model  is  set  up in such  a  way as to only  be applicable
to small  disturbances  from  the  initial  equilibrium.  This  permits  the  linear
depiction  of equilibrium  relationships.  However,  it  misses  the  effects  of
major  shifts  in regimes  due  to large  disturbances.- 76  -
APPENDIX  III
PUBLIC DOMESTIC  FINANCINGs PLOW  OF FUNDS  BY COUNTRYAF6AENTINA
FINAlE  INC  SU4IARY
(Po,c.nt  of  CDP)
(CMANCE/GDP)  1971  1Q72  1973  1974  1975  1q76  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1Q83  1Q84  1i83  1986
OCUlENCY  IN  NADS  OF  NONAM(  PRIVATE  SECTOR  1.54  1.43  4.00  3.27  5.66  3.78  3.16  4.32  3.28  2.83  2.56  3.86  5.51  5.06  4.32  2.65
INFLATION-ADJSTED  (SEIOMORACE)  -0.87  -1.63  2.38  1.09  -4.44  -1.89  0.01  0.83  0.01  0.35  -1.28  -0.40  -0.02  -0.97  1.27  0.42
PO4INAL  COMPOeNT(INFLATION  TAX)  2.41  3.06  1.62  2.17  10.11  5.68  3.15  3.48  3.27  2.48  3.84  4.26  5.53  6.03  3.05  2.23
BANK RESERVES  0.77  0.95  26.86  12.04  18.74  22.03  2.06  2.40  0.85  1.06  2.37  22.02  17.09  11.24  6.03  -0.24
INFLATION-ADIUSTED  (SE2OMtAE)  -0.13  -0.27  26.11  4.00  -18.63  2.49  -14.02  -5.81  -2.86  -0.49  0.48  19.03  -4.89  -8.47  -1.23  -3.69
NOMINAL  CWeET  (DIFLATION  TAX)  0.90  1.22  0.75  8.04  37.37  19.54  16.08  8.21  3.72  1.55  1.92  2.98  21.98  19.71  7.25  3.45
NET  8OMVINC  FROM  FINANCIAL  SYSTEM
INFLATIONADJATED  -0.30  -5.07  5.12  -2.03  0.29  -1.18  0.21  2.45  1.33  -1.31  5  55  2.21  -5.22  1.40  -3.50  1.17
OTHER  DE£ST  IC  8ORROWINC  FROM PRIVATE  SECTOR
IWFLAT ION-ADJJSTED
DOMESTIC  BORROIVIW  1/  2.01  -2.69  35.98  13.27  24.69  24.63  5.43  9.16  5.47  2.58  10  48  28.09  17.38  17.70  6.84  3.58
DOMESTIC  BORROVINr  2/  1.10  -3.91  35.23  5.23  -12.68  5.09  -10.65  0.95  1.75  1.03  8.56  25.10  -4.60  -2.01  -0.41  0.12
FOREIOM  OPERATIONS  OF CBETRAL  8AW(--INFLATION  A  2.12  0.37  -0.84  0.25  1.14  -1.44  -6.64  -2.85  -1.41  5.67  1.10  -4.33  8.29  -1.85  5.21  2.50
NET  FOREIGN  RESSWES  CHANrE(-  *  DICREASE)  2.12  0.37  -0.84  0.25  1.14  -1.44  -8.64  -2.85  -1.41  5.67  1.10  -4.33  8.29  -1.85  5.21  2.50
0THER  FOREION  8ORR0NC  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00,  0.00  0.00  0.00
CENTRAL  sANW  REDISCOWTS  - . DREASE)
TO  8ANKCIN  SYSTEN  -0.77  -0.95  -25.14  -9.59  -16.50  -15.86  4.82  -0.03  -0.24  -3.84  -5  48  -29.61  -13.40  -15.36  NA  NA
INFLATION-ADJUSTED  -0.17  -0.04  -24.52  -2.11  16.40  1.35  16.73  1.95  0.38  -3.53  -2.60  -23.64  17.03  2.60  NA  NA
NOMINAL  COMPONENT  -0.60  -0.92  -0.62  -7.48  -32.90  -17.21  -12.11  -1.99  -0.62  -0.30  -2  88  -5.97  -30.43  -18.16  NA  NA
TO  PRIVATE  SECTOR
INFLATION-ADJUSTED
NOMINAL  COWONBJT
FINANCIAL  SYSTEN  NET  FLOVS--INFLATION  ADJJ5TED
NET  FOREIGN  BOVUINC  (.)  -2.12  -0.37  0.84  -2.29  2.60  0.33  1.36  0.24  1.48  -0.13  7.23  7.50  -1.80  -2.98  -1.51  -1.80
CLAIMS  ON PUBLIC  SeCTOR(-)  0.43  5.34  -31.23  -1.97  16.34  -1.30  13.81  3.37  1.54  1.80  -6.01  -21.24  10.21  7.07  4.73  2.52
CENTRAL  8AW(  0.13  0.27  -26.11  -4.00  18.63  -2  49  14.02  5.81  2.66  0.49  -0  46  -19.03  4.89  8.47  1.23  3.69
NOWINANCIAL  PI.ELIC  SECTOR  0.30  5.07  -5.12  2.03  -0.29  1.18  -0.21  -2.45  -1.33  1.31  -S.55  -2.21  5.22  -1.40  3.50  -1.17
CLAIMS  ON  PRIVATE  SECTOR(-)  -0.61  0.60  -2.86  -3.04  15.81  0.52  -7.67  -0.91  -7.80  -3.78  -4.87  2.13  13.22  8.  50  0.98  -0.17
LOANS  FROM CENTRAL  SAW(.)  0.17  0.04  24.52  2.11  -16.40  -1.35  -16.73  -1.95  -0.38  3.53  2.60  23.64  -17.03  -2.80  NA  MA
LIABILITIES  TO  PRIVATE  SECTOR(+)  -8.15  3.69  3.73  4.41  -19.30  2.39  7.11  0.73  6.40  -0.28  -0.99  -9.76  -2.39  -3.32  -0.20  2.95
M2  EXCL  ClJIRRCY AN  OEPCSrrS  AT  CENTRAL  SAW  -6.01  3.41  3.57  3.86  -18.57  1.58  4.97  0.47  6.24  -0.55  -1.40  -5.22  -2.15  -2.36  -0.05  2.84
OTHE  -2.14  0.48  0.16  0.86  -0.74  0.81  2.13  0.26  0.17  0.26  0.41  -4.53  -0.25  -0.97  -0.14  0.11
NET  OTHER  ITEMS(.)  9.98  -9.32  8.75  1.06  -5.26  -0.71  2.06  -1.60  -1.17  -0.65  1.97  -1.80  -1.64  -8.58  NA  NA
NET  DOMESTIC  TRAN6FERS  AND TAX  ON  FINANCIAL  IMTEIATION
NET  DOMESTIC  TRANSFER  FROM FINANCIAL  SYSTEH
ADJUSSTMENT FOR  REAL  INTEREST  RATE  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.51  0.25  -0.14  -0.09  -0.08  -0.66  -1.67  -0.26  2.94  -0.06
NET  TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.72  2.20  1.47  -1.22  5.63  2.87  -3.55  I.66  -6.44  1.23
OTHER  NET  OMESTIC  TRANSF-  FROM PRIVATE  SECTOR
ADJUSTMENT  FOR  REAL  INTERES.'  RATE
NET  TRANSFER
TOTAL  DOMESTIC  NET  TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  5.94  8.91  5.60  2.67  10.56  28.75  19.05  17.96  3.90  3.64
TAX ON  FINANCIAL  INTEREDIATIoN  I/  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  19.74  21 44  7.23  4  22  5.84  7  90  29.16  26.00  7.36  5.75
TAX  ON FINANCIAL  1TERKEDIATlON  2/  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  11.87  1  07  2.33  2  42  3  43  7  47  17.09  17.15  6.09  3.29
1/  R.......  tr-t.d  as  -e,y.
2/  Adj.st.d  fo,  int....t  p.;d  n..  r.....s.BRAZIL
FINANCING  S&MAART
(P.rc.nt  of  CDP)
(CMANGE/WDP)  1Q71  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1Q80  1981  1982  1983  1984  1983  1Q986
CLARRSKCT  IN HANDS  OP  NONAM  PRIVATE  SECTOR  1.73  1.16  1.68  1.69  1.79  1.48  1.05  1.22  2.05  1  40  1 45  1.41  1.20  1.71  1.64  NA INFLATIOW4ADJSTED (SEIGOtACE)  1.00  0.55  1.12  0.40  0.58  -0.10  -0.38  0  09  0.26  -0.48  -O  39  -0.31  -1.04  0.15  0.15  NA NOMINAL.  COMPONENT(INFLATIOi  TAX)  0.73  0.61  0.5.4  1.29  1.21  1.57  1.40  1.13  1.90  1.88  1.84  1.71  2.24  1.58  1.69  NA
SAW4  RESERVES  -0.30  -0.29  0.63  0.28  0.30  0.80  1.17  0.80  1.31  0.59  0.52  0.71  0.78  0.95  0.82  NA INFLTION-ADXSTED  (SEIGCRACE)  -0.64  -0.57  0.68  -0.20  -0.07  0.39  0.68  0  20  0.23  -0..~.3  -0  46  -0.07  -0.30  0.08  -0.13  NA NOMINAL  COMPONENT  (INFLATION  TAX)  0  54  0.28  0.17  0.48  0.37  0.41  0.49  0.60  1.08  1.13  0  98  0.78  1.07  0.88s  0.94  NA
NET BORROWING  PROM  FINANCIAL  SYSTEM
INALATION-ADJSETD  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  1.73  0  31  2.83  1.18  1.52  -0.90  1.45  NA
OTHER  DOMESTIC  8ORROVINC  FROM  PRIVATE  SECTOR
INFLATION-AD.ASTED  NA  0.00  0. OD  0  00  0.10  -0.03  -0.02  0  02  -0.04  -0.01  0  36  0.78  1.84  4.64  4.36  NA
DOMESTIC  80.AROWINC  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  5  05  2 30  5  17  4.08  6.34  6.40  8.46  NA
FOREXOM  OPERATIONS  OF CBETRAL  8AW(--INFLATION A  -0.80  -4.31  -2.42  2.15  1.46  -1.40  0.08  -2 02  1.82  1.62  0.44  3.19  6.25  -1.76  0.35  NA NET FOREZOM  RESERVES  CHANGE(- m INCREASE)  -1.19  -4.27  -2.40  1.77  1.27  -1.45  0.11  -3.13  0.61  1.66  0.12  4.70  -1.09  -8.73  -0.60  NA OTHER  FOREIGZOM0RR0WINC;  0.38  -0.0A  -0.03  0.38  0.17  0.06  -0.03  1.11  1.21  -0.04  -0.09  -1.52  7.34  4.97  0.94  NA
CENTRAL  SAWC  REDISCOLDGS  (--INCFASE)  NA  -3.77  -3.93  -8.  05  -8.66  -7.50  -8.43  -2.07  -5.07  -4.65  -4.29  -3.83  -3.57  -3.34  -4.15  NA
TO 8AW(INr  SYSTEM  NA  -1.16  -0.83  -2.68  -2.49  -2.15  -2.05  0 08  -0.51  -0.70  -1.12  -0.79  -0.68  -0.906  -0.74  NA INFLATION-ADJUSED  NA  -0.96  -0.57  -2.04  -1.49  -0.58  -0.48  1.69  1 25  0.46  -0.07  0.35  0. 72  -0.04  0.22  NA NOMINAL  COMPONENT  NA  -0.20  -0.26  -0.62  -0.99  -1.57  -1  59  -1  61  -1.78  -1.17  -1.06  -1  14  -1.38  -0.91  -0.95  NA
TO PRIVATE  SECTOR  -5  30  -2.61  -3.11  -5.37  -6.07  -5.35  -4  38  -J 16  -4 55'  -3.95  -3.17  -3.04  -2.91  -2.39  -3.41  NA INFLATION-A0.AJSTED  -4  45  -1.55  -2  11  -2  98  -3.34  -1.24  -0.29  1 49  0.77  0.82  1.70  1  15  2.27  3.31  -0.56  NA  0 NOMINAL.  COMPONEN4T  -0.84  -1.08  -0  99  -2.39  -2.73  -4 11  -4  09  -3  64  -5.32  -4.77  -4 87  -4  19  -5.18  -3.70  -2.86  NA
FINANCIAL SYSTEM  NET FLOWS--  INFLATION ADJUSTED
NET FOREIGN  BORRWING (4)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NAA  NtA  NA  1 79  -0.4  2  48  0.90  4.52  0.43  -2.86  NdA
CLAIMS IN  PUBLIC SECTCR(-)  NA  NA  NA  NtA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -1.95  0.22  -2.38;  -1  11  -1.23  0.83  -1.32  NAA CBITRAL SAMA  0.64  0.57  -0.66  0.20  0.07  -0.39  -0  68  -0  20  -0.23  0.53  0.45  0  07  0.30  -0.06  0.13  NA NONFINANCIAL  PUBL-IC  SECTOR  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -1.73  -0.31  -2.83  -1.18  -1.52  0.90  -1.45  NA
CLAIMS ON PRIVATE  SECTOR(-)  -5.73  -8.09  -8.27  -4.97  -. 6.8  -4.33  -3  02  -0  10  1 98  2.43  -2.42  -2.32  3.26  -2.57  2.87  NA
LOANS PROM  CENTRA 8AW(.)  NA  0.96  0.57  2.06  1.49  0.58  0.46  -1  59  -1.25  -0.46  0.07  -0.35  -0.72  0. 04  -0.22  NA
LIABILITIES  TO PRIVATE  SECTOR(.)  NA  5.71  5.65  0.77  3.80  0.86  1.85  1.82  -0.37  -1.57  1.99  1.21  0.48  3.69  1.49  NA NO BCL  OURERBCY  ANO  DEPOSITS  AT CBAtRAL BANK  NA  3.42  3.04  -0.52  1.01  -0.62  0  59  0  85  -0.41  -1.33  -0.34  -0. 72  -1.02  1.65  2.11  NA OTHER  1.67  2.29  2.60  1.29  2  49  1.48  1.27  1.17  0.04  -0.24  2.34  1.93  1.50  2.04  -0.62  NA
NET OnHER ITEBG(-)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.17  0.43  0.71  1.93  -8.68  -2.31  0.81  NA
NET DOMESTIC  TRANSFER AND  TAX  ON FINANCIAL  INTOOSIATION
NET DOMESTIC  TRANSFER  PROM  FINANCIAL SYSTEM
ADAATSETM FOR  REAL INTEREST  RATE  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.45  0.06  -0.00  0.28  0.01  -0.03  0.13  NA NEt  TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NIA  1.28  0.25  2.83  0.90  1.51  -.0.88e  1.32  NA
oneB  NEr DOKMETIC  TRANSFER  PROM PRIVATE  SECTOR
AOAAITMEJT  FOR  REAL INTEREST  RATE  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NLA  NA  NA  -0  01  -4.SD  NA  0.97  0.03  -0.07  0.47  NA NET TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0  03  -0.00  NA  -0.19  1.81  4.71  3.89  NA
TOTAL  DOMESTIC  NEr TRANSFER  iCXC  BONDS  80-83)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  4.61  2.24  N4A  2  83  5.29  8.50  7.86  NA
TAX ON FINANCIAL  INTERMEDIATION  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  2 54  2.95  NA  1.25  3 IP7  2 54  2.03  NA
…--  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -CHILE
FINANCINC  SUM4ARY
(P,ce.nt  of  CDP)
(awNaCop)  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1095  1986
CURRENCY  IN  HANDS  OF N8OAW  PRIVATE  SECTOR  NA  NA  NA  2.17  3.10  2.41  1.67  1.46  1.10  1.00  0.71  -0.14  0.57  0.65  NA  NA
INFLATION-ADJUSTED  (SEIQNRACE)  NA  NA  NA  -1.91  0.22  0.51  0.68  0.88  0.27  0.27  0.45  -0.89  -0.07  0.02  NA  NA
NOMINAL  CWl#ONENT(INFLATION  TAX)  NA  NA  NA  4.09  2.88  1.90  0.99  0.58  0.83  0.72  0.27  0.75  0.64  0.63  NA  NA
8ANK  RESERS  NA  NA  NA  5.43  4.23  5.52  3.68  1.97  1.41  1.37  -1.37  -1.56  0.15  0.18  NA  NA
INFLATION-ADJUSTED  (SEICNRACE)  NA  NA  NA  -2.74  -2.50  2.54  1.63  0.73  -0.07  0.19  -1.79  -2.19  -0.12  -0.07  NA  NA
NOMINAL  COMPONENT (INFLATION  TAX)  NA  NA  NA  8.17  6.73  2.98  2.05  1.24  1.49  1.17  0.41  0.63  0.27  0.25  NA  NA
NET  BORROWINr  FROM FINANCIAL  SYSTEM
INFLATION-ADJUSTED  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.73  0.17  -0.67  -1.72  -0.64  -3.74  1.47  6.06  1.06  0.77  NA  NA
OTIM  DOMESTIC  ORROVUING FROM PRIVATE  SECTOR
INFLATION-ADAJSTED  NA  NA  NA  2.44  -2.21  -4.36  -0.29  0.00  -0.07  0.01  -0.00  -0.01  0.57  0.26  NA  NA
DOHESTIC  BOM%IF  1/  NA  NA  NA  NA  4.39  3.74  4.39  1.71  1.83  -1.37  0.81  4.35  2.35  1.86  NA  NA
DOMESTIC  80W1NW  2/  NA  NA  NA  NA  -2.34  0  16  2.34  0.47  0.31  -2.55  0.39  3.72  2.08  1.61  NA  NA
FOREION  OPEm.:ONS  OF  CENTRAL  BAWC--INFLATION  A  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -8.05  -1.06  -5.10  -5.90  -4.35  0.94  0.84  11.01  7.55  NA  NA
NET  FOREION  RESERVES  CHANCE(-  - INCREASE)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -S.95  -1.52  -7.21  -6.64  -2.56  2.49  -0.94  3.04  -2.44  NA  NA
OTHfR  FOREIGN  8ORReOINC  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -2.10  0.46  2.11  0.74  -1.79  -1.56  1  78  7.97  9.99  NA  NA
CENTRAL  BANK REDISCcOLWS  (-  . INCREASE)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.70  -2.19  -1.99  0.08  0.39  -1.85  -11.97  -23.78  -18.48  NA  NA
To  8AM(INO SYSTEN  NA  NA  NA  NA  -1.97  -0.54  -1.56  -0.39  0.23  -0.57  -1.51  -3.47  -22.05  -16.86  NA  NA
DPLAT1N-ADAsTED  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.05  0.68  -1.21  -0.01  0.64  -0.39  -1.42  -2.94  -20.95  -11.77  NA  NA
NOMINAL  COMFONENT  NA  NA  NA  NA  -1.92  -1.22  -0  35  -0.38  -0.40  -0.18  -0.09  -0  53  -1.10  -5.09  NA  NA
TO  PRIVATE  SECTOR  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.16  -0.63  -1.60  -0.16  0.96  -0.34  -8.50  -1.73  -1.62  NA  NA
INFLATION-AJASTED  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.02  -0.56  -1.47  0.34  1.28  -0.33  -8.41  -0.09  o.os  NA  *^
NOMINAL  CONWXENT  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.14  -0.07  -0.13  -0.so  -0.32  -0.01  -0.09  -1.64  -1.67  NA  NA
FINANCIAL  SYSTD4  NET  FLOWS--INFLATION  ADJSTED
NET  FOREICN  BORROWING (;)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  2.71  5.73  6.71  15  74  -5.97  9.39  NA  NA
CLAIMS  ON PUBLIC  SECTOR(-)  NA  NA  NA  NA  3.23  -2.71  -0.97  0.99  0.72  3.55  0.32  -3.87  -0  94  -0  70  NA  NA
CBENRAL  BANK  NA  NA  NA  2.74  2.50  -2.64  -1.63  -0.73  0.07  -0.19  1.79  2.19  0.12  0.07  NA  NA
NONfINANCIAL  PUBLIC  SECTOR  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.73  -0.11  0a.7  1.72  0.64  3.74  -1.47  -6.06  -1.06  -0.77  NA  NA
CLAIMS  ON PRIVATE  SECTOR(-)  . NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -3.55  -9.27  -9.08  -5.87  -11.12  -9.32  -10.69  8.19  -4.19  NA  NA
LOANS  FROM CENTRAL  BANK(.)  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.05  -0.68  1.21  0.01  -0.64  0.39  1.42  2.94  20.95  11.77  NA  NA
LIA8ILITIES  TO  PRIVATE  SECTOR(.)  NA  NA  NA  0.52  -1.71  3.40  4.21  4.84  3.05  3.27  4.12  2.24  -5.08  2.40  NA  NA
P2 EXCL  CURRCY  AND  OEPOSrTS  AT  CENTRAL  sANK  NA  NA  NA  0.52  -1.71  3.40  4.21  4.84  3.05  3.27  4.12  2.24  -5.08  2.40  NA  NA
OTMR
NEr  OTHeR  ITE(S)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.04  -1.81  -3.25  -6.36  -17.15  -18.67  NA  NA
NET  DOMESTIC  TRANSFERS  AND  TAX  ON  FINANCIAL  INTEM'IATION
NET  DOMESTIC  TRANSFER  FROM FINACIAL  SYSTEN
ADOJSTX4  FOR  REAL  INTEREST  RATE  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.18  -0.27  0.36  -0.15  -1.80  -1  35  0.00  0.03  0.07  NA
NET  TRANSFeR  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.49  -1.45  -1.00  -3.60  3.26  7.41  1.06  0.75  NA  NA
OTHER  NET  DOMESTIC  TRANMsFR  FROM PRIVATE  SEcTOR
AODJSTMENT  FOR  REAL  INTtREST  RATE  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.07  0.02  -0.01  0.00  0 .O  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.03  NA
NEr  TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.29  0.00  -0.07  0.01  -000  -0.01  0.57  0.24  NA  NA
TOTAL  DOMESTIC  NET  TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  4.57  1.98  1.44  -1.23  2.60  5.70  2.35  1.82  NA  NA
TAX  ON  FINANCIAL  INTERMEDIATION  1/  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  3.22  2.08  1.96  2.04  2.47  2.72  0.91  0.84  NA  NA
TAX  ON  FINANCIAL  INTERMEDIATION  2/  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  2.00  0.21  -0.30  2.48  1.82  0.63  0.64  NA  NA
I/  Rn.r ...  t.t.ted  *as  n.Y.
2/  Adj.sted  for  iAt.r.st  pa;d  on  rs.,"EXICo
FINANCINC  SuN4ARY
(Percent  of  CDP)
(COAPCE/QDP)  1971  1972  1q73  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1960  1981  1982  1983  1964  19as  1986
CIOCt  IN  NAICS OP  XMN  PRIVATE  SECTOR  0.41  0.89  1.01  1.00  0.91  1.97  0.49  1.11  1.14  1.05  I.so  2.36  1.03  1.53  1.35  1.71
INPLATION-ADASTED  (5EI@RA0E)  0.21  0.66  0.18  0.22  0.47  0.92  -0.41  0.50  0.39  0.01  0.55  -0.61  -1.35  0.15  -0.22  -0.65
NOMINAL  CNENT(INLATION  TAX)  0.20  0.22  0.83  0.78  0.44  1.05  0.69  0.62  0.75  1.04  0.95  2.97  2.38  1.40  1.57  2.36
SAWl RESERVES  0.41  3.54  1.45  2.33  2.36  -2.70  8.44  2.52  3.16  3.83  4.00  8.51  5.72  4.22  0.46  1.81
INFLATION-ADAISTED  (SE1@4MACE)  0.32  3.43  0  49  1.40  1.73  -4.44  7.87  1.09  1.42  1.31  1.43  0.51  -1.64  -1.02  -4.79  -3.56
tNIIAL  CDM  ET  (LNFATION  TAX)  0. 09  0.11  0.96  0.94  0.64  1.75  0.57  1.43  1.74  2.53  2.57  8.00  7.36  5.24  5.26  5.40
NET 8ORROWC FRO" FINAUCIAL SYSTEM
INLATION-ADJSTED  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -1.44  0.60  0.11  4.59  11.19  -4.89  -2.13  6.04  10.59
OTHER  QOESTIC  BsOWINC  FROM  PRIVATE  SECTOR
INFLATION-ADA)STED  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  N.  -0.03  0.38  0.35  0.12  1.39  0.82  0.45  -0.29  -0.23
OOMESTIC  8RWRINrC  I/  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  2.17  5.29  5.35  10.21  23  45  2.68  4.07  7.57  13.88
DOMESTYC  81wINC  2/  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.74  3.55  2.82  7.64  15.45  -4.69  -1.16  2.31  8.48
FOREICN  OPERATIONS  OF COdTRAL  8Am(--INFLATI0N  A  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.92  -0.82  -0.62  -0.23  -0.21  1.18  -1.48  -0.94  1.62  -0.37
NET FRREZGN  RESEVES CMJAEE-  *  INCREAE)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.47  -0.28  -0.38  -0.14  -0.21  1.18  -1.48  -0.94  1.62  -0.37
OTHER  FOMCaN 81NCRD42  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.48  -0.55  -0.23  -0.09  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
C86TRAL  8W  EISCWMNTS (-  . DA
TO BAWMC SVSTE5  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -1.82  0.59  0.09  -0.10  -0.56  -0.03  -2.77  1.06  -0.20  0.13  -0.05
IFLATION-ADATED,  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -1.70  0.94  0.22  0.02  -0.41  0.19  -2.28  2.51  0.06  0.39  0.12
NOMINAL  CO94MENT  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.12  -0.35  -0.14  -0.12  -0.15  -0.22  -0.49  -1.45  -0.26  -0.26  -0.17
TO PRIVATE  SeCTOR 
INFLAT  ION-AO  8T
NOMINAL  CD"ONET
FINANCIAL SY.TEN NET FLOWS--INFLATION  AD.ArETW
NET FOREICN  s0RRO4LNO  (.)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.34  0.05  -0.29  3.58  14.51  -4.62  -3.78  4.22  7.99
CLAIS  ON  4PWLIC  SECTOR(-)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.35  -2.03  -1.42  -6.01  -11.70  6.53  3.15  -1.25  -7.00
CENTRAL  sANK  -0.32  -3.43  -0.49  -1.40  -1.73  4.44  -7.87  -1.09  -1.42  -1.31  -1.43  -0.51  L.64  1.02  4.79  3.58
NOFINMCIAL  PeIC  SECTOR  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  1.44  -0.60  -0.11  -4.59  -11.19  4.89  2.13  -6.04  -10.59
CLAIMS ON PRIVATE  SECTOR(-)  NA  NA  1.82  0.32  -2.87  -2.46  11.32  -3.32  -2.22  -1.65  -1.42  9.17  2.75  -2.09  0.35  2.56
LO"AN FROM  CENTRAL  8((.)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  1.70  -0.94  -0.22  -0.02  0.41  -0.19  2.28  -2.51  -0.06  -0.39  -0.12
LIABILITIES  TO PRIVATE  SECTORtC)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  3.91  3.37  2.27  4.50  -9.15  -2.60  1.42  -3.54  -2.95
N2 EXCL  Cu  JVD QEPDSITS  AT CUENRAL  BANK  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  8.45  8.14  1.66  3.36  -7.79  -2.67  1.26  -3.42  -2.56
OTER  1.77  1.51  0.20  0.41  2.74  s.43  -18.24  0.46  0.23  0.61  0.62  -1.36  0.06  0.16  -0.15  -0.42
NET OTHER  ITEMs(*)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.56  1.00  0.67  0  10  -7.  I  1.83  1.12  0.29  -0.08
NET DOESTIC  TRANSFER AND  TAX ON FNACIAL  IDNT  IATION
NEr  OPESTIC  TRAIFSR  FRO" FVNACIAL  SYSTSI
ADAZT)CRT FOR  REAL INtEEST  RATE  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.40  -0.47  -0.62  0.17  -S.00  -3.52  -1.45  -0.10  -4.51
NET TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -1.03  1.07  0.74  4.42  16.19  -1.37  -0.68  6.15  15.10
QTHER  NET DOESTIC  TRMSFER FROM  PRIVATE  SECTOR
A0ASTMENT  FOR  REAL INTEREST  RATE  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.02  -0.03  -0.05  0.02  -0.45  -0.36  -0.23  -0.02  -0.64
NET  TRNSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.00  0.41  0.40  0.10  1.84  1.18  0.68  -0.27  0.41
TOTAL DOMESTIC  NET TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  2.60  5 78  6.03  10.02  28.90  6.56  5.75  7.69  19.02
TAX ON FINANCIAL INTERI£I.TION  I/  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  2.47  2  99  4  25  3.34  16.42  13.63  8.32  6.95  12.90
TAX 0O FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 2/  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.74  0  81  1.10  0.58  12.74  8.23  3.95  1.76  8.90
1/  R.*.,.es  trested  Do  oney
2/  Adj..td  for  ote.frst  p.-d  on  ...r.s.  D*OROCCO
FINANCINC  SUMKARY
(Percent  of  GDP)
(CMANCE/COP)  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986
CURRECY  IN  lANDS OF NONAM  PRIVATE SECTOR  1.05  2.20  1.69  2.17  1.57  2.68  1.67  1.94  2.16  1.21  1.73  0.93  1.79  1.28  1.10  1.8e
INFLATION-ADJAUTED  (SEIOORACE)  0.54  1.91  0.63  0.65  0.8s  1.09  0.79  0.73  1.01  -0.07  -0.02  0.08  0.16  0.27  -0.19  1.34
NNINAL  CPCNOENT(INLATION  TAX)  0.52  0.30  1.26  1.52  0.72  1.89  1.06  1.21  lI.S  1.28  1.75  0.85  1.63  1.01  1.29  0.54
SAl  4ES5RVES  0.23  0.11  0.07  0.18  0.33  0.13  0.14  0.13  0.12  -0.47  0.12  -0.02  0.00  0.31  -0.06  1.18
IWFLATION-ADJSTED (SEICNCRACE)  0.19  0.06  -0.04  0.07  0 27  -0.02  0.05  0.03  0.03  -0.57  0.05  -0.05  -0.06  0.28  -0.15  1.16
NOMINAL  CW9NENT  (IWLATION  TAX)  0.04  0.03  0.  1  0.12  0.06  0.15  0.09  0.10  0.09  0.10  0.07  0.04  0.06  0.03  0.07  0.02
NET BOVlNC  FRON  FINANCIAL SYSTEN
INFLATION-ADJUSTED  0.44  1.36  0.28  2.14  0.36  -0.02  1.49  3.59  0.62  0.53  -0  Il  0.65  1.54  -1.16  2.93  5.39
OTMR DOMESTIC  BORROWINO  FROM  PRIVATE  SECTOR
INFLATION-ADJASTED
DOMESTIC sORRIN0  1.72  3.68  2.25  4.50  2.26  2.79  3.50  5.67  2.91  1.27  1.74  1.56  3.33  0.43  3.95  8.46
FOREION  OPERATIONS  OF CENTRAL  BANK--INFLATION  A  -1.50  -1.23  0.13  -0.92  0.46  0.78  0.36  0.70  0.83  2.07  2  25  2.73  2.55  1.28  0.43  -2.91
NET FORECON  RESERVES  CMANWE(-  *  INCFEASE)  -1.50  -1.23  0.13  -0.92  0.46  0.78  0.38  0.70  0.83  2.07  2.25  2.73  2.55  1.20  0.43  -2.91
OThOE  FWCJN  61ORD
CENTRAL  sAWI REDISCONTS (-  INREASE)  NA  MA  NA  MA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -1.31  -0.64  -0.21  -1.88  -1.31  -4.35
TO 8A8WIN  SYSTEt  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -1.39  -0.55  0.14  -t.19  0.38  -2.78
INFLATION-ADJUSTED  NA  NA  NA  MA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.97  -0.28  0.72  -0.92  0.81  -1.99
OMINAL  CO4PONENT  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.42  -0.26  -0.53  -0.27  -0.43  -0.79
co TO PRIVATE  SECTOR  -0.06  -0.23  -0.50  0.40  -0.33  -0.41  0.40  -0.36  -0.66  0.91  0.08  -0.30  -0.40  -0.18  -1.89  -1.57
INFLATION-ADJUSTED  0.04  -0.18  -0.27  0.69  -0.24  -0.20  0.55  -0.25  -0.54  1.06  0.18  -0.26  -0.29  -0.10  -1.57  -1.46
NOMINAL  CNOMPNT  -0.11  -0.06  -0.22  -0.29  -0.09  -0.21  -0.15  -0.11  -0.12  -0.17  -0.10  -0.04  -0.11  -0.09  -0.12  -0.11
FINANCIAL SYSTEN  NET FLOVS--INAFLATI0N  AODATED
NET FORECCI  BDFRVINr  (.)  0.13  -0.03  -0.13  -0.01  0.89  1.01  1.56  0.45  -0.54  -0.45  -0.57  -0.43  0.23  0.10  0.68  1.42
CLAIMS ON RUeL1C  SECTOR(-)  -0.62  -1.45  -0.24  -2.21  -0.63  0.04  -1.54  -3.62  -0.65  0.04  0.06  -0.59  -1.47  0.88  -2.78  -6.55
CENTRAL  BAMN  -0.19  -0.03  0.04  -0.07  -0.27  0.02  -0.05  -0.03  -0.03  0.57  -0.05  0.05  0.06  -0.28  0.15  -1.16
NONFINANCIAL  PUBLIC SECTOR  -0.44  -1.36  -0.28  -2.14  -0.36  0.02  -1.49  -3.59  -0.62  -0.53  0.11  -0.65  -1.54  1.16  -2.93  -5.39
CLAIMS ON PRIVATE  SECTOR(-)  -1  75  -2.54  -1  01  -2.53  -4.09  -2.17  -2.71  -0.90  -0.73  -1.91  -0.86  -2.25  -0.50  -2.22  -0.45  NA
LO"h  FROM  CENTRAL  8ANK(.)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.97  0.28  -0.72  0.92  -0.81  1.99
LIABILITIES  TO PRIVATE SECTOR(#)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  1.36  1.16  1.32  2.10  3.39  0.94  3.93  4.97
2 El(CL CtURRC  AND OWOSITS AT CBENRAL  BAW  1.75  2.67  1.38  5.42  3.71  0.55  2.83  2.17  0.85  0.51  1.26  1.61  1.95  0.90  3.62  3.74
OTHER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.51  0.65  0.04  0.48  1.45  0.05  0.31  1.23
NET OTHER  1ITE(.)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -1.37  -0.87  -0.55  NA
- --  - --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  - - --  --  --  --  -------
NET DPOESTIC  TRANSFER APO TAX ON FINMNCIAL INTS8IWIATIaN
NET  OSMTIC  TRANSFER  FROM  FINANCIAL SYSTEN
ADASTlENT FOR  REAL INTESET  RATE  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.50  -0.58  -0.60  -0.95  -0.04  -0.81  -0.16  -0.27  0.64
NEr  TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  4.09  1.16  1.13  0.84  0.68  2.34  -1.00  3.20  4.76
OThER  NET DOMESTIC  TRANSFER  FROMt  PRIVAITE  SECTOR
ADAsTmea  FOR  REAL INTEREST  RATE
NET TRANSFER
TOTAL DOMESTIC  NET TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  6.17  3.47  1.87  2.69  1.60  4.13  0.58  4.21  7.83
TAX ON FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  1.81  2.84  1 34  2  76  0.93  2.50  1.20  1.63  -0.07PHILIPPINES
FINANCINC  SLUMARY
(P.rc.nt  of  COP)
(CMAGCE/COP)  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1963  1984  1985  1986
CLtCT  IN  HAPNS  OF  NOaNBA  PRIVATE  SECTOR  0.48  1.39  0.03  0.86  0.38  0.67  0.70  0 79  0.48  0.38  0.47  0.31  1.80  0.41  0.37  0.84
ILUATION-ADJSTED  (SEICNDRACE)  -0.37  1.45  -1.65  -0.07  0.32  0.27  0.32  0 53  -0.38  -0.17  0.12  0.02  0.94  -1.44  0.17  0.85
NO"INAL  COMENT(INFLATION  TAX)  0.85  -0.06  1.68  0.93  0.07  0.40  0.38  0 26  0.86  0.55  O..,.  0.29  0.88  1.84  0.20  -0.01
SAM  RESERVES  0.18  0.21  0.75  0.38  0.36  -0.01  0.53  0.60  1.04  0.38  -0.12  -0.03  0.64  0.68  0. 44  1.14
IW  1  ATION-ADJATED  (SEIGNORACE)  -0.11  0.24  0.24  -0.05  0.33  -0.21  0.37  0  48  0.60  -0.01  -0.38  -0.21  0.16  -0.22  0.32  1.Is
NOMINAL  C0OENT  (IfLATION  TAX)  0.29  -0.02  0.51  0.43  0.03  0.20  0.16  0.12  0.45  0.39  0.26  0.18  0.48  0.90  0.12  -0.01
NET  BORROWING FROM FINANCIAL  SYSTEH
INFLATION-ADJUSTED  -0.53  -0.04  -1.90  -0.09  3.00  1.44  0.79  0.21  -1.10  0.22  -0.10  1.50  -1.39  -0.66  1.02  NA
OTMFO DOMEST  IC  EIUINC  FROM PRIVATE  SECTOR
INLATION-ADJASTED  . 0.68  0  07  0.83  0.62  -0.03  -0.16  0  02  0.53  -0.12  -0.56  -0.18  -0.82  -0.60  -0.77  -0.02
OGESTIC  s601NC  NA  2.24  -1.06  1.98  4.35  2.07  1.86  1.63  0  94  0.86  -0.31  1.60  0.24  -0.17  1.05  NA
FOREIGN  OPERATINS  OF  CETRAL  SANK--INFLATION  A  -0.80  -2.40  -5.12  -0.81  3.63  -0.23  -1.23  1.19  1.30  1.58  2.91  4.75  5.23  -1.66  -3.58  -6.93
NET  FOREION  RESERVES  CHANCE(-  *  INCREASE)  -0.80  -2.40  -5.12  -0.81  3.63  -0.23  -1.23  1.19  1.30  1.58  2.91  4.75  5.23  -1.66  -3.58  -6.93
OTHER  FOREICN  BORROWING
COETRAL 8ANK  RED2ISCLNTS  - . INcREASE)
TO  BANAIFC  SYSTEM  -0.02  -0.59  0.62  -1.47  -4.12  0.92  0.64  -2  32  -2.37  -2.31  -1.99  -1.11  -1.79  -1.75  -0.46  4.72
fLATIO-ADJJATED  0.64  -0.63  1.89  -1.03  -4.07  1.57  1.08  -2.11  -1.35  -1.43  -1.26  -0.44  0.31  1.79  -0.02  4.69
NOMINAL  COMPENT  -0.86  0.04  -1.07  -0.44  -0.05  -0.68  -0.44  -0.22  -1.02  -0.88  -0.73  -0.67  -2.09  -3.54  -0.44  0.03
OD TO  PRIVATE  SECTOR
INFLATION-ADJSTED
NOMINAL  COMNENT
- ---  - - - - - ---  ------  - - ---  - - - - - - - -
FINANCIAL  SYSTEM  NET  FLOWS--INFLATION  ADASTED
NE7  FOREIGN  BsROVIN  (-)  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.14  2.87  2.42  2.94  1.30  0.80  -0.47  1.88  3.90  -1.87  -4.73  -7.18
CLAMI  N  R.L.IC  SECTOR(-)  NA  -0.48  0.02  0.17  -4.39  -1.24  -1.7S  -1  44  1.14  0.56  0.77  -0.66  1.78  0.79  -1.50  NA
CENTRAL  saNK  NA  -0.53  -1.N9  0.06  -1.39  0.20  -0.95  -1.22  0.04  0.78  0.67  0.84  0.39  0.14  -0.48  -1.01
NNINAPCIAL  PeBLIC  SECTOR  0.53  0.04  1.90  0.09  -3.00  -1.44  -0.79  -0.21  1.10  -0.22  0.10  -1.50  1.39  0.66  -1.02  NA
CLARDI  ON  PRIVATE  SECTOR(-)  -0.45  -4.94  1.31  -2.39  -4.09  -3.38  -3.2S  -5.32  -1.64  -3.55  -5.16  -2.36  -0.51  17.95  8.54  7.92
LOANS  FROM CENRtAL  BANK(.)  -0.64  0.63  -1.89  1.03  4.07  -1.57  -1.06  2.11  1.35  1.43  1.28  0.44  -0.31  -1.79  0.02  -4.69
LIABILITIE5  TO PRIVATE  SECTOR(.)  NA  2.60  2.25  1.46  6.49  2.60  2.97  4.53  -3.06  0.28  2.25  1.65  -4.84  -10.44  1.28  -0.29
N2  EXCL  OCLCY  AND  DEPoTS  AT  CENTRAL  8BAN  -0.17  1.55  -1.15  -0.98  1.58  2.38  2.87  2.60  -1.54  1.26  1.29  2.18  -1.82  -4.95  1.13  1.19
OnfR  NA  1.05  3.42  2.42  4.90  0.22  0.10  1.92  -1.52  -0.98  0.98  -.0.52  -3.02  -5.49  0.15  -1.48
NET  OTHER  TEMS(#)  NA  NA  NA  NA  -1.36  1.16  0.79  -2.26  1.09  0.85  1.91  -0.24  1.11  -5.11  -3.83  NA
NET  DNESTIC  TRANsFERS  AND  TAX  ON  FINaNcIAL  IWET  DIATION
NET  DOMESTIC  TRANSFER  FROM  FINANCIAL  SYSTEN
ADAZTN8ET  FOR  REAL  INTEREST  RATE  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.10  -0.09  0.06  -0.50  -0.15  0.07  0.22  -0.64  -0.88  1.21  0.81
NET  TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  1.55  0.88  0.13  -0.80  0.37  -0.17  1.28  -0.78  0.22  -0.19  NA
OTER  NET  DOMESTIC  TRANSFER  FROM PRIVATE  SECTOR
ADJJSTAzrT  FOR  REAL  INTEREST  RATE  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.08  -0.03  0.03  -0.15  -0.07  0.03  0.07  -0.13  -0.08  -0.08  -0.13
NET  TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.02  -0.13  -0.00  0.67  -0.05  -0.59  -0.23  -0.09  -0.52  -0.74  0.11
TOTAL  DOHESTIC  NET  TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  2.22  1.97  1.52  1.59  1.07  -0.41  1.32  1.00  0.78  -0.13  NA
TAX  ON  FINANCIAL  INTERMEDIATION  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.75  0.65  0 27  1.95  1.15  0.52  0.18  2.11  3.69  -0.65  -0.70
…-----------  --YUCOSLAVIA
FINANC  INC  SUqARY
(P.,c.nt  of  CDP)
(CMANGCE/CO)  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  2971  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  198  198
CURRENCY  IN  HANDS  OF  NONSAW  PRIVATE  SECTOR  I.55  3.43  2.21  1.94  1  75  2.63  -0.45  1.82  1.39  1.60  1.37  1.62  0.99  1.18  1.90  2.44
IWLATION-ADAJSTED  (SEIaGRACE)  -0.05  2.02  0.16  -0.19  -0 03  1.81  -1.65  0.65  -0.21  -0.74  -0.36  0.05  -1.82  -0.74  -0.07  0.32
NOMINAL  COHIPONENT(IMPLATION  TAX)  1.60  1.41  2.05  2.12  1.78  0.83  1.20  1.17  1.60  2.34  1.73  1.57  2.81  1,92  1.96  2.12
SANX  RESERVES  1.So  4.06  2.71  -0.76  1.31  4.44  2.41  11.74  3.32  5.33  4.60  5.79  10.8s  9.73  - 23  10.09
IWLATION-AOJASTED  (SEICGARACE)  0.32  2.97  0.89  -2.80  0.04  3.84  1.27  10.25  -0.40  -0.12  0.20  1.52  2.34  1.47  -2.10  -0.22
NOMINAL  CONDNrLNT  (INFLATION  TAX)  1.18  1.10  1.62  2.02  1.28  0.60  1.14  1.49  3.72  5.46  4.40  4.26  8.25  8.26  10.34  10.31
NET  BORROWINC FROM FINANCIAL  SYSTEM
IrLATION-ADUSTED  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.55  -0.70  -0.47  -0.22  -0.52  -0.44  -0.42  -0.36  -0.17
OTHR  DOMESTIC  BORROWINr  FROM  PRIVATE  SECTOR
INFLATION-ADAJSTED  -0.97  -1.27  1.02  -0.6s  -0.46  -0.20  -0.65  -0.04  0.02  -0.08  0.  35  0.21  -0.01  -0.24  -0.06  0.40
DOMESTIC  6ORRnVINC  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  12.97  4.03  6.38  6.10  7.09  11.13  10.25  9.71  12.77
FOREICN  OPERATIONS  OF  CENTRAL  8ANK--INFLATION  A  2f4  -4.12  -2.14  3.45  0.52  -2  53  0.44  -0.36  3.66  2.69  -0.02  2.52  4.72  1.91  -2.15  -4.12
NET  FOREIOM  RESERVES  CHANCE(-  - INtEASE)  1.24  -4.12  -2.14  3.45  0.52  -2.53  0.44  -0.36  3.66  2.69  -0.02  2.52  4.72  1.91  -2.15  -4.12
OTHE  FOREICN  soIR  Nc
CENTRAL  6AW  REDISCOLUTS  (-  . INaEASE)  -3.76  -0.so  -3  01  -2.15  -1.69  -3 63  -1.28  -11.53  -5.01  -4.47  -5.06  -4.78  -4.48  -4.94  -3.568  -4.03
TO  8AWKINr  SYSTEM  -2.20  -2.72  -1.41  5.59  -2.62  -2.56  -1.46  -11.00  -4.70  -4.10  -4.686  -4.33  -4.23  -4.67  -3.21  -3.39
INFLATION-ADJUSTED  0.06  -0.  72  1.13  7.98  -1.86  -2.06  -0.62  -9.95  -1.59  1.00  -0.93  -0.34  3.02  0.66  2.96  1.96
NOMINAL  COMPONT  -2  .26  -2.  00  -2.  54  -2.39  -0.76  -0 50  -0.84  -1.05  -3.11  -5.11  -3.92  -3.99  -7.24  -5.53  -6.17  -5.35
TO  PRIVATE  SECTOR  -1.55  2.22  -1.61  -7.73  0.93  -1.06  0.18  -0.53  -0.31  -0.37  -0.22  -0.44  -0.26  -0.27  -0.37  -0.63  C
INFLATION-ADJUSTED  -0.96  2.88  -1.30  -7.18  2.55  -0.52  0.90  0.19  0.57  0.78  0.54  o.ls  0.74  0.38  0.23  -0.06  L
NOMINAL  COlfONENT  -0.60  -0.66  -0.31  -0.55  -1.61  -0.  55  -0.72  -0.72  -0.86  -1.15  -0.76  -0.59  -0.99  -0.65  -0.61  -0.55
FINANCIAL  SYSTE4  NET  FLOWS--  INFLATION  ADJATED
NET  FOREIOGN BRWINC  (.)  1.52  -0.25  -0.65  0.06  -0.07  0.44  1.50  2.06  2.44  3.85  1.15  0.32  2.67  1.77  -0.48  0.17
CLAIMS  ON  PULIC  SECTOR(-)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -9.71  1.10  0.59  0.02  -1.00  -1.90  -1.05  2.47  0.39
CENTRAL  BA4N  -0.32  -2.97  -0.69  2.80  -0.04  -3.84  -1.27  -10.25  0.40  0.12  -0.20  -1.52  -2.34  -1.47  2.10  0.22
NONFINANCIAL  RUsLIC  SECTIR  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.SS  0.70  0.47  0.22  0.52  0.44  0.42  0.36  0.17
CLAIMS  ON  PRIVATE  SECTOR(-)  -1.93  -3.12  2.96  7.22  -6.19  -15.87  2.03  -11.96  -4.96  3.45  6.45  4.20  12.53  1.72  8.91  5.73
LOANS  ARM  CENTRAL  BANK(*)  -0  06  0.72  -1-13  -7.98  1.86  2.06  0.62  9.95  1.59  -1.00  0.93  0.34  -3.02  -0.86  -2.96  -1.96
LIABILITIES  TO  PRIVATE  SECTOR(.)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  7.22  -0.47  NA  -4.15  -0.23  -8.88  -2.49  -6.50  -4.12
2  EXCCL CURE<CY  AND OEPOSITS  AT  CENT.tAL  BfNX  2.99  2.98  4.70  1.14  6.53  14.84  8.16  6.80  -0.41  0.96  -2.09  -0.20  -8.37  -2.11  -4.77  -3.37
OTHE  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.43  -0.06  NA  -2.06  -0.03  -0.50  -0.38  -1.73  -0.74
NET  OTHER  7TES6(.)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  1.74  0.50  NA  -4.43  -3.51  -1.33  1.32  -*.S5  0.79
NET  DGESTIC  TRANFERS  AND  TAX  ON  FINACIAL  INTEREDIATION
NET  DOPESTIC  TRASPER  FROM FINANCIAL  SYSTEM
AD.AZTMNT  FOR  REAL  INTEREST  RATE  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.29  -0.43  -0.65  -0.47  -0.33  -0.55  -0.20  -0.06  -0.10
NET  TRANFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  4A  NA  -0.26  -0.27  0.19  0.26  -0.20  0.11  -0.22  -0.29  -0.07
OTlR  NET  DCMESTIC  TRANsFER  FROM PRIVATE  SECTOR
ADJATPENT  FOR REAL  INTEREST  RATE  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0  16  -0.08  -0.12  -0.23  -0.18  -0.20  -0.51  -0.24  -0.12  -0.24
NET  TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.49  0.03  0.14  0.15  0.53  0.40  0.51  0.00  0.06  0.64
TOTAL  DOMESTIC  NET  TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  13  33  4.59  7.27  6.76  7.61  12.19  10.69  9.90  13.11
TAX  ON FINANCIAL  INTER3IEDIATION  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  3.03  5  87  8.68  6.79  6.35  12.12  10.63  12.49  12.77
…-----COL"IA
FINANCING  SaJARY
(Pe,coat  of  CDP)
(CMANCE/GDP)  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  IW1  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986
CRECY  :N  HANDS  OF NONB@  PRIVATE SECTOR  0.46  1.16  0.69  1.07  1.22  1.50  1.63  1.46  1.14  1.07  0.88  1.15  1.22  1.1s  -0.51  NA
ZIELATION-AoJJSTED (SEINORACE)  -0.27  0.55  -0.36  0.07  0.52  0.49  0.49  0.62  -0.16  -0.04  -0.23  0.17  0.51  0.35  -1.49  NA
NOIINAL  CWeONET(INFLATION  TAX)  0.73  0.61  1.06  1  00  0.70  1.00  1.14  0.84  1.30  1.10  1.12  0.98  0.71  0.80  0.97  NA
BANK  RESVES  0.60  0.72  1.73  0.57  0.67  1.45  1.386  2.96  1.69  1.70  1.48  0.54  0.49  0.90  1.98  NA
DIA1.TION-AOJSTED  (SE1OuACE)  0.05  0.23  0.92  -0.42  0.04  0.63  0.38  2.25  0.21  0.36  0.04  -0.79  -0.33  0.11  1.06  NA
NONINAL  CEeNT  (INFLATIOM TAX)  0.65  0.49  0.81  0.99  0.63  0.82  0.98  0.71  1.49  1.34  1.44  1.32  0.82  0.79  0.92  NA
NET 8ORR1INC  FRON  FINACIAL  SVSTEK
tNfLATION-A0JJSTED  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.23  1.51  0.24  -0.20  -0.37  -0.16  0.17  0.06  0.67  0.40  NA  NA
OTFf  COESTIC  O8a  INC FROM  PRIVATE SECTOR
V1ATION-ADJuSTED  NA  NA  NA  -0.35  -0.35  -0.14  2.15  0.82  0.56  0.77  -0.79  0.76  -1  23  -0.17  2.14  NA
DOMESTIC  sRROW  NA  NA  NA  NA  1.30  4.31  5.38  5.03  3.03  3.38  1.74  2.50  1.14  2.28  NA  NA
FOREIGN  OPStATIOF OF CENTRAL  BANK--INfLATION A  0.13  -1.66  -1.21  1.20  -0.72  -3.84  -2.40  -1.75  -4.16  -2.31  0.98  2.70  4.31  5.13  -2.70  NA
NET FOREIN  REV  O  CHAE(-  - ICREASE)  -0.14  -1.88  -1.07  1.25  -0.91  -3.76  -2.41  -1.90  -4.12  -2.39  1.00  2.70  4.44  3.05  -3.18  NA
OTMER  FORFICN  ORIFNr  0.27  0.22  -0.14  -0.04  0.20  -0.08  0.01  0.1s  -0.04  0.08  -0.02  0.00  -0.12  0.08  0.48  NA
CENTRAL  sANKt  RWISCMTS  - *  I  qASE)  -0.is  -0.84  -1.92  -1.  5  -2.36  -0.07  -3.05  -1.26  -0.26  -0.28  -0.85  -1.01  -1.91  -1.23  -1.22  NA
TO sAWINC  SYST8N  -0.93  -0.46  -1.88  -1.56  -2.08  -0.14  -2.96  -1.17  -0.11  -0.26  -0.  67  -0.94  -1.82  -1.25  -0.61  NA
NFLATION-AJSTED  -0.28  0.14  -0.97  -0.45  -1.25  1.16  -1.65  -0.1s  1.34  0.74  0.20  -0.18  -1.26  -0.80  0.34  NA
NOMINAL  C  NT  -0.65  -0.60  -0.91  -1.11  -0.83  -1.32  -1.11  -1.02  -1.45  -1.00  -0.87  -0.76  -0.56  -0.75  -0.95  NA
TO PRIVATE SECTOR  0.80  -0.37  -0.04  0.42  -0.28  0.07  -0.09  -0.09  -0.1s  0.00  -0.17  -0.07  -0.09  0.02  -0.6l  NA  )
INFLATION-ADJTED,  1.17  -0.18  0.30  0.70  -0.18  0.23  0.02  -0.01  -0.04  0.11  -0.09  0.02  -0.03  0.09  -0.55  NA
NOMINAL  COOENT  -0.37  -0.20  -0.34  -0.28  -0.10  -0.16  -0.12  -0.05  -0.11  -0.10  -0.08  -0.09  -0.06  -0.07  -0.06  NA
FUNANCIAL  SYSTEK NET fLO--INFLATION  ADJJSTED
NET FOREIGN  RONIN  (.)  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.23  0.09  -1.60  -0.25  0.99  0.66  -0.14  0.19  -0.31  0.54  NA  NA
CLAIMS ON PUELIC SECTOR(-)  NA  NA  NA  RA  0.19  -2.14  -0.62  -2.05  0.16  -0.20  -0.21  0.73  -0.33  -0.50  NA  NA
CENTRAL  sAN  -0.05  -0.23  -0.92  0.42  -0.04  -0.83  -0.38  -2.25  -0.21  -0.36  -0.04  0.79  0.33  -0.11  -1.06  NA
NOFINANCIAL RELIC  SECTOR  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.23  -1.51  -0.24  0.20  0.37  0.16  -0.17  -0.06  -0.67  -0.40  NA  NA
CLAIrM ON PRIVATE SECTOR(-)  NA  NA  NA  NA  -1.83  -0.34  -0.10  -2.21  0.25  -4.84  -2.12  -1.83  -4.07  -3.05  NA  NA
LOANS  FROM  CETRAL  BANK(()  0.28  -0.14  0.97  0.45  1.25  -1.16  1.85  0.1s  -1.34  -0.74  -0.20  0.18  1.26  0.60  -0.34  NA
LIAILrrTIES  TO PRIVATE  SECTOR(+)  NA  NA  NA  NA  1.37  1.52  -0.29  2.89  -0.26  4.50  3.15  -0.04  2.70  1.27  NA  NA
2  EICL CUECY  AND  DEPOSITS AT CENTRAL BANK  0.05  1.85  2.07  -0.16  0.32  0.73  0.31  0.80  -0.75  2.71  1.74  -0.72  1.00  0.62  1.11  NA
0TIE  NA  NA  NA  NA  1.05  0.79  -0.60  2.09  0.49  1.79  1.41  0.67  1.70  0.65  NA  NA
NET OTHE  ITEBS(.)  NA  NA  NA  NA  1.36  1.99  1.39  -1.30  0.38  0.91  -0.71  0.52  0.71  1.03  NA  NA
NET OWESTIC  TRANES  NMO  TAX ON FINANCIAL INTEDIATION
NET DOMESTIC  TRANSF  FROM  FINANCIAL SYSTEN
ADJJsrTT  FOR REAL IWEEST  RATE  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.06  0.01  -0.00  0.14  -0.03  0.06  0.05  0.06  0.18  0.32  0.28  NA
NET ThRSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.31  1.50  0.24  -0.35  -0.34  -0.21  0.12  0.01  0.46  0.07  NA  NA
OTHER  NET OMESTIC  TRANFRF  FROM  PRIVATE SECTOR
ADJUTMENT FOR REAL INTEREiT RATE  NA  NA  NA  -0.17  0.16  0.03  -0.00  0.21  -0.07  0.17  0.18  0.16  0.58  0.63  O.36  NA
NET TRANFER  NA  NA  NA  -0.18  -0.52  -0.17  2.15  0.61  0.63  0.61  -0.97  0.60  -1.82  -0.69  1.78  NA
TOTAL DOESTIC  NET TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  1.06  4.27  5.39  4.68  3.13  3.16  1.51  2.29  0.38  1.43  NA  NA
TAX ON FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION  NA  NA  NA  NA  1.06  1  78  2.12  1.19  2.89  2.22  2.33  2.09  0.76  0.74  1.26  NA
----------------------------------------------------------------  -----  - - - _-  --  --  - . - - __  --------  _  -------------  __  _  --  .----------- _  -__-.--  _--  _--  _-  __-  _  _-  __-  __-_--  _  _--  _-  __-  __-  __-_--  _--  _--  _--  _- __  __-  __-_-  _  _--  _- __-  __-  __-  __-  _--_--_--_-__-__-__-_--_--_--_-INDONESIA
FINANCINO SUJ9ARY
(Porc*nt  of  COP)
(CHANCE/COP)  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986
CUtRENCY  IN  NAWS  OF NOA  PRIVATE SECTOR  1.17  1.56  1.57  1.14  1.21  0.83  1.05  1.15  0.95  1.37  0.65  0.62  0.55  0.43  0.79  0.91
INflATION-ADAJSTED  (SEICHDRACE)  1.06  0.44  0.48  -0.03  0.44  0.24  0.57  0.86  -0.04  0.79  0.37  0.21  0.07  0.08  0.62  0.49
NOMINAL  C0PEWT(lPLATION  TAX)  0.11  1.11  1.09  1.17  0.77  0.60  0.48  0.29  0.99  0.58  0.27  0.41  0.48  0.35  0.17  0.42
8BAK RESERVES  0.46  1.12  0.70  1.74  1.02  0.77  0.74  -0.42  0.90  0.60  0.29  -0.32  0.85  0.22  0.29  0.59
INFLATION-ADJUSTED  (SEIORACE)  0.43  0.73  0.21  1.22  0.47  0.33  0.36  -0.64  0.38  0.25  0.14  -0.54  0.66  0.03  0.20  0.38
NOMINAL  CCO4NT  (IFLATION  TAX)  0.04  0.39  0.49  0.52  0.55  0.44  0.37  0.22  0.52  0.35  0.15  0.22  0.19  0.19  0.09  0.21
NET 8ORROWINr  FROM  FINANCIAL SYSTEM
INFLATION-ADJASTW  -0.03  -0.15  1.11  0.81  0.65  0.94  -0.05  -0.08  -0.11  -0.02  0.30  1.31  0.34  1.38  -0.17  0.09
OTHER OE5STIC 8OVINC  FROM  PRIVATE SECTOR
INFLATION-AOAZTED  NA  0.88  0.24  -0.45  -0.22  0.24  0.05  0.04  0.00  -0.04  0.11  -0.25  0.09  -0.16  0.03  -0.04
DOMESTIC  8RR1NC  NA  5.40  3.62  3.23  2.66  2.78  1.79  0.68  1.75  1.92  1.35  1.35  1.83  1.86  0.95  1.55
FOREICN  OPORATIONS  OF CENTRAL  8ANK--INFLATIGN  A  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -2.08  -2.30  -2.62  0.83  1.20  -1.00  -2.64  -0.56  1.00
NET FOWCN  RESERVES  CMWANGE(-  *  INCREASE)  -0.04  -3.73  -1.16  NA  NA  -1.86  -2.86  -2.33  -1.81  -2.52  0.84  1.21  -1.00  -2.63  -0.56  1.00
OTHER  FOREIGN  8Ot  INC  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.25  -0.49  -0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.00  0.00
CENTRAL  WAN(  REDISCUIMTS - *  INCREASE)  NA  -0.22  -0.70  NA  NA  NA  -0.25  -0.77  -0.94  -1.43  -1.60  -4.63  -1.36  -4.61  -0.95  -3.06
TO 8AW4INC  SYSTEM  -0.87  -0.13  -0.67  NA  NA  NA  -0.23  -0.72  -0.90  -1.38  -1.54  -4.15  -1.31  -4.37  -0.77  -2.76
INFLATION-ADASTED  -0.79  0.66  -0.06  NA  NA  NA  0.17  -0.52  -0.22  -0.95  -1.32  -3.72  -0.46  -3.72  -0.31  -1.73
NONINAL  COPNET  -0.06  -0.81  -0.61  NA  NA  NA  -0.40  -0.20  -0.68  -0.43  -0.22  -0.43  -0.86  -0.65  -0.46  -1.02
TO PRIVATE SECTOR  NA  -0.09  -0.03  -0.02  0.01  -0.06  -0.02  -0.05  -0.04  -0.05  -0.07  -0.48  -0.05  -0.24  -0.18  -0.32  O
DILATION-ADJZTED  NA  -0.08  -0.01  0.00  0.02  -0.05  -0.01  -0.05  -0.01  -0.04  -0.06  -0.46  0.02  -0.19  -0.15  -0.24  LA
NOMINAL  COMPONET  NA  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.03  -0.02  -0.01  -0.02  -0.07  -0.05  -0.03  -0 .08
_  N_  N_  _C _  A-  _L _  _  _  S_  _  E_  M_  _  N_ Er  _  F  _  L__  0  W  _  __  -_L_  _  T_  _  _  __  A_  _  _J _  _  ___  E_  _D- FINANCIAL-SYSTEM-------------------------------
NET FORSEICN  BtWINC  (.)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -1.12  -1.33  -2.90  -0.46  1.85  -1.90  -0.53  -1.18  -1.54
CLAIMS ON RABLIC SECTOR(-)  -0.40  -0.58  -1.32  -2.02  -1.12  -1.26  -0.31  0.72  -0.27  -0.23  -0.44  -0.77  -1.00  -1.41  -0.03  -0.46
CENTRAL  8AOC  -0.43  -0.73  -0.21  -1.22  -0.47  -0.33  -0.36  0.64  -0.38  -0.25  -0.14  0.54  -0.66  -0.03  -0.20  -0.38
NOWNINANCIAL  PLS.IC  SECTOR  0.03  0.15  -1.11  -0.81  -0.65  -0.94  0.05  0.08  0.11  0.02  -0.30  -1.31  -0.34  -1.38  0.17  -0.09
CLAIMS ON PRIVATE SECTOR(-)  NA  -1.84  -2.86  -1.06  4.20  -0.83  -6.32  3.44  -0.39  -2.00  -2.36  -2.50  -1.92  -3.04  -2.73  -2.97
LDANS  FROM  CENTRAL  8AN4(.)  0. 79  -0.68  0.06  NA  NA  NA  -0.17  0.52  0.22  0.95  1.32  3.72  0.46  3.72  0.51  1.73
LIABILITIES  TO PRIVATE SECTOR(.)  NA  2.72  1.82  2.53  -0.42  1.92  0.78  1.29  1.11  3.13  1.83  0.47  2.84  2.22  *4.13  0.86
F2  EXCL  CURRBC  AND DEPOSITS  AT CENTRAL  A8A  NA  1.89  1.07  1.34  1.62  1.92  0.51  1.20  1.13  2.86  1.98  0.51  2.94  2.25  4.05  0.69
OTHER  NA  0.83  0.75  1.19  -2.03  0.00  0.28  0.09  -0.02  0.28  -0.15  -0.04  -0.11  -0.03  0.08  0.19
NET OTHER  ITEMS(t)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -4.58  0.49  0.93  0.14  -2.78  1.52  -0.91  -O.56  2.33
NET OWESTIC TRANSFERS  AND  TAX ON FINCIAL  INTERH9IATION
NET DOMESTIC  TRASFER  ROM FINANCIAL SYSTEM
AOSTMEWT FOR  REAL INTEREST  RATE  0.00  0.00  0.02  -0.13  -0.11  -0.04  -0.07  -0.02  -0.19  -0.04  0.11  0.10  0.14  0.27  0.53  0.21
NET TRANSFER  -0.03  -0.15  1.10  0.94  0.75  0.98  0.02  -0.07  0.09  0.02  0.19  1.21  0.20  1.11  -0.70  -0.13
OTHER  NET DOMESTIC  TRANSFER  FROM  PRIVATE SECTOR
ADAJSTMNT  FOR REAL INTEREST  RATE  NA  -0.02  -0.11  -0.16  -0.04  -0.01  -0.01  -0.00  -0.04  -0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01
NET TRANSFER  NA  0.89  0.36  -0.30  -0.18  0.25  0.06  0.04  0.05  -0.03  0.09  -0.28  0.09  -0.19  0.03  -0.04
TOTAL OGMESTIC  NET TRANSFER  NA  3.42  3.72  3.52  2.80  2.83  1.87  0.70  1.99  1.96  1.21  1.23  1.68  1.57  0.41  1.33
TAX ON FINANCIAL  INTERMEDIATION  NA  1.52  1.67  1.97  1.47  1.09  0.94  0.52  1.75  0.98  0.29  0.50  0.52  0.24  -0.28  0.42
------------  ----  -------------------  ------------------------------  - _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  __---  ------  __  __  ---  ----------  ---  ------------ _-__-__-__-__-__  -__  -__  -__-__-_  _-__-__-__-__-_--_--_--_--_-  -_--_--_--_  _--_--_--_--_  - _  _--_--_--_-  -_--_--_-  -_-  -_-  -_--_  -- _-  -_--_--_  -- _--_-KOREA
FINANCINC SUMKARY
(Percont  of  CDP)
(OINCEF/CDP)  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1978  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986
CLRENCY IN HANDS  OF NON8AW PRIVATE SECTOR  0  83  1.34  1.72  1.32  0.94  1.21  1.53  1.70  0.77  0.66  0.36  1.04  0.49  0.34  0.23  0.SO
INFLATION-ADJSTED  (SEIl4ORACE)  0.34  1.04  1.38  0.23  -0.08  0.63  1  12  I.oS  -0.16  -0.80  -0.10  0.as  0.41  0.24  0.10  0.45
NOMINAL  CWMNENT(INFLATIGN TAX)  0.49  0.30  0.34  1.09  1.02  0.38  0.41  0.64  0.93  1.46  0.46  0.18  0.08  0.10  0.13  0.oS
BANK  RESRVES  -1.18  2.01  1.90  0.67  2.01  1.36  1.99  1.32  1.36  -1.26  -1.30  0.90  -0.05  -0.12  -0.14  0.3S
IWFLATION-ADJASTE (SEIONRACE)  -1.79  1.78  1.57  -0.42  1.11  0.94  1.S3  0.56  0.39  -2.95  -1.65  0.82  -0.09  -0.16  -0.19  0.34
NOKIMAL  CWEOW T  (INFLATION TAX)  0.60  0.24  0.33  1.09  0.91  0.43  0.46  0.76  0.98  1.70  0.35  0.07  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.02
NET OOOING  FROM  FINANCIAL SYSTEM
INFLATION-AD.AED  -0.45  -0.32  0.28  -0.60  -0.14  -0.42  0.20  -0.83  -0.88  0.88  -0.32  -0.24  -1.24  0.56  0.02  0.73
OTHER  DOMESTIC  MOVINAC FRaN PRIVATE SECTOR
IhFLATION-ADAJSTED  0.00  0.05  -0.02  -0.02  0.25  0.38  -0.24  0.13  0.34  -0.69  0.72  -0.44  1.23  0.87  1.70  2.03
DOMESTIC  8RROW  INC  -0.81  3.09  3.88  1.38  3.07  2.54  3.49  2.31  1.60  -0.40  -0.53  1.25  0.43  1.65  1.81  3.61
FOREIGN OPSIATIOlN OF  CEaRAL  BDNA--INFLATION  A  1.1s  0.70  -2.32  4.25  -1.66  -3.26  -3.0a  1.23  0.22  0.87  1.45  -0.29  0.76  -0.20  -0.42  -0.20
NET FIGN  RERWY  CHANCE(- . INCREASE)  1.1s  0.70  -2.32  4.25  -1.66  -3.26  -3.06  1.23  0.22  0.87  1.45  -0.29  0.76  -0.20  -0.42  -0.20
OTHER  FOEaIGN  8OROMcI
CENTRAL  8ANK  REDISCTS  (-  *  INCREASE)
TO BANKCIG  SYSTEM  -0.6  -1.61  -1.86  -5.11  -0.19  0.00  -0.91  -2.66  -2.71  -1.52  -1.51  -1.07  -1.72  -2.69  -2.63  -2.05
INFLATION-ADJUED  -0.32  -1.40  -1.58  -4.13  1.47  0.52  -0  49  -2.08  -1.70  0.61  -0.78  -0.74  -1.59  -2.50  -2.33  -1.91
NOMINAL  COMPONENT  -0.33  -0.21  -0.28  -0.98  -1.66  -0.52  -0.42  -0.57  -1.01  -2.13  -0.73  -0.33  -0.14  -0.19  -0.30  -0.14  1
TO PRIVATE SECT8R  00
INFLATION-ADJSTED  Q
NoNINAL COPONENT
FINANCIAL SYSTE4 NET FLOWS--INFLATICN ADATED
NET FCREIGN 80RRNE  C.)  I1.3  -2.25  -1.15  2.33  1.95  -0.26  -0.43  0.47  1.80  1.49  1.97  4.02  0.21  1.61  2.23  -3.16
CLAmIS ON PI8LIC  SECTOR(-)  1.61  -2.01  -2.27  1.48  -2.95  -0.61  -2.89  1.17  0.65  1.3S  -0.04  -1.20  0.71  -2.17  -1.55  -0.36
CBETRAL  8AK  1.1is  -2.33  -1.99  0.68  -3.09  -1.03  -2.69  0.34  -0.25  2.23  -0.36  -1.44  -0.53  -1.61  -1.54  0.37
NIOFINANCIAL 1UBLIC SECTOR  0.45  0.32  -0.28  0.60  0.14  0.42  -0.20  0.83  0.88  -0.88  0.32  0.24  1.24  -0.56  -0.02  -0.73
CLAIMS GN PRIVATE SECTOR(-)  -5.22  -5.94  -6.67  -6.27  -0.55  -4.61  -4.94  -8.38  - ~.88  -2.33  -5.85  -9.01  -7.54  -5.84  -8.22  -6.98
LOAN  FR  CENTRAL  9ANK(#)  0.32  1.40  1.68  4.13  -1.47  -0.52  0.49  2.08  1.70  -0.61  0.78  0.74  1.59  2.50  2.33  1.91
LIILITIES  TO  PRIVATE SECTOR(*)  2.21  6.79  8.57  -1.50  0.79  S.10  5.84  3.51  1.03  -0.60  2.87  5.44  4.26  1.64  4.75  6.09 F2  EXCL C..INCY  AND  DEPOSITS AT COMTRAL  sAh  1.93  3.73  6.10  -0.85  0.75  4.33  5.60  3.45  1.02  -1.20  3.65  5.72  3.92  1.51  3.97  5.25
OTHER  0.28  1.06  2.27  -0. 65  0.04  0.77  0.24  0.06  0.02  0.60  -0.78  -0.28  0.34  0.33  0.78  0.85
NET OTMR ITEKs(.)  -0.28  2.01  0.14  -0.17  2.25  0.89  1.94  1.14  0.71  0.69  0.27  0.01  0.77  2.07  0.46  2.30
NET DOMESTIC  TRANSERS  NO TAX ON FINANCIAL INTOERIATION
NET DOESTIC TRANR  FROM  FINANCIAL SYSTEH
ADJST1UA  FOR REAL INTEREST RATE  -0.35  -0.18  -0.13  0.31  0.51  -0.15  -0.10  -0.05  0.04  0.60  -0.12  -0.10  -0.18  -0.21  -0.  1S  -0.18
NET TRANSFER  -0.11  -0.14  0.42  -0.91  -0.45  -0.26  0.30  -0.78  -0.92  0.28  -0.20  -0.14  -1.06  0.78  0.16  0.91
OTHER  NET DOSTIC  TRANSFER  FROM  PRIVATE SECTOR
ADASTMEPT  FOR REAL INTEREST RATE  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.00  -0.00  -0.10  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.07  0.10  0.22
NET TRANSFI-  0.00  0.05  -0.02  -0.02  0.25  0.37  -0.25  0.12  0.35  -0.59  0.72  -0.46  1.22  0.80  1.60  1.81
TOTAL DOMESTIC  NET TRANSFER  -0.46  3.27  4.01  1.07  2.76  2.69  3.57  2.35  1.5U  -0.90  -0.41  1.33  0.60  1.79  1.86  3.57
TAX ON FINANCIAL INTERHEIATION  1  44  0.72  0.60  1.87  1.62  0  96  0.96  1.44  1.86  2.66  0.93  0.33  0.29  0.29  0.23  0.03
…------------THAILAND
FINANCIlE  S&jMKARY
(Pe,ce.t  of  CDP)
(OiANCE/GD)  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1988
CUltRENCY  IN  HNADS  OF NON8AW  PRIVATE  SECTOR  0.82  1.36  1.56  0 66  0.63  1.04  0.71  0.96  1.38  0.73  0.24  0.74  0 61  0 39  0.  04  0.64
ItELATION-ADJAJTED  (SEIQNOFACE)  0.71  0.85  0.13  -O 57  0.32  0.81  0.13  0.48  0.49  -0.24  -0.48  0.59  0.39  0.42  -0.16  0.54
NOMINALC  COMONNBT(IWELATION  TAX)  0.10  0.71  1.43  1.23  0.32  0.23  0.58  0.46  0.89  0.98  0.72  0.15  0.22  -0.02  0.20  0.10
8461 RESERVES  0.35  0.48  0.10  0.48  0.39  0. 08  0.08  0.39  -0.06  0.29  0.24  0.13  0.16  0.03  0.61  0.16
IWfLATION-AO.JUSTED  (SEIQEAMCE)  0.32  0.27  -0.34  0.16  0.29  0.01  -0.10  0.26  -0.33  0.  06  0.06  0.09  0.10  0.04  0.58  0.12
NOMINAL  COMPONENT (INWLATION  TAK)  0.03  0.21  0.44  0  33  0.10  0.07  0.17  0.13  0.28  0.23  0.18  0.04  0  06  -0.01  0.05  0.03
NET BORROWINr  PROM  FINANCIAL  SYSTDI
INFLATION-AOJZTED  2.39  3.29  -0.36  -0 98  0.63  1.21  0.48  0.29  -0.44  0.10  0.30  2.43  0.54  4.05  0.73  3.92
OTHER  004E57IC  BORROWING  FROM PRIVATE  SECTOR
IWELATI0-ADAJSTED
DOOMETIC  BORROWING  35.68  5.13  1.30  0.16  1.65  2.33  1.28  1.64  0.88  1.12  0.78  3.30  1.31  4.48  1.38  4.72
FOREIGN  OPERATIONS  OF CBETRAL  BANK--INFLATION  A  MA  MA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.82  -1.61  -0.48  1.52  2.42  0.30  0.89  -1.38  -0.01  -1.60
NETr  FOREIOM  RESERVES  CHANCE(-  . IOWASE)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.82  -1.61  -0 48  1.52  2.42  0.30  0.89  -1.38  -0.01  -1.80
OTHER FORtEZON  BOROWING
CENTRAL 8AN(  REDISCOMTS  INC  l.REASE)
TO BANKING  SYSTEM  -0.28  -0.15  -0.80  -0.48  -1.19  0.40  -0.05  -0.69  -1.68  -0.38  -0.34  -0.16  -0.21  -0.43  -0.59  -0.96
INFL.ATION-AJASTED  -0.27  -0.07  -0.66  -0.26  -1.12  0.46  0.10  -0.58  -1.41  0.11  0.01  -0.06  -0.10  -0.44  -0.49  -0.90
NO4INAL  COMPONENT  -0.01  -0.07  -0.15  -0.22  -0.07  -0.06  -0.15  -0.11  -0.27  -0 47  -0.34  -0.07  -0.11  0.01  -0.10  -0.06
TO PRIVATE  SECTOR  2
INFLATION-ADJUSEDW.
NOMINAL  C(OMPNET
FINANCIAL  SYSTBt  NEr FLOWS--  INFLATION  ADA.4STED
NEr FOREION  BORWINPC (.)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  1.68  2.04  0.37  -2.45  -0.06  -1.23  2.34  1.07  -1.27  -1.67
CLAIMS ON PUBLIC SECTOR(-)  -2.71  -3.96  0. 70  0.83  -0.92  -1.22  -0.38  -0.64  0.76  -0.16  -0.36  -2.52  -0.64  -4.09  -1.29  -4.04
CENTRAL.  BAW(  -0.32  -0.27  0.34  -0.16  -0.29  -0.01  0.10  -0.26  0.33  -0.  06  -0.06  -0. 09  -0.10  -0.04  -0.56  -0.12
NOWINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR  -2.39  -3.29  0. 36  0.98  -0.83  -1.21  -0.48  -0.29  0.44  -0.10  -0.30  -2.43  -0.54  -4.05  -0.73  -3.92
CLAIMS  ON PRIVATE  SECTOR(-)  -1.90  -0.81  -3.30  -3.17  -4.61  -10.24  -6.30  -7.68  -1  27  0.98  -1.89  -6.02  -9.65  -7.53  -3.51  -1.61
LOANS  FROM  CENTRAL  BANK(.)  0.27  0.07  0.68  0.26  1.12  -0.48  -0.10  0.58l  1.41  -0.11  -0.01  0.06  0.10  0.44  0.49  0.90
LIABILITIES  TO PRIVATE  SECTOR(+)  4.23  4.31  0.65  1.23  3.54  9.73  4.97  5.29  -1.15  2.49  2.70  8.82  8.14  10.23  5.52  7.90
M2 EXCL  CUltENCY  APO  OEPOSITS  AT  CSAIURAL  BANK  3.73  3.74  0.48  1.28  3.31  4.82  3.42  3.27  -0.77  2.05  1.70  6.83  7.24  9.51  3.74  5.45
OTPet  0.50o  0.67  0.17  -0.  06  0.23  4.91  1.55  2.02  -0.37  0.44  1.00  1.97  0.  90  0.72  1.78  2.45
NET OTIER ITBEM(-)  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.39  0.82  -0.16  -0.49  0.04  0.68  0.14  0.61  -0.17  -1.17
PET  DOMESTIC  TRANSFERS  AND TAX  ON FINANCIAL INTEREIATION
NET OONESTIC  TPRANSFER  FROM FINAt.IAL  SYSTEM
ADJUSTMENT  FOR  REAL INOtEEST  RATE  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.07  0.02  -0.39  -0.34  0.04  0.80  0.67  1.22  0.99  0.84
NET  TRASFE  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  0.55  0.27  -0.05  0.43  0.26  1.84  -0.13  2.83  -0.26  3.06
OTHER PET  DOMESTIC  TRANSFER  PRtOM  PIRIVATE  SECTOR
ADAJSTPeJT  FOR  REAL INBtEEST RATE
NET TRANSFER
TOTAL  DOMESTIC  NET TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NAA  NA  1.34  1.82  1.27  1 46  0.74  2.50  0.65  3.26  0.39  3.89
TAX  ON FINANCIAL  1NTEREDIATION  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NAA  0.83  0.59  1 54  1.54  0.86  -0  61  -0  38  -1.25  -0.74  -0.70
…--  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -TURKEY
FINANCINC  SUbMARY
(Percent  of  CDP)
(CKANCE/WDP)  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  198
C3Ot8CY  IN mANDS  OF  NON8ANK  PRIVATE  5ECTOR  1.07  0.90  1.59  1.34  1.29  1.46  2.38  2.42  2.31  1.71  0.98  1.53  1.18  1.03  1.00  1.03
IWFLATION-ADASTE  (SEICOtACE)  -0.05  0.35  0.68  0.SO  0.30  0.61  0.18  0.61  -1.21  -1.16  -0.05  0.35  -0.15  -0.46  -0.18  0.24
NOMINAL  COF  CN4ET(IWLATION  TAX)  1.12  0.55  0.01  0.84  0.99  0.85  2.20  1.81  3.53  2.86  1.03  1.18  1.32  1.49  1.18  0.79
8ANK  RESERVES  2.41  3.23  1.62  1.83  2.27  0.99  2.70  2.47  2.81  1.72  3.07  1.77  2.26  2.83  1.90  0.96
IWLATION-ADJSTED  (SEIORtAGE)  1.66  2.74  0.50  0.83  1.05  -0.1S  0.08  0.35  -1.14  -1.58  1.93  -0.06  0.36  0.52  -0.29  -0.52
NOMINAL  COheONET  (IULATION  TAX)  0.75  0.49  1.13  1.01  1.22  1.13  2.62  2.12  3.95  3.30  1.13  1.83  1.89  2.32  2.19  1.48
NET  BORROWINC FROM FINANCIAL  SYSTEM
INFLATION-ADASTED  -0.34  -0.04  0.22  2.25  1.29  3.65  -1.25  -1.75  -2.33  -1.74  -1.64  -0.30  -1.77  0.76  2.67  -0.63
OTHE  DOESTIC  80RROVING  FROM PRIVATE  SECTOR
IffLATIOI  ADAJSTED  NA  0.04  0  19  -0.01  -0.07  0.01  -0.06  0.06  -0.10  -0.02  0.97  -0.98  -0.00  -0.02  0.01  -0.00
DONESTIC  OROWIC  NA  4.14  3.63  5.41  4.78  6.10  3.77  3.19  2.70  1.66  3.38  2.02  1.65  4.60  5.58  1.36
FOREICN  OPERATIOCS  OF  CENTRAL  8AW--INfLATICN  A  -2.97  -0.67  -1.75  2.86  4.93  4.72  -0.56  0.31  -1.33  3.86  -1.56  -1.08  1.99  3.95  2.61  2.48
NET  OEIGN  RESERVES  CANQE(-  - INCEASE)  -2.97  -0.67  -1.75  2.88  4.93  4.72  -0.56  0.31  -1.33  3.86  -1.56  -1.08  1.9  3.95  2.61  2.48
OTHER  FOREIGN  8OVINC
CENTRAL  8ANK  REDI5COUETS  - *  INCREASE)
TO  SANWING  SYSTEN  NA  NA  NA  -3.42  -4.41  -5.89  -4.86  -4.42  -3.19  -2.42  -1.69  0.35  -2.26  1.98  -0.28  -0.45
INFLATIN-ADJUSTED  NA  NA  NA  -2.87  -3.19  -4.46  0.02  -0.52  4.04  2.78  0.04  2.33  -0.83  3.90  0.28  -0.12
NOMINAL  COMPONEW  NA  NA  NA  -0.75  -1.23  -1.42  -4.68  -3.91  -7.23  -5.20  -1.73  -1.99  -1.43  -1.92  -0.55  -0.33  I
TO  PRIVATE  SECTOR  08
INFLATION-ADJUSTED  08
NONINAL  COMPONENT
FINANCIAL  SYSTEN  NET  FLOWS--INFLATION  ADJJSTED
NET  FOREIGN  80RROVINr  (.)  NA  0.17  0.04  -0.09  -0.73  1.14  -0.26  0.01  12.62  -0.80  -0.74  0.24  -0.03  0.51  1.97  2.16
CLAIMS  ON PLI8LIC  SECTOR(-)  -0.90  -2.64  -0.73  -3.02  -2.46  -4.99  -2.45  -0.75  4.58  6.51  1.13  1.00  1.75  -1.26  -2.17  0.99
CENTRAL  IADC  -1.24  -2.50  -0.51  -0.77  -1.17  -1.34  -3.70  -2.50  2.24  4.77  -0.52  0.70  -0.02  -0.51  0.50  0.37
NONINANCIAL  PLI8LIC  SECTOR  0.34  0.04  -0.22  -2.25  -1.29  -3.65  1.25  1.75  2.33  1.74  1.64  0.30  1.77  -0.76  -2.67  0.63
CLAIMS  ON  PRIVATE  SECTOR(-)  0.93  -3.84  -2.64  -2.04  -3.97  -3.13  3.41  1.42  4.27  1.13  -6.07  -1.72  -1.99  2.17  -1.65  -4.05
LOANS  FROM CENTRAL  SANK(.)  NA  NA  NA  2.67  3.19  4.46  -0.02  0.52  -4.04  -2.78  -0.04  -2.33  0.83  -3.90  -0.28  0.12
LIABILITIES  TO  PRIVATE  SECTOR(-)  NA  3.70  2.51  1.86  1.92  2.03  -3.06  -1.30  -3.14  -2.09  7.27  3.12  -1.50  1.62  2.60  2.46
F2  EXCL  O.8R  F  AD  DEPOSITS AT  CENTAL  8ANK  NA  3.72  1.98  1.53  1.64  0.85  -2.43  -0.67  -1.70  -1.28  7.34  3.41  -1.71  2.04  2.60  2.J5
OTPO  -0.81  -0.01  0.53  0.33  0.28  1.19  -0.63  -0.63  -1.44  -0.81  -0.07  -0.29  0.21  -0.43  -0.01  0.12
NET  OTIR  ITEM(S)  NA  NA  NA  0.69  2.03  0.78  2.05  -0.63  -14.65  -2.28  -1.70  -0.18  0.93  0.87  -0.49  -1.68
MET  DOMESTIC  TRA6FES  AND  TAX  ON FPINCIAL  INTEREDIATION
NET  DOESTIC  TRAr6ER  FROMI  FPWICIAL  SYSTE5
ADJSTMENT  FOR  REAL  INTEST  RATE  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -4.24  -2.43  0.59  0.41  0.42  -0.00  0.09  0.61
NET  TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  1.90  0.69  -2.23  -0.71  -2.20  0.76  2.58  -1.24
OTMER  NET  0SESTIC  TRANSFEt  FRON  PRIVATE  SECTOR
ADJ.TPINT  FOR  REAL  INTEREST  RATE  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.06  -0.02  0.00  0.12  0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.00
MET  TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -0.04  -0.01  0.97  -1.10  -0.01  -0.02  0.01  -0.00
TOTAL  DOHESTIC  NET  TRANSFER  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  6.99  4.11  2.79  1.49  1.23  4.60  5.49  0.75
TAt  ON  FINANCIAL  INTERMlEDIATION  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  11.77  6.61  1.57  2.48  2.79  3.82  3.28  1.66
--------------------------------------------- ~  ---  - - - --  - - - --  - - - ----  - --  - - - --  - - - - --  - - - --  - - - --  - - - - --  - - - ----  - --  - - - --  - - - --  - - - -----  -89 -
APPENDIX  IV
DATA SOURCES
EXTERNAL  DEBT (Table  1)
External  debt  flow  data  are  from  the  World  Bank's  World  Debt  Tables,
1987-88  Edition. Additional  -mmpublished  data  on the  revaluation  of public  and
private long-term  and  short-term  debt  are  from  World  Bank  sources.
FISCAL  DATA (Tables  2, 3, and  4)
ARGENTINA: PSBR  data  and  consolidated  public  sector  revenue  and
expenditure  breakdown  are  from  World  Bank  sources.
BRAZIL: Breakdown  of consolidated  public  sector  revenues  and
expenditures  including  SOEs  are  not available. For  1981-86,  data  on the
nominal  and  operational  PSBR,  interest  payments,  capital  expenditures,  and  net
transfers  are from  C.L.  Martone,  'Fiscal  Policy  and  Stabilization  in  Brazil,"
World  Development  Report  1988  background  paper,  p.28.  Datum  for  1987
operational  PSBR is from  a  World  Bank  source.
CHILE: PSBR  data  and  consolidated  public  sector  revenue  and
expenditure  breakdown  are from  World  Bank  sources.
MEXICO: PSBR  data  and  consolidated  public  sector  revenue  and
expenditure  breakdown  are from  World  Bank  sources.
MOROCCO: PSBR  data  and  consolidated  public  sector  revenue  and
expenditure  breakdown  are  very  limited. Data  used  are from  World  Bank
sources.
PHILIPPINES: PSBR  data  and  consolidated  public  sector  revenue  and
expenditure  breakdown  are  from  World  Bank  sources. Data  on transfers  for- 90  -
these  last  two  years  include  only  transfers  between  the  national  government
and  non-financial  public  enterprises.
YUGOSLAVIA: PSBR  data  and  consolidated  public  sector  revenue  and
expenditure  breakdown  are  from  World  Bank sources.
COLOMBIA: PSBR  data  and  consolidated  public  sector  revenue  and
expenditure  breakdown  are from  World  Bank  sources.
INDONESIA: PSBR  data  and  consolidated  public  sector  revenue  and
expenditure  breakdown  are  unavailable.
KOREA: PSBR  data  and  consolidated  public  sector  revenue  and
expenditure  breakdown  are from  World  Bank  sources. Domestic  interest  is for
central  government  only.
THAILAND: PSBR  data  and  consolidated  public  sector  revenue  and
expenditure  breakdown  are  from  World  Bark  sources.
TURKEY: PSBR  data  are  from  World  Bank  sources. Consolidated  public
sector  revenue  and  expenditure  data  are  not  available,  except  for  investment
spending  and tax  revenues  from  World  Bank sources.
INTEREST  RATES  (Table  6)
Real  interest  rates  are  calculated  from  the  nominal  rates  given  in
the  sources  specified  below  using  the  following  equation:  [(1  + nominal
rate)/(l  +  inflation  rate)  - 1]*100. Nominal  spreads  are  calculated
geometricallys  ((1  +  lending  rate)/(l  +  deposit  rate)-l]*100.  A geometric
average  of either  monthly  or quarterly  rates  is calculated  for  the  nominal
rate.
ARGENTINA: Both  the  nominal  lending  and  deposit  rate  are  from  World
Bank sources. Rates  are  for  a 30-day  term. Government  rates  are  not
available.- 91  -
BRAZILs Nominal  lending  and  deposit  rates  are  from  the  World  Bank
report  Brazil:  A Macroeconomic  Evaluation  of the  Cruzado  Plan,  1987,  p.142.
Lending  rates  are  nominal  overnight  rates  and  deposit  rates  are for  a 30-day
term.  Government  rates  are  from  Morgan  Guaranty,  World  Financial  Markets,
various  issues.  Rates  are  the  average  of  monthly  rates  on three-month  Treasury
bills.
CHILE: Nominal  lending  and  deposit  rates  are  from  World  Bank
sources. Rates  are  average  of rates  on 30-89  day  operations.  Government  rates
are  from  Banco  Central  de  Chile,  Boletin  Mensual. Rates  are  averages  of
monthly  rate  on 30-89  day  maturities.
MEXICO:  Nominal  lending  and  deposit  rates  are  from  International
Financial  Statistics,  IMF. Lending  rates  are  the  weighted  average  of nominal
date  charged  by banks  on  new loans  during  the  month. Deposit  rates  are  on
three-month  fixed  term  deposits.  Government  rates  are  from  Morgan  Guaranty,
World  Financial  Markets,  and  Banco  de  Mexico,  Indicadores  Economicos.  They  are
the  average  of  monthly  rates  on three-month  Federal  T-bills.
MOROCCO: Nominal  lending  and  deposit  rates  are  from  International
Financial  Statistics,  IMF. Government  rates  are  not  available.
PHILIPPINES: Nominal  lending  and  deposit  rates  are  from
International  Financial  Statistics,  IMF.  Lending  rates  are  the  average  rate
of commercial  banks. Deposit  rates  are  on a 61-90  day  term. Government  rates
are  from  Morgan  Guaranty,  World  Financial  Markets,  various  issues. Until  June
1984,  rates  are  average  of  monthly  rate  of 91 day  T-bills. From  July 1984,
rates  refer  to  weighted  interest  on 91  to 183  day  T-bills  sold  to  banks  under
negotiated  basis.
YUGOSLAVIA: Nominal  lending  and  deposit  rates  are from  International
Financial  Statistics,  IMF.  Lending  rates  are  on "short-term"  credits.- 92 -
Deposit  rates  are the  upper  rate  of  margins  on time  deposits  of less  than  12
months. Government  rates  are  not  available.
COLOMBIA: Nominal  lending  and  deposit  rates  until  1985  are  from
International  Financial  Statitics,  IMF,  both for  a 90 day  term. After  1985
rates  are  based  on  World  Bank  sources. Government  rates  are  not available.
INDONESIA: Nominal  lending  and  deposit  rates  are from  World  Bank
sources. Lending  rates  are  the  average  rate  for  private  banks. Deposit  rates
are  on deposits  of less  than  three  months. Government  rates  are  not
available.
KOREA: Nominal  lending  and  deposit  rates  are  from  International
Financial  Statistics,  IMF. The  lending  rate  is the  minimum  rate  charged  on
loans  up to one  year.  Deposit  rates  are  the  maximum  rate  on time  deposits  of
one  year  or  more.  Government  rates  are  from  Morgan  Guaranty,  World  Financial
Markets. Rates  are  for  three-month  T-bills  until  May 1981. As of June  1981
rates  are  on one-month  T-bills  sold  by the  Central  Bank. Government  rates
given  are  December  rates.
THAILAND: Nominal  lending  and  deposit  rates  are from  International
Financial  Statistics,  IP.  -Lending  rates  are  the  maximum  rate  charged  for
export  related  loans.  Deposit  rates  are  the  maximum  rate  on three-to-sis
month  savings  deposits. Government  rates  are from  the  Bank  of Thailand,
Quarterly  Bulletin,  various  issues,  Table  32.  Rates  are  median  of end-of-
year rates  except  for  1987  which  is  median  of July  rates.
TURKEY: Nominal  lending  rates  are  from  World  Bank  sources,  the  terms
are  not specified. Deposit  rates  are from  Internatioral  Financial  Statistics,
IMP.  The  1986  deposit  rate  is from  Morgan  International  Data,  Aug. 1987,
Table  A-27.  Deposit  rates  are  on three-month  time  deposits. Government  rates
for  1985-1987  are  from  World  Bank  sources.- 93 -
CPI  INFLATION  RATES (Table  7)
For  all  countries  data for  Consumer  Price  Indices  (CP1s)  come  from
the  World  Bank's  Economic  and  Social  Database  (BESD).
DOMESTIC  FINANCING  AND  DOMESTIC  FINANCiAL  nows  (Tables  8-12)
Data  on domestic  financing  and  domestic  financial  flows  are  from
International  Financial  Statistics,  IMF. The  IFS  data  allows  the  construcsion
of  a fairly  complete  picture  of domestic  financing  of  public  deficits  through
the  financial  system. The  data include  loans  to local  g.vernments  and  public
enterprises  from  the  financial  system. The  data  also  capture  any  external
financing  that  passed  through  the  financial  system,  such  as foreign  exchange
reserve  changes  and  foreign  loans  of the  central  bank  and  the  rest  of the
financial  system. The  assets  and  loans  of the  private  sector  in the  financial
system  are  also  fully  covered. This  data  thus  allows  us to fill  in  most  of
the  entries  in the  financing  matrix  presented  in  Table  5.
There  are  some  flows  that  cannot  be fully  captured. Direct  sales  of
government  bonds  to the  nonbank  private  sector  are  not included  in  the  IFS.
However,  data  on these  flows  exist  for  Brazil  (Martone)  and  Mexico
(Indicadores  Economicas)  and  this  data  is included  in  the  analysis. Any sales
of government  bonds  that  pass  tr:rough  the  central  bank (e.g.  in  Korea)  are
already  included  in the  IFS  data.
Data  on arrears  to  the  private  sector  (or  domestic  suppliers'  credits
in general)  are  also  generally  lacking. These  may  well  have  been  an important
source  of financing  in some  countries. For  example,  arrears  in  Morocco  are- 94 -
believed  to be  very important. However,  arrears  and  sunplier.'  credits  have
to  be excluded  from  the  analysis  in  this  section.
The  flow-of-funds  exercise  is  also  incomplete  in that  t'.e  IFS  data
are  not reconciled  with the  data  on  direct  foreign  borrowing  of the  public
sector  presented  in  Table  1.  It is  not  possible  to  reconcile  this  data
without  further  information,  since  the  external  debt  data  include  loans  to the
private  sector  or financial  system  which  are  publicly  guaranteed. Further
work is  needed  in this  area  to  perform  a comprehensive  flow-of-funds  analysis
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